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ABSTRACT
An Empirical Analysis of Performance in Principal-Agent Relations
by
Ame Nygaard
Previous empirical research has supported the predictions derived from transaction cost
analysis that asset specificity and complexity entail vertical integration. The underlying
assumption is that integration creates the most efficient organizational formation.
Given the transaction cost theory, that integration caused by market failures due to asset
specificity entails efficiency; this test focus the ability of the principal company to
control opportunism from the economic agents and to reduce transaction costs through
vertical control. Therefore, the empirical question raised here is whether dimensions of
costs can be contract related. This problem has not been studied in previous empirical
analysis. However, the theoretical question makes it crucial to explore a homogeneous
setting where third variables also including asset specificity can be kept relatively
constant. Our intention, therefore, is not to test traditional hypotheses derived from
transaction cost theory, but to explore dimensions of transaction costs and to test the
prediction from the theory that costs associated to the bilateral exchange are related to
the incentive system given by the contract. The test reveals how transaction costs are
related to aspects of the bilateral contract. The bilateral contract is dimensionalized into
structural variables like centralization and formalization and a variable describing the
interactive process. The chosen empirical setting is an oil company (Shell) and its
dealers in the Norwegian gasoline market, representing standardized technology and
products, and trademark specific assets equally distributed among dealers. Both dyadic
and unilateral data are used to test the hypotheses. The results point out the importance
of formal rules and procedures and the scope and magnitude of interactions as efficient
instruments of bilateral contracting. Centralization, though, is related to both control
costs and free-riding costs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Integration Problem
The intention here is to analyze how the nature of the bilateral contract influences
problems and costs related to the cooperation between a company and a dealer.
Contracts may create divergences between the interests of the company and the dealer.
The study explores the cost dimensions related to the principal-agency contract. We also
analyze how the cost dimensions affect interorganizational performance. The core
research problem, though, is how a trademark company can operate a distribution
system more efficiently.
The empirical study analyzes transaction cost theory as a positive economic theory
(Friedman 1953).The test intends to describe the impact of vertical controlon the
nature of transaction costs in a real world context. Williamson (1985) explains
institutional formation by the actors economizing on transaction costs. The transaction
costs are affected by market forces and the technological structure (Chandler 1962, 1977).
Technological complexity and specificity entail market failure and increased vertical
integration.
The distribution channel is analyzed as a principal - agent problem. That is, the
company delegates activities to the agent as well as the rights to use the trademark. The
agent is restricted and governed by the vertical control defined in the contractual
relations (Reve 1980).The company has to coordinate and manage the activities within
the channel in order to organize the most efficient and competitive distribution chain.
The problem is that the information that the company decisions are dependent upon is
asymmetrically distributed between the parties. The dealer probably knows more about
the market context than the principal company. Thus the empirical question is what
kind of contract produces lower costs due to less opportunism resulting from
information impactedness (Williamson 1975). The company invests in trademark
capital that is specific assets with no value outside the company-dealer relationship
(Williamson 1991). Thus, the principal company has to safeguard its specific assets by
vertical control of dealer activities.
8
1.2 The Bilateral Contract
The ex post perspective emphasized here (Williamson 1988) is a consequence of the fact
that real world contracts are incomplete. That is, both parties in the contract have
imperfect information about the future and each other. Incomplete contracts, therefore,
make ex post realignment efforts necessary. Contractual disharmony is reinforced by
vertical control. The contractual relationship legitimates the level of vertical control.
The organizations, therefore, can be seen as a nexus of contracts where the defined
incentives is instrumental to align the conflicting interests of the prindpal-company
and the agent-dealers (Fama and Jensen 1983). The contractual form is supposed to
align efficiency purposes and to promote efficient exchange.
Not only the formal contractual arrangement safeguards the interests of the two parties.
Also, implicit conditions not formulated in the formal contract affect the level of
vertical control. Thus, the vertical control inherent in the bilateral contract is
dimensionalized as the level of centralization, formalization, and interaction. This is
the conventional way of describing the vertical control entailed by the contractual or
administrative relationship.
The main objective of this study is to analyze different dimensions of transaction costs
influenced by the interorganizational form. The intention is to investigate the existence
of the categories of contract-related costs. Therefore, the study explores transaction cost
dimensions as outlined in the transaction cost literature (Williamson 1985) and the
costs of free-riding described in other channelliterature (Hennart 1986,Rubin 1978,
Anderson 1988).These costs are often mentioned as important contractual costs but
have hardly been investigated empirically. We are also interested in how these cost-
dimensions affect performance. The conceptual model includes both economic and
political factors. The dealers are controlled and motivated also by the implicit
contractual system and not only by the formal agreement between the parties.
Information about how contracts may influence different cost-dimensions, provide
valuable input for future contractual design. The study may, therefore, provide
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managerial implications; what kind of contracts are the most efficient instruments in
distribution-strategy?
1.3 Contribution
The intended contribution of the inquiry presented here is the identification of
dimensions of the ex post costs of transactions. The structure of the transaction costs is
analyzed as a function of the bilateral contractual relationship. The goal is to specify the
dimensions of the ex post transaction costs both theoretically and empirically. Problems
related to the internalization of agents have been analyzed as early as Ridgeway (1957)
and later explored by Eccles (1983).However, transaction cost dimensions have almost
never to our knowledge, been analyzed in a formal empirical study before. Although
both Noordewier, John and Nevin (1990),and Walker and Poppo (1991) have provided
input to operationalizations of transaction costs, they have not analyzed the multiple
elements inherent in the concept that is formulated in the literature.
The empirical results support the categorization of transaction costs discussed in
transaction cost literature (Williamson 1988).The empirical analysis also indicated that
these costs dimensions are related to the nature of vertical control in the bilateral
contract and the level of opportunism. Formalization and the magnitude of interaction
have positive effects on the dyadic climate (opportunism) and reduce costs as well as
increase dyadic performance. This observation contradicts John's (1984) empirical
results from the same industry. On the other hand, the impact of centralization is
mixed. Hierarchical decision making has positive or no effects on cost dimensions.The
results presented here are consistent with Reve (1980), and indicate that formalization
and centralization can be viewed as alternative governance structures.
Methodological contribution in the study is twofold. First, the development of multi-
item constructs of transaction costs dimensions may provide valuable input to future
empirical research. Secondly, the three-step methodological approach, unilateral
analysis, dyadic analysis and final structural model tests, may be fruitful when dyadic
data is needed as is the situation when the focal dyad is the level of analysis. Dyadic data
analysis is used to specify the measurement model before final testing of structural
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relationships. Thus, the methodological approach presented here, provides better data
than a one sided test. Also the three step approach produces a retest of the measurement
modelon another sample.
1.4 Outline of the Study
The first part of the study contrasts previous research based on the transaction cost
paradigm to the specific context of the principal-agent problem. Chapter 2 directs the
transaction cost tradition in the channel literature to the integration problem of
effective contracting. The conceptual model presented in chapter 3, describes the basic
theory and the causal relations based on the transaction cost literature. The model also
comprises contractual cost dimensions. Based on the conceptual model, hypotheses
from the transaction cost literature were derived, operationalizations and measures
were developed and instruments were presented in chapter 6. The empirical analysis
presented in Chapter 7 is a three step analysis approach instrumental to design the
measurement model. The first step is the preliminary unilateral analysis, followed by
dyadic data analysis where the measurement model is designed. The final stage is the
test of the structural model presented in chapter 8. Chapter 9 presents limitations and
implications from the presented empirical research followed by conclusions in chapter
10.
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2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Transaction costs have almost never been measured directly (Day and Klein 1987).The
difficulty in quantifying transaction costs is due to the fact that these costs reflect
consequences of alternative institutional structures (Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990). If
this is the case, what we expect to find here is that transaction costs are equally
distributed among the dealers. On the other hand, it can be argued that only efficient
markets, where information about all possible alternatives is available to the principal,
are able to produce clear cut alternatives to hierarchical structures and to produce
efficient governance structures (Alehian 1950).Transaction cost literature emphasizes
however, that market failures due to asset specificity motivates integration because of
the costs of organization of bilateral exchange. The theory focuses on equilibrium
phases of organizational development. The adaptive process studied here, do not test
the relationship between transaction characteristica and organization. Instead we
underline the ex post process of bilateral exchange and the on-going process of vertical
control following the bilateral contract. Although, our theoretical perspective draws the
lines from the transaction costs framework, we intend to analyze the ex post process of
vertical control intended to reduce costs. The ex post position, according to Williamson
(1988),also focuses transaction costs. The process of realignment of incomplete ex ante
contracts makes dimensions of transaction costs observable and possible to investigate
empirically.
As noted in chapter 1, the transaction is the basic unit of analysis in transaction cost
theory (Williamson 1985). Therefore, the contracted relationship between the two
parties in the transaction becomes essential. The design of the bilateral contract reflects
the intention to safeguard the interests of both parties. However, the contract in a
principal-agent relationship is offered by the principal company in a market for agents
(Fama and Jensen 1983).
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2.1 The Transaction Cost Approach
The contractual relationship may affect the company-dealer dyad in several ways. The
concept of the bilateral contract includes all aspects of the relationship, not only the
attributes of the formal explicit contract. The agent agrees to obey the directions defined
in the contract within specified limits (Coase 1937). Contracts regulate these bilateral
governance structures and restricts the organization of transactions between the
principal and the agent. The contractual relationship, however, can be described by the
time perspective. Transaction cost theory distinguishes the ex ante from the ex post
perspective (Williamson 1985). The ex ante contract is given by the existing formal
arrangements between the principal company and the dealer, while the ex post
perspective is related to the on-going process of vertical control. Here, consistent with
the focus in transaction cost theory (Williamson 1988)we address the ex post issues of
contracting.
Ex post vertical control is a manifestation of the rational managerial belief in reduced
opportunism, increased ability to coordinate, easier access to neutral information and
reduced costs of bilateral organization of transactions. According to the theory, the costs
of transactions are reduced by increased vertical control (Williamson 1981, 1985) given
specific assets. The company is interpreted as one economic unit where both the
company and the dealer have clear, unambiguous and convergent goals and a uniform
strategy defined in the dyadic contract.
The organization responds to the level of transaction costs. Even at a high level of
economies of scale there are no incentives to integrate if no specific assets exist (Riordan
and Williamson 1988). Even scale economies, according to Riordan and
Williamson(1988) can be bought cheaper in the market. High transaction costs due to
asset specificity, can only be reduced through vertical control and hierarchical
structures, given asset specificity. Increased vertical control makes it possible to design
the most efficient organizational relationship with the dealer. Alternative
organizational forms are evaluated in terms of relative level of transaction costs.
Interorganizational relations take several alternative forms. The principal may choose
to internalize the agent in the hierarchy or use contracts that respond to the need for
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external control. Ownership is, however, only a formal governance structure. Between
the two archetypes of transaction-governance structures, the hierarchy and the perfect
market exchange, there exist a continuum of contractual relations between principals
and agents. These contractual relations are also characterized by dimensions other than
the ownership structure, i.e., the degree of centralization, formalization and interaction.
According to transaction cost theory, the potentiallevel of transaction costs defines the
motives to build efficient institutional structures. Therefore, the institutional form is
described as an "efficient boundary" (Williamson 1985). As we can see from figure 2.1,
the organization of transactions is a question about the costs of coordinating market
(Mfk) exchange versus the relative costs of hybrid (Xfk) or hierarchical exchange
(Hfkj). The heuristic model presented in figure 2.1 shows that when asset specificity
k-ckj, the market is the most efficient governance structure, for kt<k<k2' hybrid forms
are more efficient, and when lok2the internal hierarchy is more efficient. Transaction
costs economics focuses on the comparative costs of governance. The object of the
analysis is the contractual structure relative to alternative organizational forms
(Williamson 1991).
M(k)
~ X(k)s
U H(k)
~
fa Hierarchy
~
~
L'
o k1
Asset Specificity
k
Fig. 2.1 Costs of alternative governance structures as a function of asset specificity
(Williamson 1991).
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The transaction cost approach focuses on economically motivated behavior. This
behavior is connected to the self interest seeking activities within the bilateral dyad.
Both parties have two basic interests. First, there is a conflict between the two sides
regarding the distribution of welfare. Second, the two parties are interested in
cooperation through maintenance of the bilateral cooperation in the distribution
channel as long as it is profitable. Thus, it is the contradiction between private and
common interests that produces contractual costs. The best option is the alternative
where private and common interests converge. The first best solution is produced by
the transaction costs economizing process.
2.2 The Structure of Transaction Costs
The company always loses welfare by using independent dealers (agents) because they
are rather independent decision units that maximize their share of the welfare based on
their own private interests instead of the interests of both parties in the transaction
(lensen and Meckling 1976). However, the principal company uses agents because it
receives offsetting benefits by contracting sales activities to the independent dealer.
Anticipated better sales performance and cost-effectiveness are arguments for delegating
rights to use the trademark. The total costs of transactions have to be carried by the
entire distribution system and covered by the end-user price. Costs associated with the
cooperative efforts between the company and the dealer are referred to as transaction
costs. That is costs determined by the organization model of distribution. Transaction
costs are friction costs in the economic system (Arrow 1969).These contract related costs
are due to two factors. The first is the monitoring, enforcing and writing of the
contractual restrictions accepted by the agent. The second relates to costs produced by
suboptimal behavior and ineffective coordination of interorganizational activities. This
empirical study is a preliminary test of ex post transaction cost dimensions related to the
nature of vertical control.
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2.3 The Dimensions of Contract Related Costs
According to the channel literature, these costs are produced by the incentives inherent
in the contractual structure (Stem and Reve 1980,Williamson 1985). Ex post contract
related costs can be grouped into two basic categories: 1) transaction costs (Williamson
1985)2) costs of free-riding (Rubin 1978). The ex post contract related costs are produced
after the relationship between the parties have been established by the formal
contractual arrangements. The ex post transaction costs, therefore, are related to the ex
post contract determined by the vertical control.
Ex post transaction costs affect cash flow directly. These costs are carried by the
distribution system because of negotiations with the dealers, inadequate coordination of
the distribution system, monitoring and maladaption costs due to inadequate and
incomplete "ex ante" bilateral contracts. Transaction costs are costs related to
administration activities: monitoring systems, accounting and control systems, as well
as costs entailed by conflicts, cooperation and coordination misalignment (Williamson
1985).They are categorized into three groups: 1) bargaining costs 2) control and
monitoring costs and 3) maladaption costs (Williamson 1985:22, 1988).
Also, transaction cost analysis in the channelliterature have focused on the process of
negotiating, information gathering, and monitoring performance (Dwyer and Oh 1985).
These three dimensions of coordinating activities that entail costs are frequently
mentioned in the transaction cost literature.
Bargaining is related to the polity in the channel environment. The administration of
interorganizational activities includes modifications of the contractual relationship.
When the dynamic environment or new information about the two parties in the
transaction changes the basis for the ex ante contractual relation, bargaining is necessary
in order to safeguard the interests of both parties in the transaction. Thus, bargaining
activities are focused on the process of realignment of interests.
1) Bargaining costs are induced by conflicts and ex post renegotiation of the
bilateral contract. These costs are related to the efficiency of the bargaining
process intended to align the bilateral interests.
16
Monitoring problems play an important role in theories of agency (Fama and Jensen
1983). When the principal company and the agent agree to cooperate ex ante, it is also
necessary to monitor that the intentions defined in the contract are respected by both
parties' ex post. Ex post control activities are related to the determination of the value
of the transaction.
2) Control and monitoring costs reflect the resources spent to monitor
whether transactions are consistent with the principal-agent contract.
Imperfect information or information impactedness is one of the most important
features of the principal-agency relationship (Jensen and Meckling 1976,Reve 1986,
Williamson 1975). Inconsistent with traditional economics, the parties are faced with
information systems that are unable to provide necessary and valid input to the
decision process. Maladaption costs refer to the production of imperfect and invalid
information. In a principal-agency context, imperfect information may be even more
important because the principal have licensed activities to the agent. As a result, the
agent is in a superior position to evaluate the activities delegated to him. Maladaption
costs, therefore, are of key importance to the principal.
3) Maladaption costs represent communication and coordination failures
between the two parties in the contract. These costs reflect resources used to
produce information that is not absorbed by the other part of the transaction.
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2.4 Costs of Free-Riding
Free-riding costs, according to Williamson (1985) have transaction cost origin. That is,
costs of free-riding are associated to the incentive system defined in the bilateral
contract. The problem of free-riding also can be related to the principal's investments
in trademark-specific capital (Williamson 1985). When the principal-company
delegates decisions under the trademark, it might be exploited by agents that maximize
their own private interests.
Costs of free-riding do not directly affect the single agent's cash flow in the short term.
But the costs of free-riding influence the business of all other trademark agents. Like ex
post transaction costs, these costs are also caused by, or vary with, the way the company
chooses to organize the contractual relationship with the dealer. Costs of free-riding are
produced by conflicts of interests between the trademark company and each single
dealer. One of the most important contract related costs in trademark chains is the cost
of free-riding (Rubin 1978, Klein 1980, Hennart 1986). Because each dealer utilizes the
marketing profile and the trademark image of the company, there is a potential
externality problem of free-riding. The marketing profile, product style and design of
the trademark chain signals and guarantees standardized service and product quality.
Trademark chains may therefore be described as an institutional response to quality
uncertainty (Akerlof 1970). The trademark company carries the quality risk due to sales
of inferior goods and reduced service quality from the dealers. Therefore, the
trademark company demands that the dealer must purchase company products in order
to operate his business associated with the trademark. The trademark profile is related
to the product itself. Thus, the company has to enforce the standard quality of the
product offered by the dealer and related to the trademark.
The trademark company invests heavily in marketing and promotion in order to
achieve quality reputation. This is investments in specific trademark assets with no
alternative value in the market (Williamson 1991). At the same time, the dealer may be
interested in reducing quality profile efforts and costs and instead concentrate only on
sales activities. The outcome is service equipment in poor condition, dirty restrooms
and shops, incompetent and impolite staff, no non-sales trademark profile activities,
etc. The free-riding costs are caused by the fact that single dealers may degrade the value
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of the trademark image in the market, but simultaneously increase their own welfare
(Davidson 1982).The negative consequences of this suboptimalization must be carried
by all the other trademark dealers and the principal company.
Conclusively, it is possible to draw lines from the literature that discusses problems and
costs related to the bilateral contract. Figure 2.2 summarizes contractual costs such as the
cost dimensions derived from transaction cost theory and the free-riding costs discussed
in related literature.
Transaction Costs Externality Costs
Bargaining Costs
Costs of Free-RidingControl Costs
Maladaption Costs
l I
+
Contractual Costs
Fig. 2.2 Ex post contract related costs.
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2.5 Transaction Cost Approach; Empirical
Evidence
In general, empirical studies of the integration problem based on the transaction cost
perspective have largely supported ifs predictions. Table 2.1 below presents a selection
of the most cited empirical studies. None of these studies have focused on the cost
structure directly. Instead, they have analyzed the relationships between the
characteristics of transaction and institutional form Asset specificity, uncertainty and
small numbers bargaining have been used as conventional proxies for the level of
transaction costs.
For instance, Acheson (1985)studied the contractual forms in the Maine lobster market.
His study showed how private long term arrangements between suppliers and buyers
safeguarded the parties against the horizon of opportunism and uncertainty. The
results were consistent with the transaction cost framework.
Anderson (1985) investigated make or buy decisions in electric component companies.
Only two of her seven proxies for asset specificity produced results in the predicted
direction. One measure, loyalty between the sales person and the customer, was
negativelyand significantly related to integration. Anderson (1988), though, still using
data from the electronics manufacturers, strongly supported hypotheses from the
transaction cost theory that opportunism increases when asset specificity increases. In
addition, her investigation indicated that monitoring problems become difficult when
agents are less integrated. Anderson and Coughlan (1987)explored the choice of
distribution channels in foreign markets by U.S. semiconductor companies. They
found that integration was related to the degree of transaction specificity. This was
consistent with the study conducted by Anderson and Schmittlein (1984). The results
supported the prediction derived from the transaction costs framework that specificity
affected the level of integration. Other studies have applied other proxies for asset
specificity.
Armour and Teece (1980) tested whether R&D expenditures affected vertical
integration. In their data from the petroleum industry during the 1954-75period, they
found a positive association between R&D expenditures and vertical integration. This
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evidence supported the transaction cost approach argument that hierarchy safeguards
against potential opportunistic hold-up when investments in specific assets is the case.
Also Caves and Bradburd (1988)in a cross sectional study using data from 83 industries
supported transaction cost explanations that asset specificity determined the level of
vertical integration. Davidson and McFetridge (1984)tested how asset specificity affected
integration in 32 U.S. based multinational companies during the period of 1945-1975.
They found that newer and more advanced technology was more likely to be
transferred internally. The results, therefore, support the transaction cost framework.
Gatignon and Anderson (1988)applied transaction cost analysis in a multinational
corporation context. They used data from 1267foreign entries by American
multinational corporations. Their results strongly indicate that vertical control is
associated with the level of proprietary content of products and processes. However,
their conclusion was that transaction cost theory is useful, but not the only perspective
that had explanatory power.
In their analysis of the vertical structure in 30 forest product firms Globerman and
Schwindt (1986) found that asset specificity affected the level of vertical integration. The
nature of the technology in logging, pulping and paper making strongly determined the
governance structure in the downstream chain.
Also the investigation by Goldberg and Erickson (1987)of 90 petroleum coke contracts
supported predictions from transaction cost theory. The long term contractual
arrangements reflected the need to reduce potential ex post opportunistic behavior.
Hennart (1988) explored the structural differences between the tin and aluminium
market. High level of specificity in the aluminium industry increased the level of
integration. Tin industry, though, is not so integrated due to more standardized
technology. His conclusions, therefore, were consistent with predictions derived from
transaction cost theory.
John and Weitz (1988) tested transaction cost hypotheses in forward integration into
distribution. The level of asset specificity needed to support distribution activities were
associated to the level of integration. Their data from 87 industrial firms indicated that
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both behavioral and environmental uncertainty affected integration in the predicted
direction.
[oskow (1988) analyzed 277 coal contracts. He found that the contracts safeguarded the
parties against ex post opportunistic behavior. His other study (Joskow 1987) also
analyzed data from contracts between the coal industryand electric utilities. Here, he
investigated 300 coal contracts. The results strongly supported the hypotheses that asset
specificity is related to long term contracts. When the parties invest in specific assets,
they will tend to tie down the terms of exchange in long term contracts.
Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990) studied integration in an international market context.
A test based on data from 510 Canadian export firms supported the hypothesis that asset
specificity is related positively to the level of channel integration. On the other hand,
contrary to expectations derived from the transaction cost perspective, the impact of
uncertainty is mixed and production cost theory is strongly supported.
In a cross sectional study using data from 69 firms, Levy (1985) found an association
between the concentration of firms in the industry and the level of vertical integration.
His study also supported other transaction cost hypotheses, that uncertainty and
research intensity affected integration. MacDonald (1985) studied shipments from 79
manufacturing industries. Consistent with Levy (1985), MacDonald (1985) provided
supportive indications that specificity and small numbers bargaining affected vertical
integration.
Also MacMillan, Hambrick and Pennings (1986) inspected cross sectional data. The
setting was consumer, capital and component manufacturing firms. They tested the
hypotheses that volume uncertainty and asset specificity caused backward integration.
Both hypotheses were supported.
Masten (1984) explored the relationship between specific design and site specific capital
and integration. In his study from 1887 component specifications in the aerospace
industry he found that asset specificity and complexity increased the likelihood of
integration. His test produced strong backing to the transaction cost framework.
Monteverde and Teece (1982a) tested the phenomenon of backward integration in Ford
and GM. Their test included data from 133 automotive components. The test indicated
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significantly that human asset specificity affected integration. The degree of application
engineering was used as a proxy for human asset specificity. Also in the other test
Monteverde and Teece (1982b) analyzed component procurement in the auto industry.
The investigation showed that quasi-rents affected the governance structure in the
direction predicted by the transaction cost theory. In their test, however, quasi-rents
explained only 12 % of variation in assembler ownership of tooling.
Mulherin (1986) investigated the organization of distribution between gas producers
and pipeline owners during the period 1940-1954. The empirical evidence indicated
that asset specificity plays a significant role in explaining integration. He also tested
other hypotheses, but found that the transaction cost framework had the strongest
explanatory power.
Palay (1984) analyzed 51 contracts between rail-freight carriers and shippers. He studied
how asset specificity influenced the agreements between the parties. The test supported
the transaction cost hypothesis that the contractual structure reflected the need to
safeguard investments in specific assets. Palay (1985) again supported transaction cost
explanations in his analysis based on the same data. The studies conducted by Palay
(1984, 1985) are particularly important contributions in the understanding of contractual
relations in regulated industries.
Walker and Weber (1984) studied 60 make or buy decisions in an American automobile
company. Their study produced mixed support for transaction cost theory. Production
costs had a stronger impact on the governance structure. On the other hand, both
volume uncertainty and supplier market competition had small but significant impact
on the make or buy decision.
Although a number of studies supports the relationship between asset specificity and
integration, some empirical analyses of the agency problem have produced doubt about
the predictive power of transaction cost theory (Williamson 1985:116). Studies
conducted by Walker and Weber (1984) and Anderson (1985) in typical principal-agent
settings have provided empirical evidence critical to predictions derived from
transaction cost theory. The empirical focus chosen in this research builds on the doubt
presented there. In addition, agency theorists have previously emphasized the need for
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more empirical work on the principal-agency problem (Arrow 1985, Holmstrom and
Tirole 1989).
Overall, the majority of empirical studies supports the prediction that asset specificity,
uncertainty, and small numbers bargaining break down coordination between actors in
the market and stimulate internalization of exchanges. The tests presented here (see
table 2.1), indicate that in-house transactions are based on more specialized assets than
transactions between independent parties. However, none of these studies inspected the
direct effect of institutional differences on transaction cost efficiency. The studies are
based on a strategic rationality assumption that integration in market failure situations
was intended to reduce the costs of transactions (Elster 1982).The implicit belief is that
integration creates ex post bilateral efficiency and effectiveness. The situation, therefore,
reflects a need for research intended to investigate transaction costs more directly. That
is to explore the facets of the ex post transaction costs by developing multi-item proxies
instead of using specificity and uncertainty as transaction cost proxies. In addition, the
previous empirical research is based on one-sided data that may exclude important
information necessary to describe bilateral contractual relations. Also previous research
may reflect a lack of a robust ceteris paribus research design, where all other factors than
the level of vertical control can be kept relatively constant. Prior research has applied
data from rather heterogeneous organizations or heterogeneous products. In addition,
empirical studies based on the transaction cost perspective have used the same data to
specify the measures and to test the structural model (Churchill 1979).
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SE'ITING JOURNAL THEORETICAL EMPIRIC
PREDICI10N SUPPORT
Acheson, J Lobster Market Journal of Law Quasi- +
Contracts Ec.andOrg. integration
1985 Uncertainty
Anderson, E. 13 el. Marketing Specificity -/+
component Science 1985 Integration
man.
Anderson, E. 169 elect. Journal of Ec. Integration +
manufact. Behavior and Opportunism
Org.1988
Anderson, E. & 36US Journal of Specificity +
Coughlan, A. Semicond Marketing 1987 Integration
Companies
Anderson, E. & El. compo Rand Journal Specificity +
Schmittiein, D. industry of Economics Integration
1984
Armour, H. & Petroleum Rev. of Ec. and Integration +
Teece, D. industry St.198O R&D-
performance
Caves, R. & Cross-sectional Journal of Ec. Specificity +
Bradburd, R. Behavior and Integration
Org.1988
Davidson, W. 32US Journal of Integration +
& McFetridge, Multinationals Industrial Specificity
D. Economics 1984
Gatignon, H. & 180largestUS Journal of Law Specificity -r-
Anderson, E. Multinationals Ec.andOrg. Integration
1988
Globerman, S. 30 large Forest Journal of Ec. Specificity +
& Schwindt, R. product comp, Behavior and Integration
Org.1986
Goldberg, V. & 90 Petro coke Journal of Law Specificity +
Erickson, J. contracts and Economics Quasi-
1987 integration
Hennart, J. Aluminum Journal of Ec. Specificity +
and Tin Market Behavior and Integration
Org.1988
Table 2.1 Selected previous empirical research based on a transaction cost perspective.
25
SElTING JOURNAL THEORETICAL EMPIRIC
PREDICTION SUPPORT
John, G. & 87 Ind. firms Journal of Law Specificity +
Weitz, B. Ec.andOrg. Integration
1988
[oskow, P. 300 coal Journal of Law Specificity +
contracts and Economics Quasi-
1988 integration
[oskow, P. 277 coal American Specificity +
contracts Econ. Review Quasi-
1987 integration
Klein, S. 375 Can. expo Journal of Uncertainty +/-
Frazier, G. & firms Marketing Specificity
Roth, V. cross sect. Research 1990 Integration
Levy,D. 69 firms Reviewof Small numbers +
37 industries Economics and integration
Stat. 1985
MacDonald, J. 79 manuf. Reviewof Small numbers +
industries Economics and integration
Stat. 1985
MacMillan, I Cross-sect. Organisational Specificity +
Hambrick, D. & Studies 1982 Integration
Pennings, J
Masten, S. Aerospace Journal of Law Integration +
Industry and Economics Specificity
1984
Monteverde, K. GM and Ford Journal of Law Specificity weak, but sign.
& Teece, D. and Economics Quasi-
1984 integration
Monteverde, K. Automobile Bell Journal of Specificity +
& Teece, D. Industry Economics 1982 Quasi-
integration
Mulherin, J. Gas Industry Journal of Law Specificity +
contracts Ec.andOrg. Integration
1986
Palay, T. Rail Freight Journal of Specificity +
market Legal Studies Quasi-
1984 integration
Palay, T. Rail Freight Journal of Law Specificity +
market Ec. andOrg. Quasi-
1985 integration
Walker, G. & US Automobile ASQ 1984 Uncertainty weak, but sign.
Weber, D. company Integration
Table 2.1 (Continued) Selected empirical work based on the transaction cost perspective.
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3. THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL
The elements and relations of the conceptual model will be specified and discussed in
this chapter. The conceptual model organizes the theoretical elements for empirical
testing. The elements (see figure 3.1 below) that describe the theoretical framework of
transaction cost approach are, vertical control, opportunism, transaction costs and
performance.
- +- Opportunism ..Vertical Control Hl H3 Transaction Costs
• Centralization • Bargaining Costs
• Formalization • Control Costs
• Interaction • Maladaption Costs- • Free-Riding Costs..
H2
- + H4
Performance
• Effectiveness
·Effiåency
Fig.3.l The structure of the conceptual model and the hypothesized effects.
We assume that the company intend to reduce costs and opportunism by implementing
vertical control. In free markets where all information is available and free contracting
is possible, vertical control is not necessary in order to reduce opportunism and costs. It
is first after the free market mechanism is replaced by an ex ante (incomplete) contract
that the company has to exeråse control to safeguard the interests of the distribution
system. We therefore model vertical control as the independent variable affecting
opportunism and transaction costs. Also, we anticipate that vertical control and
perceived opportunism come before transaction costs. Transaction costs are affected
directly by the level of bilateral trust and openness. The reason is that the level of
rr-mness (opportunism) probably will affect the amount of resources that is used to
align the relationship through bargaining and control as well as the suboptimal
behavior of free-riding and maladaption. Vertical control in the model affects the
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transaction costs directly. Finally, we expect costs to affect the level of bilateral
performance.
Vertical control is dimensionalized as centralization, formalization and interaction.
Contract-related costs are categorized into bargaining costs, control costs, maladaption
costs and free-riding costs. Performance is divided into interorganizational performance
(effectiveness) and profitability (efficiency). The hypotheses are derived from the
conceptual model presented in figure 3.1. The hypotheses are discussed in chapter 4.
The power relationship between the principal company and each retail dealer is highly
asymmetrical (Heide and John 1988).Agents may be hired and fired, and they may be
exposed to new contractual incentives. The company (principal) chooses the
interorganizational fonn in response to ex ante anticipated transaction costs. The
principal-agent problem after the formal contract is established ex ante, is to design
efficient vertical control. Vertical control makes the agents behave in the interest of the
company at the lowest level of ex post transaction costs. The empirical analysis
presented in this study focuses on the process of dyadic vertical exchange between the
principal - company and the agent/dealer. In order to analyze the problem, two
important relations are described: the potential opportunism initiated by the ex post
contract (vertical control), and how the contract affects the dimensions of transaction
costs. The ex post contract is described by various aspects of vertical control. Transaction
climate is characterized by the potential opportunism related to the dyadic exchange.
The concept of contractual costs includes multiple dimensions of the costs of bilateral
organization. Therefore, the model comprises both the political (opportunism) as well
as the economic aspects (contractual costs and performance) of the dyad.
The political-economy framework that is used here, focuses on the interaction between
economic and socio-political aspects inherent in the transaction. The political-economy
framework (Stem and Reve 1980) has been explored in several empirical studies Gohn
1984, Dwyer and Welsh 1985, Anderson and Weitz 1986,Reve and Stem 1986,Reve
1986,Heide and John 1988).The modeloffers the advantage of analyzing how both
vertical control and oppo+n-usm affect transaction costs. At the same time, it is possible
to analyze how the contract directly affects the level of opportunism and transaction
costs. The political - economy framework is applied because we want to explore the
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dimensions of transaction costs from both social and contractual (vertical control)
angles.
3.1 Dimensions of Vertical Control
The conceptual model describes vertical control by three dimensions: interaction,
formalization and centralization (Reve 1980).Vertical control is determined both by
process and by structural aspects of the bilateral contract (Van de Ven 1976,Lehman
1975). Structural dimensions can be characterized by the level of centralization and
formalization. The process dimension of the contract is described by the level of
interaction. Vertical interactions characterize the frequency of exchange and the
magnitude of interaction between the agent and the principal. These interactions are
vertical flows of resources and info~ation within the distribution channel dyad (Van
de Ven 1976).
Formalization of transactions can be described by the rules, fixed policies, restrictions
and the procedures that govern the interorganizational flows (Stern and Reve 1980).
Centralization refers to the extent to which one of the two parties in the relationship
has concentrated the power to make and implement decisions on his own (Marrett
1971, Aldrich 1976,Van de Ven and Ferry 1979).
A number of studies has dimensionalized vertical control into centralization,
formalization and interaction (Dahlstrom 1990,Dwyer and Welsh 1985,Dwyer and Oh
1987,1988,John 1984, John and Martin 1984,John and Reve 1982, Phillips 1982, Reve
1980, Spekman and Stem 1979). Some of these studies have applied a more narrow
concept of interaction called participation (i.e., Dahlstrom 1990,Dwyer and Oh 1987,
1988) defined as the degree of input to interorganizational decisions. Because of our
more exploratory profile, we have chosen to follow the broader conceptual basis offered
by Reve (1980). Still, the concept of participation is included in the concept of
interaction. We, therefore, assume that the three-dimensional space of centralization,
formalization, and interaction picture the extent te ~,·':ticha market relationship has
been replaced by an administrative relationship (John and Reve 1982).
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3.2 The Concept of Opportunism
Williamson (1975)stressed that the level of transaction costs not only could be predicted
from transaction specific investments but also from climate factors surrounding the
transaction. Later, Stem and Reve (1980) emphasized that the interaction between
economic and socio-political factors, e.g. , opportunism, produces costs and affects
performance. Opportunism reflects the lack of mutual trust In the transaction cost
literature, the concept of opportunism has been defined as self-interest seeking behavior
with guile (Williamson 1985:47).Opportunism arises when the principal has imperfect
information about agent behavior (Anderson 1988) and there is information
impactedness between the parties. The essence of opportunism is the potential deceit of
promises defined in the bilateral contract (John 1984).The opposite situation is
produced when the two parties feel that the other shares neutral information relevant
to the dyadic exchange(Reve and Stem 1986). This kind of openness and trust may
alleviate the fear of emerging opportunism (Bradach and Eccles 1989).
In the free markets where all information is available and switching costs are minor,
opportunism is not a problem that affects the costs of realizing the exchange. Both
parties are able to choose among a large number of alternative buyers and suppliers.
The phenomenon of opportunism is not absent in free markets, but have no cost-
driving consequences. Whenever opportunism is detected, a new partner can be found
costlessly among the large number alternatives. Specific investments in trademark
assets, equipment, sites etc. entail a need to safeguard the interests of the principal
company against opportunism. We, therefore, argue that vertical control is associated
to the level of opportunism. Vertical control is the safeguarding tool operated by the
principal company. In frictionless markets, the appearance of opportunism does not
affect transaction costs. However, in relations where asset specificity is present,
opportunism is costly. We, therefore, assume in our model that opportunism is
related to the cost structure.
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3.3 Contractual Costs
In this study, the concept of contract related costs refer to what is called "ex post" costs
that is the contractual focus in the transaction cost literature (Williamson 1988). Costs
carried by both the principal and the agent in order to organize exchange can be
included in the concept of transaction costs. In other words, transaction costs are caused
by governance of interorganizational activities. The amount of such friction costs
depends on how difficult it is for the parties in the exchange relationship to make an
agreement (Ulrich and Barney 1984) and how difficult it is to measure performance.
Williamson (1985) divides transaction costs into the categories of "ex ante" and "ex.
post" types. "Ex ante" transaction costs consist of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding
an agreement. The "ex post" costs take several forms: maladaption costs, costs incurred
if bilateral efforts are made to correct ex post misalignments, the set-up and running
costs assoctated with the governance structures to which disputes are referred and the
bonding costs of effecting secure commitments (Williamson 1985:21, 1988).
The contractual form is designed after having analyzed the opportunity costs of
alternative governance structures (Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990). Transaction costs
analysis, therefore, emphasizes comparisons of transaction costs among alternative
contractual arrangements (Williamson 1991). Thus, we want to explore the ex post
transaction costs entailed by vertical control. Since the contract is designed to promote
efficient exchange, transaction costs are associated to vertical control in the model. In
order to enrich the transaction cost analysis, we have dimensionalized contract-related
costs as presented previously in chapter 2.3.
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3.4 Dimensions of Performance
There is a lack of consensus in the literature about interorganizational performance
assessment. Some transaction cost analysts, however, have argued that performance
may be indicated through the dimensions of transaction cost-effectiveness (Noordewier,
John and Nevin 1990).
The model focuses the attributes of interorganizational performance. Performance,
often is dirnensionalized into both effectiveness and efficiency (Stern and EI-Ansary
1988). Interorganizational effectiveness is referred to as the successfulness of
interorganizational activities that produces output that can meet demand in the
market. Thus, we have established a performance concept that reflect the performance
of such cooperative efforts in the distribution system like marketing activities, training
and courses, and management and control. The problem is that it is no quantitative
measures of effectiveness. In order to produce insights about the association between
transaction costs and effectiveness, we have developed multiple perceptual measures
describing the concept. In the empirical model, we assume that successfulness of
cooperative activities are affected by the costs to administer such activities and the
failure costs of free-riding and rnaladaption. Transaction costs, like production costs,
represent a welfare effect in the distribution system. That is, the costs either reduce the
level of performance or indirectly reduce other costs that affect performance.
Channel system efficiency is an input to output measure. Therefore, efficiency is
described as the added value produced by the interorganizational activities. Transaction
costs, we assume, have a direct or indirect impact on the financial result.
In the next chapter we will derive hypothesis based on the structural relationship
between the concepts presented in this chapter. The operative measures of the
presented concepts are presented in chapter 6.
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4. HYPOTHESES
This chapter discusses the structural relationships in the conceptual model presented in
figure 3.1. The hypotheses are summarized at the end of the chapter and in table 4.1.
The main focus in the transaction cost approach is on the costs of organizing and
operating interrelationships between economic actors. The implicit belief is that the
level of costs caused by opportunism and suboptimal behavior within a distribution
system can be reduced by increased vertical control and integration. That is, we assume
that the actors in a complex world intend to be rational. However, the empirical context
might be in a process where efficient organizational boundaries have not yet been
formed. The empirical focus of this investigation is the elements of contractual costs
and how these costs relate to the structure of vertical control.
The transaction cost perspective predicts effectiveness from the organizational form.
The organizational form reflects the anticipation of the level of future transaction costs.
High "ex ante" anticipated transaction costs relative to alternative institutional forms
initiate a higher degree of "ex post" vertical control. Transaction costs stem from
potential opportunism and the structure of vertical control defined in the bilateral
contract.
The assumption here is not that existing contractual arrangements minimize the sum
of transaction costs. The intention is to examine how dimensions of transaction costs
can be related to social (opportunism) and contractual aspects (vertical control) of the
bilateral relationship. Therefore, we have applied a political-economy framework that
also includes ~pportunism as a social dimension related to the dyadic exchange. In the
model, opportunism is not a given underlying assumption, but a variable that can be
studied empirically.
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4.1 Centralization, Opportunism and Contract-
Related Costs
High asset specificity, e.g. , trademark assets, creates incentives for the principal
company to safeguard its interests by increased vertical control (Williamson 1985).
Vertical control reduces the potential for opportunistic behavior from the agent.
According to transaction cost theory, opportunism and conflicts can be controlled by
employing more centralized contracts. Looser connections, given uncertainty and
specific investments, can increase the incentives for suboptimalization and the loss of
welfare within the distribution system.
Consequently, increased vertical control is a response to high anticipated costs of
coordination, management and control activities, maladapted contracts and free-riding.
The rational principal company responds to high anticipated costs and uncertainty in
order to gain more profits and better performance. The rational belief is that
centralization leads to better coordination, control and lower transaction costs (Ruekert,
Walker and Roering 1985). Following the argument from transaction cost theory,
centralization may increase both the ability to coordinate efficiently and the potential to
safeguard interests in the market. Thus, hierarchical decision-making leads to
consistency between the strategic and operational decision levels and convergent goals
between the company and the dealer-agent. Conclusively, we expect that centralization
is negatively related to both opportunism and cost dimensions.
4.2 Formalization, Opportunism and Contract-
Related Costs
Formal rules and regulations restrict the ex post behavior. Although, all ex ante formal
arrangements are incomplete and will drift out of alignment ex post, they also create
stability. Formalism determines the goal congruency in the dyad. The parties know
what they can expect from each other in the future. Formalization, therefore, reduces /
the potential for suboptimal conflicts. Explicit formal contracts are more resistant to
turbulent environmental conditions. Therefore, formalization may work as a stable
framework that makes it easier for both parties to make rlms and to reduce uncertainty.
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This aspect may be especially important to the agent that is often considered to be risk
averse in the principal-agency literature (Eisenhart 1989). The agent is risk averse
because it is difficult or impossible for him to diversify. Heide and John (1988)provided
evidence that agents were able to reduce risk by offsetting investments. We assume
though, that the parties prefer decreased uncertainty that may be provided by increased
formalization of the dyadic relationship (Thompson 1967). Therefore, reduced
uncertainty due to increased formalization tends to reduce agent opportunism and
contract related costs. In a fluctuating and turbulent interorganizational context without
routines, programs, rules, etc., the principal company and the agent dealer probably will
be less committed to the relationship and will behave increasingly opportunistic.
Formalization also reduces the space for political activities (Milgrom and Roberts 1988).
The formalized practice is more difficult to change by using power than in a more
anarchic situation where each problem has an ad hoc solution. That is, the anarchic
situation with no formalism involved encourage the parties to exercise their political
influence in order to maximize their share of the resources. On the other hand, by
increased formalization activities in the dyad are constrained to only productive and
cost-efficient behavior. Consequently, bargaining costs will decrease when negotiation
between the two parties are less necessary.
Increased standardization, routinization, and formal rules, reduce costs per transaction.
The parties do not design new contractual arrangements for every transaction.
Additionally, increased formalization should make it easier for the parties to control
each other at less expense (Ouchi 1980). Control becomes more efficient because
activities governed by the contract no longer are ease specific.
Based on the previous discussion, we anticipate that formalization both will reduce
opportunism and transaction costs.
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4.3 Interaction, Opportunism and Contract-
Related Costs
v, kt;tJ,tit (A~
The maghitude of the exchange between the two parties is the third ex post contractual
dimension that characterizes the relation between the parties. A high level of
interaction may bring the agent closer to the planning and coordination process in the
company. More bilateral cooperation entails convergent goals, less opportunism and
lower transaction costs. Closer cooperation between the two parties means that
information might be more accessible for both the principal and the agent. The
magnitude and scope of interactions will therefore make the principal company better
positioned to write more efficient contracts. Interaction, therefore, is instrumental to
align the interests of both parties in the dyad. The scope and the magnitude of
cooperation offered by the company, redirects the agents' motivation in favor of the
interests of the principal.
Interaction is based on autonomous and voluntary decisions from both parties in the
dyad. Acceptance of the sovereign rights to take decisions regarding the exchange
improve transaction climate and reduces the level of opportunism. Consistently,
interaction on a decentralized level between the parties also is cost efficient. That is, the
two parties can combine resources in a way that creates synergy-effects and reduced need
for bargaining and control. Conclusively, we expect that interaction both creates
openness as well as reduced transaction costs.
4.4 The Problem of Free-Riding
Since the problem of free-riding is rarely discussed in transaction cost literature, the
hypothesis including this dimension has to be justified more thoroughly. Recent
theory development (Williamson 1991)discusses the problem of safeguarding
trademark assets. The free-riding problem probably is the most serious threat against
trademark assets. Consistent with transaction cost theory, the literature on free-riding
suggests that the problem can be reduced ~" implementation of increased vertical
control. Williamson (1975:5,1985:112)has also pointed out that the externality problem
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of free-riding has transaction cost origin. Free-riding, we assume, can be related to the
vertical control.
Unlike monitoring costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976), the costs of free-riding cannot be
externalized by making the agent outcome-dependent. It is in fact outcome-dependent
compensation that fuels incentives to free-ride on the trademark assets.
Simultaneously, company investments in trademark assets make it necessary to
safeguard trademark capital by establishing contractual incentives in the ex post contract
(vertical control).
A market characterized by high consumer mobility and standardized products, the
dealers are interdependent because the quality of the supply of products affects all
dealers that represent the trademark. With highly standardized products, customer
preferences reflect the service quality that each customer associates with the trademark.
Therefore, the dealer may have incentives to reduce the costs of service and product
quality of added products because the welfare loss is carried by all the other dealers and
the trademark company in the distribution system. Low quality is substituted for
promised high quality in order to reduce costs (Minkler 1990).
Independent dealers may take the price as given and maximize their profits without
taking quality standards given by the trademark company into consideration. The
trademark signals and guarantees a given quality standard to the consumers in the
market (Akerlof 1970).While the trademark company invests in quality reputation, the
single dealer has incentives to free-ride on the reputation of the trademark if the
negative effects of inferior service and product quality are not borne alone. Therefore,
the more independent the dealer is (Rubin 1978, Hennart 1986)and the more valuable
the brand name is (Anderson and Gatignon 1986) the more likely it is that the
externality costs of free-riding may increase.
This free-riding problem might be solved by increased vertical control. The company
can then specify rules and restrictions about quality standards. In addition, the company
may formalize the operations of the business activities in order to safeguard the quality
image of the brand name. The principal company also may take more of the operating
decisions at the dealer-unit level. Hierarchical decision-making may limit the
potential for cheating.
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Free-riding also can be reduced by establishing cooperative relations between the
principal and the agent. The magnitude and scope of cooperation between the parties
initiate a "team spirit" or a "corporate culture," better transaction climate and promote
more efficient exchange. Interaction states that the principal company supports the
agent. The agent will be more motivated to follow company policy and quality profile in
the market. Decentralized and autonomous dyadic decisions make both parties more
satisfied.
We therefore expect that vertical control will produce fewer free-riding costs and that
opportunism will increase free-riding costs.
4.5 Opportunism and Contract-Related Costs
In the model (see figure 3.1) the concept of opportunism is an intermediate variable.
Although, it is treated as an independent variable affecting the cost structure, it is also
itself related to and affected by the dimensions of vertical control. In a free market
context where information is costless and switching costs dose to zero, the appearance
of opportunism does not entail transaction costs. When vertical control and
contractual relations replace free markets as a governance structure, opportunism,
probably leads to transaction costs.
Opportunism is a climate factor that describes the parties' "self seeking behavior with
guile" (Williamson 1985). The concept of opportunism includes the potential
utilization of asymmetrical information and bilaterallack of trust. Specifically,
opportunism refers to calculated and covered efforts to mislead, manipulate or distort
the other part of the dyad. According to the theory, we anticipate that the more ex post
opportunism involved in the transaction, the more difficult it is to coordinate, to solve
conflicts, and to control the intentions inherent in the bilateral contract. Therefore,
consistent with the previous theoretical discussion, more opportunism increases'
contract-related costs.
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4.6 Contract-Related Costs and Performance
Ceteris paribus we believe that contract-related costs affect performance. Although we
assume that costs are associated to performance, it is not obvious that it is a consistent
negative relationship. For instance, agency theory argues that there may exist a positive
association between control costs and performance (lensen and Meckling 1976). The
principal company can safeguard its interests by incurring control costs designed to
constraint agent activities not intended in the bilateral contract.
Bargaining costs may have the same function. Negotiation between the parties is
instrumental in order to realign contractual incentives and make the agent-dealer more
motivated to work in the interests of the principal company. In a complex world, it is a
problem for the company to measure the trade off between control costs, bargaining
costs and performance. The company may use resources on these activities without
getting increased performance back. This is the case when latent and more destructive
bilateral conflicts appear.
Maladaption costs are produced by inferior information and communication systems
between the principal company and the dealer. The consequences are that both parties
use resources to produce information not available or needed by the other part of the
transaction. In addition, maladaption costs may produce wrong decisions because the
parties lack valid information. This suboptimal effect makes it possible to predict a clear
negative association between maladaption costs and performance. Williamson (1988)
emphasizes maladaption costs as the most important transaction cost dimension.
Free-riding costs have both a short term and long term effect. In the short run, the
single dealer might increase his performance by reducing quality signalled by the
trademark and reduce his own costs. Still, the long term effect will be negative because
customers even in quite mobile markets will avoid the low quality dealer. Thus, free-
riding costs in the long run will affect the dealer performance as well as
interorganizational performance negatively. Conclusively, we expect consistent with
predictions from transaction cost theory, that transaction costs reduce
interorganizational performance.
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4.7 Summary: Hypotheses
Consistent with the conceptual model presented in figure 3.1, it is possible to derive the
following set of four hypotheses and sub-hypotheses:
HI: The higher the level of vertical control, the lower is the level of opportunism.
Hypothesis 1 can be broken down to three sub-hypotheses:
HI a: The higher the level of centralization, the lower is the level of
opportunism.
HI b: The higher the level of formalization, the lower is the level of
opportunism.
HI c: The higher the level of interaction, the lower is the level of
opportunism.
H2: The higher the level of vertical control, the lower is the level of contract
related costs.
Hypothesis 2 can be broken down to 12 sub-hypotheses:
H2 a: The higher the level of centralization, the lower is the level of
bargaining costs.
H2 b: The higher the level of centralization, the lower is the level of control
costs.
H2 c The higher the level of centralization, the lower is the level of
maladaption costs.
H2 d: The higher the level of centralization, the lower is the level of free-riding
costs.
H2 e: The higher the level of formalization, the lower is the level of bargaining
costs.
H2 f: The higher the level of formalization, the lower is the level of control
costs.
H2 g: The higher the level of formalization, the lower is the level of
maladaption costs.
H2 h: The higher the level of formalizatio-i. +he lower is the level of free-riding
costs.
H2 i: The higher the level of interaction, the lower is the level of bargaining
costs.
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H2 j: The higher the level of interaction, the lower is the level of control
-costs.
H2 k: The higher the level of interaction, the lower is the level of maladaption
costs.
H2 l: The higher the level of interaction, the lower is the the level of free-
riding costs.
H3: The higher the level of opportunism, the higher is the level of contract related
costs.
Hypothesis 3 can be broken down to 4 sub-hypotheses:
H3 a: The higher the level of opportunism, the higher is the level of
bargaining costs.
H3b: The higher the level of opportunism, the higher is the level of
control costs.
H3 c: The higher the level of opportunism, the higher is the level of
maladaption costs.
H3d: The higher the level of opportunism, the higher is the level of free-
riding costs.
H4: The higher the level of contract related costs, the lower is the level of
interorganizational performance.
Hypothesis 4 can be broken down to 8 sub-hypotheses:
H4 a: The higher the level of bargaining costs, the lower is the level of
effectiveness.
H4b: The higher the level of bargaining costs, the lower is the level of
efficiency.
H4c The higher the level of control costs, the lower is the level of
effectiveness.
H4 d: The higher the level of control costs, the lower is the level of
efficiency.
H4 e: The higher the level of maladaption costs, the lower is the level of
effectiveness.
H4 f: The higher the level of maladaption costs, the lower is the level of
efficiency.
H4g: The higher the level of free-riding costs, the lower is the level of
effectiveness.
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H4 h: The higher the level of free-riding costs, the lower is the level of
efficiency.
The consistent set of hypotheses derived from the theoretical model above will be
operationalized and tested in the following chapters. Expected directions of the
structural relationships in the model are presented in table 4.1.
INDEPENDENT INTERMEDIA TE DEPENDENT EXPECTED
VARIABLE VARIABLE VARIABLES SIGNS
VERTICAL OPPORTUNISM
CONTROL
VERTICAL TRANSACTION
CONTROL COSTS
OPPORTUNISM TRANSACTION +
COSTS
TRANSACTION PERFOItMANCE
COSTS
Table 4.1 Predicted association in the model and their expected signs.
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter specifies research design and methodology used to analyze hypotheses
derived from the conceptual model presented in figure 3.1. The data collection process
was a two step survey approach. First phase was a survey of the most standard Shell-
stations called Shell "Team-stations". The reason for this was that we wanted the
sample to be as homogeneous as possible in order to control third variables. The second
phase was stratified sampling among the three categories of ex ante contracts: employee
manager-contracts, dealers with a leasing contract and independent dealer-contracts.
The hypotheses presented in the previous chapter are correlational. The reason for
deriving correlational hypotheses is that we wanted to study the reallife phenomenon
of transaction costs. It may be difficult and expensive to apply an experimental
investigation. As follows, an analogous static group comparison design applied here,
seeks to describe the relationship between the variables in the presented model. We
wanted a setting where the ex post vertical control variable varied as much as possible.
But vertical control is not easy to detect because it is not visible to the researcher.
Therefore, we chose a setting with three categories of ex ante formal contracts. We
assumed that the variation of formal ex ante contracts (see figure 5.2 below) guaranteed
enough variation in ex post vertical control. This is a typical survey design where we
assume that the different groups of contracts provide sufficient variation in vertical
control enough to investigate opportunism and the dimensions of transaction costs.
Fig. 5.1 The static group comparison design, X= contract group, 0= observations.
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In order to isolate alternative explanations to the variations in the dependent variables,
a homogeneous setting is preferable. The oil company that is used as an empirical
setting here, operates three different formal models for organizing dealers: 1)
independent dealers, i.e., dealers who own and manage the gasoline station; 2) contract
dealers, i.e., dealers who lease and operate the gasoline station; 3) employee managers,
i.e., company owned and company-managed gas stations (see figure 5.2 below).
The Oil Company
(Shell Norgea.s.)
"Independent Dealers"
(Dealer owned-Dealer
operated)
"Contract Dealers"
(Companyowned
site-Dealer operated)
"Employee" Managers
(Company
owned-Company
operated)
Fig. 5.2 The organizational structure of the distribution system in A.S Norske Shell.
The empirical setting analyzed here may therefore reflect a continuum of vertical
control including intermediate types. This corresponds to theoretical presentation of
transaction cost theory, where ex post vertical control represents a continuum and not
polar categories as was the case in early stage of theory development (Williamson
1975)(seealso fig.2.1).
Prior to the survey information material from Shell, secondary data and previous
surveys conducted by the company were collected and analyzed. Extensive pretest
interviews with both Shell managers and representatives from the three categories of
dealers gave necessary inputs to the first phase of the research. In addition, preparations
for the survey also included a minor pilot-test. The survey provided two types of data:
I Data from the dealers
II Data from the area sales managers in the company
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Our focus here is on abstract theoretical concepts in the model. The study concentrates
on developing new constructs in transaction cost analysis. The importance of construct
validity therefore has been given superior priority. That is, the problem whether it is
possible to generalize from a set of operations to a referent construct (Cook and
Campbell 1979). Thus, an empirical setting was chosen because factors irrelevant to
model-testing could be kept relatively constant. External validity therefore was
sacrificed in order to produce a better control of third variables.
On the other hand, it was also important to find a setting where the independent
variable (vertical control) varies as much as possible. The oil company that is focused
on here, distributes gasoline by using employee managers, dealers who lease their
station from the company and "independent" dealers who own and manage the
stations. The employee managers have fixed salary schemes. Their flexibility are
constrained by the informal or formal rules defined by the sales area managers. Dealers
operating leased stations are more output dependent. They have to pay a fixed rent to
the company. But their compensation is determined by the residual income. However,
they are subjected to more control from the company who owns the station. On the
other hand, independent dealers are output-dependent. They have the possibility to
switch to another principal company after the contracted period. Their position in the
system is closest to the market on the market-hierarchy continuum in transaction cost
theory. The various formal contractual arrangements were therefore assumed to secure
variance in the independent variable (vertical control). These categories of dealers were
connected to the company by three types of standardized contracts.
5.1 The Bilateral Contract
Also the empirical setting should be a principal-multi-agency setting in order to
produce insights in principal - agency relationships in a distribution context. The
empirical setting can be characterized by the principals' active role in attempting to
influence agent behavior by establishing contractual incentives (Allvine and Patterson
1972, Prisdirektoratet 1984).This was initially assumed to secure variation in the
independent factor (vertical control) that is necessary in order to inspect the influence
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on indicators of transaction costs. Oil companies and their dealers are not an unknown
setting for interorganizational research (Ridgeway 1957,Teece 1976,John 1984).
In particular, the study conducted here can be related to John (1984). He applied a
major oil distribution company as an empirical setting. He also applied a political -
economy framework to analyze the contracts. The company analyzed here and the
company analyzed in John(1984) used heterogeneous contracts to influence
homogeneous dealer operations. Both companies, therefore, represent plural systems
(Bradach and Eccles 1989).
The initial assumption was that the variation in explicit contracts that define the
ownership structure of the agent dealer secured enough variation in vertical control. In
the dyadic model we have paired data from both sides of the transaction. The empirical
model utilized information from 72 dyadic cases. The dyadic information was used as a
validation sample. Table 5.1 below shows the distribution of these cases on the three
categories of formal contracts. The final model test (the hypotheses test)used
information from 179 dealer cases. Table 5.1 also exhibits how the dealer side cases in
the final model test were related to formal ex ante contracts in the company.
MODEL-TEST EMPLOYEE CONTRACTED INDEPENDENT TarAL
DEALERS DEALERS DEALERS
DYADIC MODEL 13 30 29 72
HYPOTHESES TEST 18 103 58 179
Table 5.1 The distribution of the two samples of cases on the three formal categories of ex ante
contracts.
5.2 Sampling and Sample Description
Shell has 520 stations in the Norwegian market. The survey includes only 320 "Team-
stations" because we wanted to study a homogeneous setting in order to control for
third variables. A "Team-station" is a gas station where Shell and the dealer cooperate
more intensively in marketing and promotion activities. The dealer has a standard
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cooperation agreement with the company. The agreement implies that Shell is
supposed to supply all promotion material to the dealer. Team-stations also are the
biggest stations in the distribution system, where the technological relationship (storage
tanks, interface-systems, credit-card-systems etc.) and the market profile are relatively
standardized.
Step 1: 202
'''feam''-station
questionnaires
,
Step2:
Questionnaires from
72 sales area
managers
Junel990
September 1990
Fig.5.3 The two step sampling procedure.
Because we found it both efficient, more flexible, and cheapest, we chose to collect
information by using mailed questionnaires and telephone reminders. Our research
problem was structured in a way that could be understood by the informant. The
company provided us with updated addresses and phone numbers. The dealers were
given two telephone-reminders in order to maximize the number of respondents.
Enclosed to the questionnaire, there were recommendations both from the company
and from the union of dealers. A subset of items from the questionnaire was sent to the
area managers in the company. This questionnaire was directly related to the dyad in
question. The questionnaire to the dealer and to the sales area manager and the
recommendation letters are enclosed in appendix C. A test was conducted to control if
the dealers who answered later did perform better or worse relative to the others. The
T-test (not reported here) did not produce any indications that late response reflected
performance differences. As we can see from figure 5.3 we received 202 dealer
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questionnaires back during the first step of the sampling procedure. During the second
step of sampling we received 72 usable questionnaires back from the sales area
managers.
Shell had 22 company-owned and employee managed stations. From the residual 300
stations, about 50% of the dealers were company owned and managed by independent
representatives. The other half was dealer owned and dealer managed. This indicated
sufficient variation in the ex ante formal contracts.
In order to maximize the number of cases, the first wave of questionnaires was sent to
all Shell Team - stations in Norway, minus the pilot-test-group (5 dealers) and the two
dealers in the expert-group who evaluated the face validity of the constructs. Five
dealers had more than one gasoline station. They received only one questionnaire
related to one of the contractual relationships. The final population carne to 299
gasoline stations. From the population, we received 202 questionnaires back (68 %).
There were 179 (60%)usable cases. The missing item problem was not related to any
particular construct, but was distributed all over the questionnaire. The dealer side -
survey was sent out in mid-June 1990and we received the last questionnaires in
November 1990.A description of the dealer side sample is presented in tables 1 to 3 in
appendix B. The sequential steps in the data gathering process are illustrated in figure
5.4 below.
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EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH
ONECOMPANY
I
MANAGER
INTERVIEWS WITH
1WO ACADEMIANS
INTERVIEWS
WITHTHE
EXPERTGROUP
OFDEALERS/
MANAGERS
Fig. 5.4 The process of face validation and the data collection process.
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INTERVIEWS
WITH
ACADEMIANS
In order to secure contractual variance in the dyadic information, a stratified sampling
method was used to collect questionnaires from the sales-area managers. There were 23
sales area-managers in the company. Because of the limited number of informants from
the company, 75 dyads were randomly picked out from the 164 perfect questionnaires
we had received in mid September 1990 (see table 5.6). Figure 5.3 shows the two step
sampling process. Each manager filled out from 1 to 9 questionnaires. Table 5.2 below
shows the distribution of the number of questionnaires from the managers.
As we can see from the table, four managers did not fill out any questionnaires, five
managers filled out 2 questionnaires, and so on, while one manager filled out 9
questionnaires. A stratified sampling design was chosen because we wanted to increase
the efficiency of sampling. We have previously referred to the three categories of ex
ante formal contracts that are internally homogeneous with respect to characteristics
being studied. Our initial expectation was that the categories of ex ante contracts were
related to the degree of vertical control ex post. We also increased the proportion of
employee dealers relative to the two other groups of contracts in order to secure that
internal agents were satisfactory represented in the sample (see figure 5.5). From figure
5.5, we can see that 15 of 18 employee dealers were represented in the sample of dyads,
while 30 contract dealers were chosen from 95 contracted dealers and 30 from 53
independent dealers.
Numberof Numberof Total number of
managers questionnarreseaCh dyads
4 O O
5 2 10
6 3 18
3 4 12
2 5 10
2 7 14
1 9 9
Total 23 - 73
Table 5.2 The distribution of questionnaires among the 23 area sales managers.
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Fig. 5.5 Stratified data sampling of dyadic information from the dealer-side sample.
From the sample of dyads we received 73back. One dealer went bankruptcy and was
deleted from the sample. The final number of dyads then became 72. We received the
last questionnaires from the area sales managers medio February 1991.
5.3 The Three Step Analysis Design
There are two important reasons for choosing a three step analysis design. First, that
the single side problem is a serious threat to validity in research focusing on
interorganizational properties. The criticism raised against single side information in
dyadic level research questions the validity of tests of dyadic relationships (Reve 1980,
John and Reve 1982). The single side problem leads to a specification of the
measurement model that is related to the side of the dyad where the data is collected.
Another problem that we have addressed here is that we are developing new
constructs. Therefore, it is important that we are retesting the measurement modelon
another sample to state that the development of contractual cost constructs was not
accidental or related to the specific character of the sample. In order to secure that dyadic
perceptions converge before structural testing, the research is designed like an hour-
glass-shaped three step analysis approach.
51
The first step is an unilateral analysis of the data. The intention is to formulate a
preliminary measurement model based on the item to total correlation method as well
as a face validation of the constructs. The unilateral analysis is instrumental to improve
clarity in the model-specification. This stage of research provides a more manageable set
of data as well as constructs with satisfactory face validity.
N=l79
N=72
N=l79
Unilateral Model Analysis
(Item-total correlation)
Dyadic Model Analysis
(Common factor analysis)
Final Model Analysis
(Pearson correlation, least square regression)
Fig. 5.6 The three step hour-glass shaped analysis design.
The dyadic model identifies the measurement model valid for both sides of the
relationship. Items that are not related to the construct on both sides of the dyad are
deleted. For example, we anticipate that both parties should report a consistent set of
items that belongs to the construct of centralization. Like Anderson and Weitz (1991),
we adopted parallelism between the scales. That is, when one item was deleted from
the construct on one side of the dyad, it was also removed from the other side. The
dyadic model test is an "acid test" of construct validity in interorganizational research.
The dyadic model is based on data from key informants from both sides (John and Reve
1982). The single dealer and the single key informant in the company belonged to the
exact same dyad. The output measurement model from the dyadic model screening test,
therefore, provided a more robust empirical model before final testing of the structural
model. The final model test was based on the measurement model formulated in the
dyadic model test. The structural model was tested on data from 179dealer cases.
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5.4 Asset Specificity
Asset specificity related to the exchange is, according to the company managers, equally
distributed among the dealers. Asset specificity refers to the technology specific to the
company e.g., trademark assets. In principal-multi-agent settings, however, technology
is specific to the trademark company but not specific to each company-dealer
relationship. This is an asymmetric distribution of specific assets, typically bringing the
principal company in a superior power-dependency situation relative to the agent
(Heide and John 1988).If an independent dealer chooses to switch to another company, -
the company takes back company-specific assets. Pretest interviews with Shell
managers indicated that investments in specific trademark assets are equally distributed
among the "team" dealers (Williamson 1991).
In the presented study we do not adopt specificity as a proxy for transaction costs. A
high level of specificity according to the theory means lower transaction costs in house
relative to market exchange. Our review (see table 2.1) revealed that the relationship
between specificity and governance structures has been studied several times before.
Here, we want to move one step further into the transaction cost analysis in order to
explore how the dimensions of the governance structure affect dimensions of
transaction costs. Therefore, we are not anticipating any equilibrium or optimal
relationship in our analysis. Our research purpose is to focus how dimensions of
vertical control are related to transaction costs. Our focus is ex post on the process of
transaction cost economizing.
5.5 Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis here, is the focal dyad. The reason is that we are focusing on the
organization of transactions between the company and the dealer. Our focus is
consistent with transaction costs economics that argues that transactions is the basic
unit of analysis (Williamson 1985:18). Therefore, it is assumed to be necessary to gather
information from both sides in order to indicate the level of opportunism, vertical
control, transaction costs and performance. Studies where data are collected only from
one side of the dyad may lack information crucial to empirical testing of the theories
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that explain the integration processes. The same items, therefore, are measured both by
the survey among the dealers and the sales area managers in the company.
5.6.Aspects of Homogeneity
A principal-multi-agent trademark setting offers important advantages for
interorganizational research. First, there are specific assets associated to the trademark
capital not related to each single contract, but to the company or the distribution system
as a whole. The Shell "Team"-agreement secures homogeneous exchange relations
between the company and the dealer. However, the technology might be specific to the
dealer, but the dealer has minor possibilities to influence the ex post choice of formal
governance structure.
Another important feature of the empirical setting is the nature of the product market.
All dealers supply about the same kind of products in the market i.e., gasoline, mineral-
oil products, fast-food, tobacco, chocolate, magazines, car wash, car sales etc. (see
Appendix B). All the dealers are small business units. They do not differ much in size
compared with other real-world settings. In addition, the dealers are trademark dealers.
That means they have one dominant principal company. Other non trademark small
business firms often have multiple and heterogeneous principals.
The design chosen here makes it possible to keep several important factors constant that
may threaten construct validity, and statistical conclusion validity: company marketing
policy and strategy and corporate culture and environmental factors that differ between
companies. Another important factor that can be kept relatively constant is the
technological inter-relationship (payment system, data systems, logistic systems etc.)
between the company and the dealers.
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5.7 External Conditions
Norway can be described as an egalitarian society without any large economic
differences socially or geographically. In addition, Norway can be characterized by a long
post-war period of economic and political stability. The distribution system that is
chosen as an empirical setting, therefore, operates in a relatively homogeneous and
stable environment that minimizes the effects of external variation (Achrol, Reve and
Stern 1982).
5.8 The Adverse Selection Problem
The adverse selection problem is a serious validity problem in principal-agency
research. That is, for instance, if less qualified agents prefer one type of contract with the
company. It is then difficult for the principal and for the researcher to sort out how
contractual incentives alone affect the cost structure or performance. Neither pretest
interviews nor aT-test of the relation between contract- category and educationallevel,
indicate problems of adverse selection.
5.9 Key Informants
The use of key informants in distribution research has been criticized as unreliable
(Phillips 1981).Other channel researchers have, however, pointed out that the use of
key informants can give valuable information if used with caution (John and Reve
1982).
The most feasible key informant on the agent side will be the owner of the gasoline
station, the manager (if the station is leased) or the employee-manager (if the oil
company owns and operates the station). The key informant on the company side of the
dyad is the sales-area manager. The sales-area manager is in charge of the company
contacts with each single dealer. These key informants occupy positions that make them
qualified to respond to questions about the dyadic relationship.
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5.10 Instrumentation
In order to test the face validity of the operationalizations, we conducted preliminary
and post-test interviews with the representatives from the marketing division in the oil
company and with representatives from the different categories of dealers. The first
step was to design a questionnaire where all other concepts than transaction cost
dimensions were based on previous studies. However, some of the questions were
slightly changed to adapt to the empirical setting. The development of the
questionnaire was based on interviews with both representatives from the company
and academicians. The first draft, however, was outlined by utilizing experience from
previous distribution research. The draft was presented to one employee manager and
one independent dealer, one sales area manager in the company and the company
director of the distribution system in Norway (later called "the expert group"). The
feedback from the interviews guided adapting of operationalizations to the empirical
setting. In addition, the questionnaire was carefully evaluated by two colleagues at the
Norwegian Institute for Research in Marketing.
The next step was a minor pilot test. The test group included one employee manager,
managers of two leased stations and managers of two independent stations. In cases
where there were no response variation, the expert group in the companyadvised me
either to keep the item, to change the formulation in the text or to delete it. Two of the
items in the centralization construct, one item in the formalization construct and one
item in the construct of bargaining costs were deleted from the draft. Six questions were
added to the construct of centralization, one item was added to the construct of vertical
interactions, two items were added to the construct of bargaining costs, six items were
added to the construct of free-riding costs. Finally, two colleagues read the final
questionnaire and suggested some minor changes in some of the formulations.
The next step was to design a questionnaire for the sales-area managers. The
questionnaire was basically the same as for the dealers, but focused on the sales area
manager as a key informant. Some very few questions, however, had to be excluded
because the sales-area manager probably did not have enough information to report
facts or perceived data about the dyadic relation. The Shell manager, one sales - area
manager and one colleague commented on the questionnaire. One item was added to
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the construct of formalization, and one item was added to the construct of
opportunism. Two items on the construct of control and monitoring costs were
changed. In addition, only one question remained from the group of control questions:
the number of years the sales manager had been representing the company interests in
the dyad in question.
In order to secure variety in the statements, about half of the questions in the constructs
formalization, opportunism and all the cost categories were reversed in both
questionnaires and had later to be recoded.
After having conducted the data analysis, the results were commented and analyzed by
the members of the expert group. The company received their own reports based on the
same material. Both company managers and the dealers took part in the debriefing
process.
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6. OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES
This chapter presents the operational definitions and measurement items. Both
perceptual and unobtrusive or "objective" measures were used to describe vertical
control, opportunism, contractual cost elements and performance. In order to generate
items that are suitable representatives of the variables described in the theory,
interviews and secondary information material have been helpful sources. However,
the most important source has been previous channel research. Regarding transaction
cost-dimensions, however, it was not possible to utilize previous research, although
two recently published studies shed light on some interesting aspects of the
operationalization problem (Noordewier, John and Nevin 1990, Walker and Poppo
1991).
6.1 Vertical Control
The dimensionalization of vertical control is based on combined perspectives provided
by previous research in the field of interorganizational and intraorganizational
relations (Aldrich 1979,Dalton, Todor, Spendolini, Fielding and Porter 1980, Hage 1965,
Pugh, Hickson, Hinings and Turner 1968,Reve 1986,Van de Ven 1976,Warren 1972).
The dimensions are vertical interaction between the parties, formalization of interfirm
transactions and centralization of interfirm decision making. The items were adapted to
the empirical setting.
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6.1.1 Centralization
Centralization of interfirm decisions can be defined as the perceived level of
asymmetrical decisions and implementation associated with the relation between the
company and the single dealer (Marrett 1971,Aldrich 1976,Reve 1980,Van de Ven and
Ferry 1979).Centralization can be understood as the hierarchical contractual structure
that govern the relationship. The construct of centralization has been operationalized
in a number of previous studies (Dahlstrom 1990,Dwyer and Welsh 1985, Haugland
and Reve 1988,John 1984,John, Sullivan and Peterson 1982, John and Reve 1982,
Phillips 1982,Reve 1980,Reve 1986,Reve and Stern 1986, Spekman and Stem 1979).The
operationalization benefits from these studies as well as pretest interviews with dealers
and company-managers. Because we have a principal-agent setting where the power
relationship is highly asymmetrical, the items focus on how the principal company
influences important dealer activities and not the opposite. The construct of
centralization reflects the need to get permission from the principal company and the
freedom for the dealer to make independent decisions regarding dealer activities.
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DEALERS' VERSION:
THROUGH YOUR COOPERATION WITH SHELL, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF MATIERS
WHERE THE COMPANY HAS MORE OR LESS INFLUENCE. PLEASE INDICA TE THE EXTENT
TO WHICH YOU CONSIDER THE COMPANY INFLUENCES YOUR DECISIONS REGARDING
YOUR OWN BUSINESS.
SALES MANAGER VERSION:
THROUGH YOUR COOPERATION WITH THE DEALER, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF
MATTERS WHERE THE COMPANY HAS MORE OR LESS INFLUENCE. PLEASE INDICATE
THE EXTENT TO WHICH YOU CONSIDER THIS INFLUENCES THE DEALERS' DECISIONS
REGARDING HIS/HER OWN BUSINESS.
Please put a cross in the square 1 (no influence) to 7 (complete control):
Dealers Version Sales Area Manager Version
Centr.1 Centr.1
Deliveries of other goods than gasoline Deliveries of other goods than gasoline
and mineral-oil products and mineral-oil products
Centr.2 Centr.2
The design of the advertising, sales The design of the advertising, sales
concepts and marketing concepts and marketing
Centr.3 Centr.3
Purchase- and ordering procedures Purchase- and ordering procedures
Centr.4 Centr.4
The composition of product selection at The composition of product selection at
your station this station
Centr.5 Centr.5
How comprehensive the cooperation How comprehensive the cooperation
will be; the number of Shell products and will be; the number of Shell products and
services sold from your station services sold from this station
Centr.6 Centr.6
Opening hours at the station Opening hours at the station
Centr.7 Centr.7
Whether products should be taken out of Whether products should be taken out of
the selection the selection
Centr.8 Centr.8
Sales prices on other products than Sales prices on other products than
gasoline gasoline
Centr.9 Centr.9
Determination of salaries to the Determination of salaries to the
employees at the station employees at the station
Table 6.1 Operationalization of the centralization concept.
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6.1.2 Formalization
Formalization is defined as the perceived level where fixed policies, rules, operating
procedures and programmability influence the interorganizational exchange. The
operationalization followed the guide-lines provided by previous research (Dwyer and
Welsh 1985, Haugland and Reve 1988,Hyvonen 1983, John 1984, John, Sullivan and
Peterson 1982,John and Reve 1982,Phillips 1982,Reve 1986,Reve and Stem 1986,
Spekman and Stem 1979)as well as pretest interviews. Form 1 relates to
programmability and the level of standardized procedures of deliveries. Form 2 and 3
reflect the formalized expected distribution of rules in the relationship. Form 4 describes
the level of routinization of interorganizational communication. All items were
reversed and had to be recoded.
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DEALER VERSION:
IN YOUR COOPERATION WITH SHELL, THERE ARE ESTABLISHED MORE OR LESS
DEFINED ROUTINES, PROCEDURES, RULES AND PLANS ABOUT HOW VARIOUS
PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SOLVED. TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES
REPRESENT AN ERRONEOUS OR CORRECT DESCRIPTION OF THIS ASPECT OF THE
COOPERATION
SALES AREA MANAGER VERSION:
IN THE COOPERATION BETWEEN SHELL AND THIS DEALER, THERE ARE ESTABLISHED
MORE OR LESS DEFINED ROUTINES, PROCEDURES, RULES AND PLANS ABOUT HOW
VARIOUS PROBLEMS SHOULD BE SOLVED. TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE FOLLOWING
SENTENCES REPRESENT AN ERRONEOUS OR CORRECT DESCRIPTION OF THIS ASPECT
OF THE COOPERATION
Please put a cross in the square l (erroneous description) to 7 (completely correct description):
Dealers Version Sales Area Manager Version
Form. 1 (Reversed) Form. 1 (Reversed)
The deliveries from Shell are made at The deliveries from Shell are made at
various days and times various days and times
Form. 2 (Reversed) Form. 2 (Reversed)
There are no clear distribution of tasks There are no clear distribution of tasks
between us and Shell between Shell and the dealer
Form.3 (Reversed) Form. 3 (Reversed)
There are no clear routines for safety There are no clear routines for safety
training for employed persons at our training for employed persons at this
station station
Form. 4 (Reversed) Form. 4 (Reversed)
In general, the information routines to In general, the information routines
Shell are very unclear from the dealer are very unclear
Table 6.2 Operationalization of the formalization concept.
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6.1.3 Vertical Interaction
The concept of interaction can be defined as vertical flows of activities, resources and
information from the principal company to the dealer (Van de Ven 1976, Van de Ven
and Ferry 1979).Again, because we have a principal-agent relationship, the
operationalization indicates the magnitude and scope of assistance, service and
programs offered by the principal company. These activities contain both constructive
contacts between the parties (INT.5)and cooperation between the parties in order to
increase the competitiveness of the dealer.
Vertical interactions can be measured by perceptions of joint activities and programs,
and assistance systems worked out to help realize the exchange between the parties in
the distribution system. Operationalization is related to previous research (Dwyer and
Welsh 1985, John and Martin 1984,John and Reve 1982, Phillips 1982, Reve and Stem
1986,Reve 1980, 1986,Spekman and Stem 1979).
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DEALER VERSION
THE COMPANY OFFERS YOU COOPERATION IN A NUMBER OF BUSINESS ACTIVmES.
HOW OFfEN 00 YOU COOPERATE WITH THE COMPANY?
SALES AREA MANAGER VERSION
THE COMPANY OFFERS THIS DEALER COOPERATION IN A NUMBER OF BUSINESS
ACTIVITIES. HOW OFTEN DO YOU COOPERATE WITH THE DEALER?
Please put a cross in the square 1 (never) to 7 (always):
Dealers Version Sales Area Manager Version
Int.l Int.l
You cooperate with Shell when you plan You cooperate with the dealer when you
the future of the station plan the future of the station
Int.2 Int.2
You cooperate with Shell in local sales You cooperate with the dealer in local
campaigns sales campaigns
Int.3 Int. 3
You cooperate with Shell in order to You cooperate with the dealer in order to
design market plans design market plans
Int.4 Int. 4
The company helps us to improve our The company helps the dealer to
competitiveness improve the competitiveness
Int.5 Int.5
You have continuous interactive contact We have continuous interactive contact
with Shell with the dealer
Int.6 Int.6
You cooperate with Shell when you We cooperate with the dealer when s/he
design advertisements designs advertisements
Int.7 Int.7
You cooperate with Shell to compose the We cooperate with the dealer to compose
right selection of products the right selection of products
Int.8 Int.8
Shell helps us to plan or modernize the We help the dealer to plan or modernize
store, or if we want to enlarge the shop the store, or if s/he wants to enlarge the
shop
Int.9
Shell assists us with courses and training
Table 6.3 Operationalization of the vertical interaction concept.
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6.2 Opportunism
Opportunism is defined as the potential for covert self-interest-seeking behavior by the
exploitation of asymmetric information between the two parties. The level of
opportunism is related to the extent to which the company and the dealer feel that the
other party hides information important to the dyadic exchange, prevents information
impactedness (Williamson 1975), and follows the intentions inherent in the contract.
The construct describes the potential self-interest seeking behavior or the informational
consequences of the lack of bilateral trust between the principal company and the agent.
The operationalization of the construct of opportunism is based on insights presented
in previous studies (Anderson 1988,Dwyer and Oh 1987,John 1984,Phillips 1982,Reve
and Stern 1986).E.g., items 1,2,3and 5 are basically the same as in Anderson (1988)but
are altered somewhat in order to fit the context. The items describe whether one of the
parties hides information important to the bilateral relationship (OPP.l, OPP.3, OPP.5),
does not keep what he promises (OPP.2) or has to be controlled to follow the intentions
in the bilateral contract (OPP. 4).
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DEALERS' VERSION
IN A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE PARTIES HAVE MUTUAL
TRUST IN THE FULFILMENT OF THE INTENTIONS IN THE CONTRACT. TO WHAT DEGREE
00 YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE STATEMENTS USTED BELOW?
SALES AREA MANAGER VERSION
IN A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE PARTIES HAVE MUTUAL
TRUST IN THE FULFILMENT OF THE INTENTIONS IN THE CONTRACT. TO WHAT DEGREE
00 YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE STATEMENTS USTED BELOW?
Please put a cross in the square l(very strongly disagree) to 7 (very strongly agree):
Dealers Version Sales Area Manager Version
Opp.1 Opp.1
We have the reason to believe that the We have the reason to believe that the
company hides important information dealer hides important information of
regarding our station interests to the company
Opp.2 Opp.2
The company has not kept what it The dealer has not kept what s/he
promised when we entered into the promised when we entered into the
relationship relationship
Opp.3 Opp.3
Our impressions are that it does not Our impressions are that it does not
always payoff to tell the truth always payoff to tell the truth
Opp.4 Opp.4
In order to be motivated to follow the In order to be motivated to follow the
company strategy of high service quality, company strategy of high service quality,
the company has to control our service- the company has to control the service-
level level of the dealer
Opp.S Opp.S
It has happened that we in order to It has happened that we in order to
defend our interests have not provided defend the interests of the company have
information to the company that may be not given the dealer information that
/ could have been useful may be/could have been useful for
him/her
Table 6.4 Operationalization of the concept of opportunism.
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6.3 Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are costs of running the economic system. All transactions imply
friction costs (Arrow 1969)and resource losses because of imperfect information
(Dahlman 1979).Transaction costs are caused by imperfect and incomplete coordination
and cooperation between two parties.
The importance of the face validation process as well as the content validity is crucial to
the research conducted here because we are developing new constructs. The intention
is to develop multi-item proxy-variables that describe various elements of these
contract-related costs. The items were generated through the pretest interviews and two
previously company-conducted internal surveys. Also two previous studies presented
in table 6.5 provided interesting insights into the operationalization problem discussed
here.
To our knowledge, transaction costs have been operationalized and tested empirically
only twice before (Noordewier, John and Nevin 1990,Walker and Poppo 1991).
Noordewier, John and Nevin (1990)analyzed heterogeneous companies, but
homogeneous products. Walker and Poppo (1991),on the other hand, studied one
company, but heterogeneous products.
Research conducted by Noordewier, John and Nevin (199O)categorized transaction
costs into possession and acquisition costs. Possession costs were operationalized as
inventory turnover and acquisition costs were operationalized as unacceptable bearings,
percentage on time record and accuracy of filled orders.
Walker and Poppo (1991)used a two-item approach to describe transaction costs: the
difficulty of agreement with the supplier on allocation of costs due to 1) engineering
changes for the part and 2) changes in material costs for the part. Still, the difficulties of
obtaining an agreement may not reflect the use of resources from both parties in the
relationship or cost ineffective output by e.g., suboptimal allocation of investments in
the distribution system. Also difficulties of obtaining an agreement may have to do
with the nature of the technology or the heterogeneous products in question. Both
Noordewier, John and Nevin (1990)and Walker and Poppo (1991) specified the
measurement modelon the same sample as they tested the structural model. The
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measurement model, therefore, may be produced by the specific character of the one
sided sample.
Transaction Empirical Market Context N
Costs Items Setting
Noordewier, Heterogeneity Homogeneity 140cases
John and 3 Diversity of Bell and roller One side data
Nevin, JM companies purchasers(1990)
Walker and Homogeneity Heterogeneity 99cases
Poppo, ASQ 2 One large US Generic inputs One side data(1991) company to an assembly
division in one
company
Table 6.5 Some central aspects of research that have operationalized transaction costs.
Thus, the exploratory profile of this research emphasizes the necessity of generating
new items in order to reflect the theory. This is also why we, unlike previous research,
have chosen to develop the measurement model first and then test the structural
model afterwards on another sample.
Consistent with Williamson (1988),the investigation focuses on ex post costs.
Transaction cost-dimensions are defined as cost elements surrounding the realization
of bilateral exchange (Williamson 1985:22).The empirical problem is to describe
contract-related cost elements. Basically, we have applied the previously discussed
categories described by Williamson (1985)and the taxonomy presented by Dahlman
(1979:148).
6.3.1 Bargaining Costs
Bargaining costs appear because of the ex post effort to correct misalignments and to
maintain the contractual relationship as well as the continuous bilateral ability to take
decisions regarding the optimal distribution of companyefforts among the trademark
dealers. Item 1 and 2 in the construct are reversed.
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DEALER VERSION
IT TAKES TIME AND RESOURCES TO GOVERN AND TO COORDINATE ras COOPERATION
WIlli ras COMPANY. TO WHAT EXTENT DOES ras FOLLOWING SENTENCES GNE AN
ERRONEOUS OR CORRECT DESCRIPTION OF THIS ASPECT OF THE COOPERATION
SALES AREA MANAGER VERSION
IT TAKES TIME AND RESOURCES TO GOVERN AND TO COORDINATE ras COOPERATION
WIlli THE COMPANY. TO WHAT EXTENT DOES ras FOLLOWING SENTENCES GIVE AN
ERRONEOUS OR CORRECT DESCRIPTION OF THIS ASPECT OF rus COOPERATION
Please put a cross in the square 1(erroneous description) to 7 (completely correct
description):
Dealers version Sales Area Managers Version
Barg. 1 (Reversed) Barg.l (Reversed)
It does not give us any advantages It does not give any dealer any
relative to other dealers regarding preferences regarding our investment-
company investment- and and modernization policy, to play an
modernization policy to play an active active role vis a vis Shell
role vis a vis Shell
Barg. 2 (Reversed) Barg. 2(Reversed)
Our meetings with Shell representatives Our meetings with the dealer are very
are very effective and systematic effective and systematic
Barg.3 Barg.3
Both parties are always well prepared in Both parties are always well prepared in
the meetings with Shell, so that decisions the meetings with the dealer, so that
can be made decisions can be made
Table 6.6 Operationalization of the concept of bargaining costs.
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6.3.2 Control and Monitoring Costs
Control and monitoring costs reflect the time and resources used to safeguard the
interests of both parties in the contract through bilateral control and monitoring
activities. These costs are effecting secure commitments between the parties in the
transaction (Williamson 1985:21,1988).The items describe the efforts dedicated to
various control activities. From the dealers point of view the obvious alternative to the
use of time on control activities is to sell more and increase profitability. While this
trade off exists at the dealer level, the role of the sales area manager is to control and
monitor the gas stations in his area. So he is not loosing sales by increasing control of
the dealer in question, but when using too much time on the particular dealer he has to
use less time on the other dealers in his area. The cost represents the payoff from
alternative use of time (the time used to control the dealer in question versus time used
on the other dealers). So when the area manager perceives that he uses too much time
on the dealer, we assume that it is relative to the time used on the other dealers in his
area.
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DEALERS' VERSION
IT TAKES TIME AND RESOURCES TO GOVERN AND TO COORDINATE THE COOPERATION
WITH THE COMPANY. TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES GIVE AN
ERRONEOUS OR CORRECT DESCRIPTION OF THIS ASPECT OF THE COOPERATION
SALES AREA MANAGER VERSION
IT TAKES TIME AND RESOURCES TO GOVERN AND TO COORDINATE THE COOPERATION
WITH THE COMPANY. TO WHAT EXTENT 00 THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES GIVE AN
ERRONEOUS OR CORRECT DESCRIPTION OF THIS ASPECT OF THE COOPERATION
Pleaseput a crossin the square l(erroneousdescription)to 7 (completelycorrectdescription):
Dealers version Sales Area Managers Version
Cont.1 Cont.1
We use to much time to control We use to much time to monitor
deliveries of gasoline from the company payment for deliveries of gasoline from
regarding quantity and quality. Instead the dealer
the time could have been used to
increase the profitability of the station
Cont. 2 Cont.2
We use to much time on account books We use to much time on economic
that instead could have been used to control of the activities at the station
improve profitability at the station
Cont. 3 Cont. 3
We use to much time to control We use to much time to control payment
deliveries of mineral oil products from and deliveries of mineral oil products to
Shell, that instead could have been used this dealer
to improve profitability at the station
Table 6.7 Operationalization of the concept of the costs of control- and monitoring.
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6.3.3 Maladaption Costs
Maladaption costs according to Williamson (1988:572)are the most important category
of costs. These costs appear in an incomplete contracting context where transactions
drift out of alignment.
The construct reflects bilateral coordination, cooperation and informational difficulties
and information produced by one party that cannot sufficiently be applied or
understood by the other part.
DEALERS' VERSION
IT TAKES TIME AND RESOURCES TO GOVERN AND TO COORDINATE THE COOPERATION
WITH THE COMPANY. TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES GIVE AN
ERRONEOUS OR CORRECT DESCRIPTION OF THIS ASPECT OF THE COOPERATION
SALES AREA MANAGER VERSION
IT TAKES TIME AND RESOURCES TO GOVERN AND TO COORDINATE THE COOPERATION
WITH THE COMPANY. TO WHAT EXTENT 00 THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES GIVE AN
ERRONEOUS OR CORRECT DESCRIPTION OF THIS ASPECT OF THE COOPERATION
Please put a cross in the square 1 (erroneous description) to 7 (completely correct
description):
Dealers version Sales Area Managers Version
Mal. 1 Mal. 1
The information from Shell is often The information from the dealer is often
poorly formulated and difficult to poorly formulated and difficult to
understand understand
Mal.2 Mal. 2
Important information from the Important information from the dealer
company seldom comes at the right time seldom comes at the right time
MaI.3 Mal. 3
The information from Shell is either The information from the dealer is
incomplete or to voluminous so that we either incomplete or to voluminous so
do not catch the message that we do not catch the message
Table 6.8 Operationalization of the concept of maladaption costs.
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6.3.4 Costs of Free-Riding
The costs of free-riding are costs due to degradation of the brand name by production of
inferior product or service quality in the market. Costs of free-riding are entailed by the
inter-dependency between the single dealer and the rest of the distribution system.
Because we anticipated that the dealer would not directly admit and report that he broke
the restrictions defined in the bilateral contract, we asked him instead about his opinion
of the quality-restrictions in the contract. The sales area manager version, though,
measures to what extent free-riding is taking place.
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DEALERS' VERSION
TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES GNE AN ERRONEOUS OR CORRECT
DESCRIPTION
SALES AREA MANAGER VERSION
TO WHAT EXTENT 00 THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES GNE AN ERRONEOUS OR CORRECT
DESCRIPTION
Please put a cross in the square 1 (erroneous description) to 7 (completely correct description):
Dealers version Sales Area Managers Version
Free. 1 (Reversed) Free.l
The restriction from Shell to wear The restriction from Shell to wear
uniforms is necessary uniforms is seldom followed by this
dealer
Free. 2 (Reversed) Free.2
The company restrictions to keep the The company restrictions to keep the
station clean and tidy are necessary and station clean and tidy are not followed by
relevant also to us and our station this dealer
Free. 3 (Reversed) Free. 3 (Reversed)
It is no problem to keep the station The station is always cleaned and tidy
perfectly clean even when there are a lot even when there are a lot of customers
of customers
Free. 4 (Reversed) Free. 4 (Reversed)
Our employees are often informed about It is unnecessary for us to control that the
the quality standards defined by the dealer respects the quality standards,
company because s/he keeps him/herself and the
employees informed about these quality
standards
Free. 5 (Reversed)
Our employees are often informed about
the importance of service quality
Table 6.9 Operationalization of the costs of free-riding .
The items on the dealers side were reversed and had to be recoded. Also item 3 and 4 in
the sales area manager version was reversed and had to be recoded.
The free-riding problem reflects suboptimal dealer behavior that reduces the value of
trademark specific assets signalling a standard quality in the market. Items 1 to 5 seek to
measure how much the dealer is dedicated to the standard quality signalled by the
trademark. A dealer who refuses to wear uniform free-ride on the other dealers efforts
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to build a trademark profile in the market (item 1). Likewise, the dealer who do not
follow the cleaning instructions (item 2) or prefer to use resources to increase sales
instead of keeping the station clean (item 3) is taking advantage of such quality-
activities produced by the other trademark dealers in the system. The trademark dealer
has to secure quality in all activities at the station that signal quality (or not) to the
customers. The question is, therefore, whether or not the dealer informs his employees
about the quality standards (item 4) and the importance of such standards (item 5). We
assume that if the employee is not well enough informed about the quality standards
given by the trademark company, he is not able to keep the standards signalled by the
trademark either. The assumption is that the other parts of the distribution system have
to carry the losses induced by one single free-rider, because he is not properly engaged in
quality management.
6.4 Performance
Consistent with the previous discussion of the conceptual model, the concept of
performance is divided into effectiveness and efficiency (Stern and El-Ansary 1988:478).
Effectiveness is measured by perceptual measures that describe the success of
interorganizational activities in order to meet the demand for service outputs
(Hyvonen 1983).Efficiency is measured as agent profitability. Because we study a
principal-multi-agent setting company efficiency can be held constant. Objective data
that describe efficiency was available only from the dealer - side of the dyad. According
to the company, there are scale advantages in distribution of gasoline. Thus, the
construct of efficiency was divided by gross sales revenue.
In a distribution system there is a problem to measure interorganizational efficiency. It
is a problem to divide company productivity into dealer related costs and income. A
solution applied here is to see company performance as a constant and dealer
productivity as a proxy for interorganizational efficiency. This is a rather robust
assumption because we have the same principal company on the supply-side in all
dyads. The robustness of the structural relation between costs and efficiency is highly
based on this assumption.
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DEALER VERSION
PLEASE CHARACTERIZE HOW SUCCESSFUL THE COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER PART
HAS BEEN IN THESE FIELDS OF ACTIVmES?
SALES AREA MANAGER VERSION
PLEASE CHARACTERIZE HOW SUCCESSFUL THE COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER PART
HAVE BEEN IN THESE FIELDS OF ACTIVITIES?
Please put a cross in the square l(very unsuccessful) to 7(very successful)
Dealers Version Sales Area Manager Version
Perc.l Perc.l
Marketing activities Marketing activities
PerC.2 Perc.2
Training and courses Training and courses
Perc.3 Perc.3
Management and control Management and control
Table 6.10 Operationalization of effectiveness.
Dealers Version
OPER.l
Net operating income/gross sales revenue
Table 6.11 Operationalization of efficiency.
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7. MEASURE VALIDATION
This chapter presents the specification of the measurement model. The empirical
investigation follows a three step approach described in chapter 5. The dyadic data
sample is used for measurement validation purposes in this chapter.The input to the
measurement validation was the unilateral model described in table 7.1 and 7.2 below.
7.1 Methodological Approach
The methodological approach was rather conventional. The applied method in the
screening process of the measurement model specification was item-to-total correlation
in the unilateral model and common factor analysis to specify the measurement model
in the dyadic screening process. A Cronbach's Alpha test of the measurement model
specification is also reported during the three step process.
7.2 Measurement Model Specification
The first step in the process is to determine the reliability of each construct.
Psychometric literature (Nunnally 1978, Lord and Novick 1968) argues that
measurement error is related to measurement of all non-directly observed theoretical
concepts. Because of real world complexity, a theoretical concept, therefore, should only
be constructed by multi-item approximation. A conventional method in order to assess
the level of measurement error is Cronbach's Alpha (Peter 1979).Cronbach's Alpha is
the most commonly accepted reliability test. Discriminant validity has been defined as
"the extent to which the measure is indeed novel and not simply a reflection of some
other variable" (Churchill 1979:70).In order to assess the unidimensionality of the
constructs on the same side of the equation, common factor analysis was used.
However, common factor analysis also assesses convergent validity. The number of
latent variables was determined in advance; that is, the number of latent variables is
restricted by the parallel dimensions of the conceptual model: the dimensions of
vertical control and the dimensions of transaction costs. Item to total correlations were
NORGES HANDELSHØYSKOLF
BIBLIOTEKET
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used to reduce the number of items to a more manageable data set (Gerbing and
Anderson 1988)and to provide acceptable reliability scores in the unilateral model
(Nunnally 1967)before analysis of dyadic data.
Factor analysis was also applied to assess convergent and discriminant validity of the
model. Common factor analysis (Principal Axis) uses the initial estimates of
communalities in the diagonal of the correlation matrix. The single item communality
is determined by the part of its variance explained by factors.
Orthogonal factor rotation was conducted in order to obtain interpretable factor
loadings. The varimax method (orthogonal rotation) reported here, maximizes the sum
of variances of squared loadings in the columns of the factor matrix. The principal axis
option (common factor analysis) in the SPSS-program was applied. The principal axis
method estimates the square multiple correlation coefficient obtained when each item
is regressed on the remaining set of observed items (Bollen 1989, Harman 1976).
7.3 Unilateral Measurement Model
The first step in our three step analysis approach was the unilateral measurement
model. First, the unilateral measurement model was determined by simple use of
item-total correlation (not reported here). Unilateral model analysis is based on the
data from 179 dealers. The intention is to provide a manageable set of data with
satisfactory internal consistency as well as acceptable face validity before the
measurement model specification in the dyadic model analysis.
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Dimensions Initial Number of Revised Number C.Alpha
Items
Centralization 19 9 0.86
Formalization 12 4 0.63
Interaction 17 9 0.89
Opportunism 9 5 0.74
Bargaining Costs 7 3 0.69
Contr. & Monitor. 6 3 0.70
Maladaption Costs 12 5 0.85
Free-Riding Costs 15 5 0.64
Effectiveness 3 0.67
Table 7.1 The number of items before and after the convergent screening by using item total
correlation in the unilateral model analysis (N=179).
The initial intention in the unilateral measurement model design was to satisfy the 0.7
Cronbach's Alpha - criteria defined by Nunnally (1978). However, as we can see from
table 7.1, four of the constructs had a lower alpha than 0.7.
As can be noted from table 7.1, alpha in the unilateral model range from 0.63 to 0.89 that
is still above the conventional acceptance criterion for basic research (Nunnally 1967).
The many items in the initially designed questionnaire reflected the exploratory nature
of the research conducted here. The constructs of centralization, formalization,
interaction and opportunism already had an acceptable face validity because the items
were imitations based on previous research. Transaction costs dimensions, though,
have a more improvisating character because we were not able to take advantage of
prior operationalizations. Table 7.2 shows that in the unilateral model, the lowest item-
total correlations after having deleted items that do not contribute to internal
consistency was 0.32.
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Unilateral Model Constructs Corrected Item - Total Correlation
Centralization 0.42
Formalization 0.33
Interaction 0.56
Opportunism 0.42
Bargaining Costs 0.38
Contr. & Monitoring costs 0.50
Maladaption Costs 0.66
Free-Riding Costs 0.32
Effectiveness 0.33
Table 7.2 The lowest item total correlation in each construct in the unilateral model analysis
(N=179).
7.4 Dyadic Analysis: Measurement Model
Design
The criticism against developing the measurement model and testing the modelon the
same sample is met here by formulating the measurement model by using dyadic
information as a measurement validation sample. Dyadic data was collected from 72
cases where each dealer and the company manager respectively are represented. The
reliability of the dyadic scales was tested by using Cronbach's Alpha. Common factor
analyses and item-total correlation (not reported here) were applied to improve
discriminant and convergent validity. Factor analysis is a conventional method that is
instrumental in order to identify the not-directly observable factors based on observable
data. Varimax rotation is reported from both sides of the dyad.
The factor analysis was instrumental in order to secure unidimensionality of the
constructs. Whenever one of the items from one side of the dyad did not show
satisfactory discriminant and convergent validity it was deleted from the scale. The basic
assumption here is that the model should have the same configuration on both sides
because the items describe the same aspects of vertical control and contractual costs on
both sides of the dyad. During the dyadic model specification parallelism was applied
(Anderson and Weitz 1991). So if one item was deleted from one side, it was also
deleted from the other side. Thus, in any case, where one item is not loading
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consistently on the same construct on both sides, we assume that it is not satisfactorily
related to the conceptual model.
ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX:
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 COMMUNALITY
CENTR.l .68 -.02 .42 .65
CENTR.2 .85 .12 .27 .si
CENTR.4 .70 .22 .Sl .Bl
CENTR.5 .74 .29 .16 .67
CENTR.B .63 .20 .35 .57
CENTR.9 m .14 .17 .57
FORM.2 .13 .19 .46 .27
FORM.3 .18 .04 .47 .26
FORM.4 .20 .00 .61 .41
INT.l .33 .82 .01 .80
INT.2 -.09 .77 .10 .61
INT.3 .45 .67 .01 .65
INT.6 .08 .83 .21 .74
INT.B .29 .36 .05 .22
PCT.OFVAR. 39.7 13.6 4.7
Table 7.3 Varimax rotation common factor analysis of vertical control; centralization,
formalization and interaction based on data from the company side of the dyad. Non-
construct factor-loadings above 0.30 are boldfaced (N=72).
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ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX:
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 COMMUNALITY
CENTR.1 .56 -.02 .w .33
CENTR.2 .75 .09 .w .58
CENTR.4 .'19 .06 -.26 .70
CENTR.5 .68 .10 -.16 .50
CENTR.8 .71 .05 -.10 .53
CENTR.9 .49 .22 .05 .29
FORM.2 .00 .13 .62 .40
FORM.3 -.07 .03 .35 .13
FORM.4 -.07 29 .55 .39
INT.1 .00 .88 -.01 .78
INT.2 .00 .80 .14 .66
INT.3 .11 .71 .16 .63
INT.6 .21 .60 .36 .54
INT.8 .18 .43 .22 .27
PCT.OFVAR. 25.2 17.8 5.5
Table 7.4 Varimax rotation common factor analysis of vertical control; centralization,
formalization and interaction based on data from the dealer side of the dyad. Non-
construct factor loadings above 0.30 are boldfaced (N=72).
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The vertical control dimensions create a less clear picture. Five non-construct factor
loadings are above 0.3 on the company side of the dyad and one non-construct factor
loading is above 0.3 on the dealer side. However, the dyadic measurement model of
vertical control dimensions still has an acceptable unidimensionality.
The results showed that the construct of centralization was the strongest dimension in
the factor analysis of vertical control. Centralization on both sides of the dyad was
determined by factor 1, which produced highest total variance of the three constructs.
Likewise factor 2, interaction, accounted for 13.6%of the variance on the company side
and 17.8%of the variance on the dealer side of the dyad. The third and weakest
construct in the three dimensionalized space of vertical control was formalization
reflected by factor 3 both on the company side and the dealer side. It accounted for only
4.7% (company side) and 5.5% (dealer side) of the variance.
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ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX:
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 COMMUNALITY
BARG.2 .17 .06 -.03 .52 .31
BARG.3 .14 .14 .00 .94 .92
CONT.l .19 .11 .'79 -.15 .70
CONT.2 -.12 .08 .76 .19 .64
CONT.3 .32 .04 .75 -.09 .68
MAL. l .84 .14 .14 .18 .78
MAL.2 .69 .41 .10 .19 .69
MAL.3 .81 .'l9 .14 .18 .80
FREE.l .21 .63 .00 .00 .45
FREE.2 .23 .90 .17 .15 .92
FREE.3 .12 .71 .09 .14 .65
PCT.OF VAR. 36.1 15.0 9.5 8.4
Table 7.5 Varimax rotation common factor analysis of transaction cost dimensions based on data
from the company side of the dyad (N=72). Non-construct factor loadings above 0.30 are
boldfaced.
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ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX:
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 COMMUNALITY
BARG.2 .05 .96 .10 .11 .95
BARG.3 .17 .64 .14 -.01 .46
CONT.l .09 .07 .76 -.05 .60
CONT.2 .26 .00 .55 .00 .38
CONT.3 .03 .17 .48 .07 .26
MAL. l .58 .20 .08 -.01 .39
MAL.2 .67 -.01 .25 .00 .52
MAL.3 .89 .08 .06 .00 .82
FREE.l .02 .06 .03 .67 .46
FREE.2 .02 .08 .07 .63 .41
FREE.3 -.05 -.05 -.04 .55 .32
PCT.OF VAR. 21.7 12.1 9.4 7.8
Table 7.6 Varimax rotation factor analysis of transaction cost dimensions based on data from the
dealer side of the dyad (N=72). Non construct factor loadings above 0.30 are
boldfaced.
Transaction costs dimensions had acceptable convergent and discriminant validity on
both sides of the dyad. On the company side, the lowest construct loading was 0.52 and
the greatest non-construct loading was 0.41. Only one non-construct loading was above
0.30 (MAL.2).
Dealer side data produced even better unidimensionality. The lowest construct loading
was 0.48 and greatest non-construct loading was 0.26. Although the factor pattern of the
vertical control dimensions was the same on each side of the dyad, the factor analysis of
the transaction cost dimensions (see table 7.5 and 7.6) produced a less consistent picture.
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The maladaption cost dimension (MAL) was determined by factor 1 on both sides and
accounted for most variance (36.1 on the company side and 21.7 on the dealer side).
While the construct of free-riding was represented by factor 2 on the company side of
the dyad, the free-riding cost dimension was represented by the fourth factor with
poorest percentage of variance on the dealer side. This may indicate that the problem of
producing inferior service and product quality more consistently is seen as a company
problem than a dealer issue.
The result of the dyadic analysis is a purified measurement model that has dyadic
validity. That is, the items belong to the exact same construct on both sides of the dyad.
Both dealers and company managers have consistent perceptions about the content of
the concepts vertical control and contractual costs related to the dyad.
All deleted items but one were eliminated from the model because of low discriminant
validity on the company side of the dyad. One item in the construct of opportunism
(OPP.5) was deleted because of item-total correlation below 0.20 on the dealer side. The
reliability of the measurement model seems to be adequate for further analysis. All
Cronbach' s Alpha's are above the O.s criterion established by Nunnally (1967).
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CONSTRUCT NUMBER OF NUMBER OF DEALER- COMPANY-
ITEMS ITEMS SIDE
UNILATERAL DYADIC (N=72)
ANAL YSIS ANAL YSIS ALPHA
SIDE
(N=72)
ALPHA
CENTRALIZATION 9 6 0.83 0.91
FORMALIZATION 4 3 0.55 0.55
INTERACTION 9 5 0.84 0.82
OPPORTUNISM 5 4 0.67 0.68
BARGAINING COSTS 3 2 0.79 0.70
CONTROL COSTS 3 3 0.64 0.80
MALADAPTION COSTS 3 3 0.77 0.89
FREE-RIDING COSTS 5 3 0.64 0.84
EFFECTIVENESS 3 3 0.68 0.77
Table 7.7 The number of items and Cronbach's Alpha after convergent and divergent
validity tests of dyadic data (N=72).
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LOWEST ITEM-TOTAL
CORRELATIONS
ITEMS DEALERS COMPANY
(N=72) (N=72)
CENTRALIZATION 6 0.44 0.71
FORMALIZATION 3 0.29 0.34
INTERACTION 5 0.45 0.42
OPPORTUNISM 4 0.38 0.29
BARGAINING COSTS 2 0.65 0.70
CONTROL COSTS 3 0.39 0.80
MALADAPTION COSTS 3 0.53 0.89
FREE-RIDINGCOSTS 3 0.41 0.84
EFFECTIVENESS 3 0.39 0.77
Table 7.8 Lowest corrected item-total correlation in each construct in the dyadic model (N=72).
There are, as we can see from table 7.8 above, two items in the revised dyadic model that
have corrected item-total correlations below 0.30. They are FORM.2 on the dealer side
(0.29)and OPP.3 on the company side (0.29).
7.5 Final Model Analysis: Retest of the
Measurement Model
The retest of the final measurement model formulated in the previous dyadic analysis
is evaluated by a Cronbach's Alpha test, common factor analyses and item-total
correlation. The constructs of centralization, formalization, interaction, and
opportunism have been tested in several previous studies. We present a comparison
of the internal consistency of the retested measurement model of vertical control and
opportunism with previous channel research that have used the same conceptual
variables.
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UNILATERAL
MODEL
ANALYSIS
(179)
DYADIC
MODEL
FINAL
MODEL
ANAL YSIS ANAL YSIS
DEALERS COMPANY (N=179)
(N=72) (N=72)
CENTRALIZATION 0.86 (9) 0.83 (6) 0.91 (6) 0.81 (6)
FORMALIZATION 0.63 (4) 0.55 (3) 0.55 (3) 0.58 (3)
INTERACTION 0.89 (9) 0.84 (5) 0.82 (5) 0.85 (5)
OPPORTUNISM 0.74 (5) 0.67 (4) 0.68 (4) 0.73 (4)
BARGAINING COSTS 0.69 (3) 0.79 (2) 0.70 (2) 0.74 (2)
CONTROL COS1S 0.70 (3) 0.63 (3) 0.80 (3) 0.70 (3)
MALADAPTION COSTS 0.85 (3) 0.77 (3) 0.89 (3) 0.85 (3)
FREE-RIDING COS1S 0.64 (5) 0.64 (3) 0.84 (3) 0.64 (3)
EFFECTIVENESS 0.67 (3) 0.68 (3) 0.77 (3) 0.67 (3)
Table 7.9 Cronbach 's Alpha and the number of items () in the unilateral model analysis,
dyadic model analysis and final model analysis.
Internal consistency in general shows satisfactory Cronbach's Alpha above the 0.5
criterion for basic research (Nunnally 1967). All constructs according to Nunnally (1967)
had acceptable Alpha's in the dyadic model analysis. Three constructs, though, had
Alpha's below the 0.7 criterion later suggested by Nunnally (1978).
The construct of centralization produced an Alpha of 0.81 in the final model. Although
this is lower than the unilateral model analysis, it is higher than revised Alpha's in
some previous research presented in table 7.10 below.
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Cronbach's Alpha
Dwyer and Welsh (1985) 0.49
John (1984) 0.79
John and Martin (1982) 0.52
Haugland and Reve (1988) 0.76/0.74
0.43/0.58
Phillips (1982) 0.70
Spekman and Stem (1979) 0.63
Reve and Stem (1986) 0.69/0.58
Table 7.10 Cronbach's Alpha of the construct of centralization in some selected previous studies.
The construct of formalization has the lowest Alpha in the final empirical model.
Although a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.58 is above the acceptance criterion of 0.5 for basic
research it is lower than expected due to an anticipated good face validity of the
construct. The reliability of the construct of formalization is somewhat lower than what
is mostly obtained in previous studies.
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Cronbach's Alpha
Dwyer and Welsh (1985) 0.72
John (1984) 0.63
John and Reve (1982) 0.75
Haugland and Reve (1988) 0.64/0.53
0.65/0.54
Hyvonen (1983) 0.83
Phillips (1982) 0.68
Reve and Stern (1986) 0.70/0.63
Spekman and Stem (1979) 0.68
Table 7.11 Cronbach's Alpha of the construct of formalization in some selected previous studies.
Interaction, though, shows acceptable reliability (0.85)compared to related studies that
have used the same construct variable. It has, however decreased relative to the
unilateral model. It is about the same as in Stem and Reve (1986) that was the main
source of items (Wholesaler C.Alpha=0.88, Retailer C.Alpha =0.86).
Cronbach's Alpha
Dwyer and Welsh (1985)
John and Martin (1984)
John and Reve (1982)
Phillips (1982)
Stern and Reve (1986)
Dahlstrom (1990)
0.53
0.85
0.86
0.70
0.88/0.86
0.84
Table 7.12 Cronbach 's Alpha of the construct of interaction of some selected previous studies.
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The construct of opportunism reflects relatively robust item combination. Only one of
the items was deleted through the dyadic screening process. An Alpha of 0.73 is
acceptable compared with other studies referred in table 7.13.
Cronbach's Alpha
Anderson (1988)
John (1984)
Phillips (1982)
Reve and Stem
0.88
0.88
0.59
0.71/0.80
Table 7.13 Cronbach's Alpha of the construct of opportunism of some selected previous studies.
The constructs that describe transaction cost dimensions gained reliability through the
screening process. On the other hand, because of low discriminant validity in the dyadic
model analysis, one item in bargaining costs and two items in maladaption costs had to
be deleted. In general, data from the managers reflects higher Alpha's of the cost
dimensions. The three step process has slightly reduced reliability of the constructs of
vertical control and opportunism. The situation is different for the cost dimensions.
One of the cost dimensions has slightly increased Alpha after the dyadic screening
--- process. The lowest item-total correlation in each construct is presented below in table
7.14.
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LOWEST ITEM-TOTAL
ITEMS CORRELATION
CENTRALIZATION 6 0045
FORMALIZATION 3 0.33
INTERACfION 5 0.50
OPPORTUNISM 4 0.41
BARGAINING COSTS 2 0.59
CONTROLCOSTS 3 0.50
MALADAPI10N COSTS 3 0.67
FREE-RIDING COSTS 3 0.38
EFFECTIVENESS 3 0.33
Table 7.14 The lowest corrected item-total correlation in the revised final model (N=179).
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ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX:
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 COMMUNALITY
CENTR.l -.01 .50 -.01 .25
CENTR.2 .00 .67 .00 .45
CENTR.4 .06 .75 -.20 .61
CENTR.5 .18 .58 -.17 .41
CENTR.8 .13 .64 -.10 .44
CENTR.9 .14 .61 -.04 .40
FORM.2 .17 -.12 Al 21
FORM.3 .00 -.07 .49 .25
FORM.4 21 -.09 .75 .62
INT.l .82 .06 .06 .69
INT.2 .81 .05 .07 .66
INT.3 .69 .14 .13 .51
INT.6 .74 .07 .15 .58
INT.8 .54 .11 .04 .30
PCT.OFVAR. 23.5 17.2 5.4
Table 7.15 Yarimax rotation common factor analysis of vertical control; centralization,
formalization and interaction based on data from the dealers (N=179). Non-
construct factor loadings above 0.30 are boldfaced.
As we can see from table 7.15, the construct of interaction in factor 1 produces more
variance and higher communalities than the construct of centralization. The construct
of interaction, therefore, seems to have improved unidimensionality relative to the
two other dimensions of vertical control. Formalization, still seems to be the weakest
variable in the multidimensional concept of vertical control after the dyadic model
analysis. The formalization construct had poor communalities and lowest percent of
variance (5.4%).
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ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX:
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 COMMUNALITY
BARG.2 .14 .04 .15 .67 .50
BARG.3 .12 .14 .02 .82 .71
CONT.l JYl .63 .01 .06 .40
CONT.2 .10 .73 Ul .05 .55
CONT.3 .04 .60 .17 .06 .40
MAL.l .76 .08 .os .09 .60
MAL.2 .70 .09 -.05 .15 .53
MAL.3 .94 .07 .06 .07 .90
FREE.l .01 .11 .68 .09 .48
FREE.2 .08 .06 .75 es .59
FREE.3 -.04 .04 .43 .03 .19
PCT.OFVAR. 23.4 13.2 8.9 8.2
Table 7.16 Yarimax rotation common factor analysis of transaction cost dimensions based on
data from the dealers (N=179). Non-construct factor loadings above 0.30 are
boldfaced.
-_ The maladaption cost construct still seems to be the strongest variable determined by
factor 1 with highest communalities and per cent of variance (23.4%),while bargaining
costs with two items (factor 4) produced 8.2%of the variance.
The final measurement model test shows the retest of the constructs purified through
the dyadic model analysis. No items measuring each construct of vertical control had
less factor loadings than 0.41. Also, no items measuring any other variable had loadings
above 0.21. Although the unilateral model analysis of the cost-dimensions indicated
acceptable convergent validity, some items were deleted due to low discriminant
validity through the dyadic model analysis. The factor analyses of the final model,
therefore, indicate a model with acceptable unidimensionality. No construct item
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loaded lower than 0.43 and no non-construct loading was higher than 0.17. Thus, the
final measurement model produced both better convergent validity and better
discriminant validity, though fewer items of the parallel constructs in model.
VERTICALCONTROL
LOWEST
CONSTRUCT
LOADING
HIGHEST
NON-CONSTRUCT
LOADING
FINAL MODEL (N=179) 0.41 0.21
Table 7.17 Lowest construct factor loadings and highest non-factor loadings of vertical control
dimensions in the retest of the measurement model.
LOWEST HIGHEST
TRANSACTION COST DIMENSIONS CONSTRUCT NON-CONSTRUCT
LOADING LOADING
FINAL MODEL (N=179) 0.43 0.17
Table 7.18 Lowest construct factor loadings and highest non-factor loadings of transaction cost
dimensions in the retest of the measurement model.
The single construct of perceived interorganizational performance obtained satisfactory
internal consistency through the three step process without loosing items. Based on the
measures provided by the three step analyses design means, standard deviation and
ranges were calculated and presented in table 7.19below.
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VARIABLE MEAN STD.DEV. MINIMUM MAXIMUM
CENTRALIZATION 268 1.12 1.00 6.50
FORMALIZATION 4.52 1.39 1.00 7.00
INTERACTION 3.79 1.38 1.00 7.00
OPPORTUNISM 290 1.33 1.00 6.75
BARGAINING COSTS 4.01 1.39 1.00 7.00
CONTROL COSTS 3.42 1.50 1.00 7.00
MALADAPTION COSTS 3.70 1.38 1.00 7.00
FREE-RIDING COSTS 218 0.95 1.00 7.00
EFFECTIVENESS 4.57 0.90 1.67 6.67
EFFICIENCY 0.01 0.06 -0.67 0.31
Table 7.19 Mean, standard deviation and range of the constructs in the final model (N=179).
7.6 Ex Ante contracts and Ex Post Vertical
Control
Before testing of the structural relations in our conceptual model, it is interesting to
relate the independent variables defined by vertical control dimensions to the ex ante
formal structural alternatives given by the three categories of company-dealer contracts.
The formal contracts are the ex ante structures that presumably were consistent with
our vertical control dimensions.
The question is how the three categories of ex ante contracts (employee dealers,
contracted dealers and independent dealers) are associated to the three aspects of vertical
control.
We have argued consistent with figure 2.1, that the three types of contracts reflect the ex
ante market-hierarchy dimension in the transaction cost theory. In this study though,
we have focused the ex post perspective of the theory. We chose a trademark company
with sufficient variation in ex ante contracts because we wanted to secure variation in
ex post vertical control. Our initial expectation, therefore, was that the level of vertical
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control was greater between the company and employee managers than between the
company and contracted dealers. We also expected that vertical control was greater
between the company and contracted dealers than between the company and
independent dealers. Yet, since the number of dimensions of vertical control was
extended, there may be no significant relationship between the three types of formal
contracts regarding the dimensions of vertical control. We expected, though, that
centralization was closest related to the formal ex ante contractual structure. That is,
employee dealers were more subjected to one-sided decisions from the company.
EMPWYEE EMPWYEE CONTRACT
DEALERS- DEALERS- DEALERS-
CONTRACT INDEPENDENT INDEPENDENT
DEALERS DEALERS DEALERS
Centralization 2,76 ...... 3,78 ......... 2,26 ......
(3,6-2,7) (3,6-2,3) (2,7-2,3)
Formalization 1,10 0,54 -(J,97
(4,9-4,4) (4,9-4,6) (4,4-4,6)
Interaction 2,47 ...... 1,63 -(J,84
(4,4-3,7) (4,4-3,8) (3,7-3,8)
Table 7.20 T-tests of the differences between formal contracts (employee dealers, contract dealers
and independent dealers) and dimensions of vertical control (centralization,
formalization and interaction). Mean values O.(N=179)
The test based on the final revised model (179)shows that centralization is related to the
ownership structure defined in the formal contract. Table 7.20 shows that employee
dealers consistent with the transaction cost literature (Williamson 1975, Dwyer and Oh
1988), are exposed to a significantly greater level of centralization than contracted
dealers. The more the company owns, the more hierarchical decisions the company
takes. Contracted dealers are subjected to more hierarchical decisions than independent
dealers. The T-values in table 7.20 reflect significant differences and are consistent with
our pretest anticipations.
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Although internal dealers relations to the company are more formalized than company
dealers and independent dealers, the results presented in table 7.20 are not significant.
The T-values also indicate that contracted dealers have a slightly less formalized
relationship to the company than the independent dealers. The level of formalization,
therefore, is not significantly related to the ownership structure and the explicit
contractual structure and is not opposing our initial choice of the dimension as
instrumental to describe the level of vertical control.
Vertical interaction as we can see from table 7.'1IJ, is somewhat related to the formal ex
ante contract. Employee dealers significantly interact more with the company than
contracted dealers and independent dealers. Still, the data seems to reflect slightly more
interaction between independent dealers and the company than between contracted
dealers and the company. But the relationships are not significant.
In general, centralization and interaction seem to be more associated with the
ownership structure defined in the contracts than formalization. The concept of
centralization is most strongly related to the ownership structure. The concept of
centralization is also the most important vertical control dimension. The close
relationship between the ownership structure and centralization shows that the
company uses hierarchical authority associated to the ex ante formal contract.
Conclusively, dimensions of vertical control are therefore not inconsistent with the
formal control inherent in the ex post contract.
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8. HYPOTHESES TESTING
The structural relations in the final model analysis are inspected by using ordinary least
square regression and Pearson correlation. S-coeffidents are standardized. That is, they
are comparable because they are measured in standard normal deviates. Coefficient of
determination (adjusted R-square) is also presented in the structural model analysis.
The first step in the structural analysis is a Pearson correlation in table 8.1 below. It
presents the bivariate correlations in the structural model. Bivariate correlations are
instrumental to inspect nomonological validity and the collinearity problem as well as
to draw a preliminary picture of the model,
The correlations indicate that centralization and formalization may be alternative
governance structures. There is a significant negative association between the two
-
constructs, while both centralization and formalization correlate positively with
vertical interaction. Both transaction cost dimensions and opportunism correlate
positively with each other. It is also the case with the two performance constructs.
The obtained data patterns in the correlation matrix, therefore, support nomological
validity. That is, the correlations indicate a fit between dimensions in the theoretical
network and the data (Cook and Campbelll979). Pearson correlation is also
instrumental in order to reveal a potential collinearity problem. Multicollinearity
diagnostics is also presented in appendix A. The diagnostic tests do not indicate
-~ unstable coefficients or shifting signs. The maximum difference between B-coefficients
when one, two or no independent variable was taken out of the model was 0.13.
Neither does the presented correlation matrix in table 8.1 indicate a collinearity problem
related to the three independent variables. Although the multicollinearity diagnostics
do not indicate a collinearity problem, it cannot be ignored.
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Correlation Coeffidents
CENIR JQBM. 1Nf. QPP. BARG. cosrr. MAL. FREE. PERC. QPER.
CENTR. 1,0000 ,-
FORM. -,1904 - 1,0000
INT. ,1948 -- ,2250-- 1,0000
OPP. ,1055 -,4117-- -,2253-- 1,0000
BARG. -))957 -,1911· -,4188-· ,3266-- 1,0000
corer. ,2098-- -,2559-- -,1686- ,2957-- ,1810- 1,0000
MAL. -,0114 -,2537-- -,2322·· ,2991-- ,2576-- ,1762· 1,0000
FREE. ,1731- -,2319·· -,1997-- ,1728· ,1504- ,1645- ,Q496 1,0000
PERC. P779 ,2453-- ,5661-· -,3461'" -,3939-- -,1871- -,3446-- -,2134-- 1,0000
I--ol OPER. -))997 ,1625· ,()028 -,0869 ,Q477 ,0590 -,0571 -,0349 ,1223 1,000
O
I--ol
It p<0.05 --p<O.01 (2-tailed)
Table 8.1 Two tIIiled Pttmtm correlation of the fitull structural model (N=179).
In order to investigate the relationship between multiple dimensions of the
independent variables and the dependent variable described in the conceptual model,
we have applied ordinary least squares regression. The method is instrumental to
compute an estimate of the hypothesized structure in the model, and is providing an
evaluation of how the model fits the data by calculating adjusted R2.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
OPPORTUNISM
CENTRALIZA TJON
FORMALIZA TJON
INTERACTION
0.07
-0.36 •••
-0.16··
ADJUSTED R SQUARE
• p<0.10
•• p < 0.05
••• P < 0.001
0.18
Table 8.2 Ordi1Ulry least square regression P-coefficients in the Jimll model a1Ullysis between
vertical control and opportunism (N=179).
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INDEPENDENT VARIABlEs
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
BARGAINING COSTS CONTROL COSTS MAlADAPTION
COSTS
FREE-RIDING
COSTS
CENTRALIZATION -O,D4 0,21 •• -O,()2
FORMALIZATION -0.11 -0,18·· -0,22 ••
INTERACTION -0.39 ••• -0,17·· -0,18 ••
ADJUSTED R SQUARE 0.17 0,10 0,08
• p<O.lO
~
O •• P < 0.05
CJJ
••• P < 0.001
0,18 ••
-0,15 ••
-0,20 ••
0,09
Table 8.3 Ordinary least squIIre regression p-coefficients in the final modelilnalysis between vertiCilI control and transaction cost dimensions (N=179).
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE BARGAINING COSTS
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
CONTROL COSTS MALADAPTION
COSTS
FREE-RIDING
COSTS
OPPORTUNISM 0,33 ...... 0,30 ...... 0,30 ...... 0,17 ....
ADJUSTED R SQUARE
.. p<0.10
.... P <0.05
......P < 0.001
0,10 0,08 o,os 0,02
Table 8.4 OrdinAry least square regression ft-coefficients in the finAl model anAlysis between opportunism and transøction cost dimensions (N=179).
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
EFFECTIVENESS EmCIENCY
BARGAINING COSTS .
CONTROL COSTS
MALADAPTION COSTS
FREE-RIDING COSTS
ADJUSTED R-SQUARE
.. p<O.lO
.... p < 0.05
......P < 0.001
-0.30 ...... 0.06
-{j'(1l 0.07
-0.25 ...... -0.08
-0.15 .... -{j.05
0.23 -0.009
Table 8.5 Ordinary least sqUilre regression fl-coefficients in the final model analysis of the
relation between transllction cost dimensions and performance (N=179).
·-The analysis of the structural model indicates that the impact of vertical control is less
consistent. Centralization increases, though, not significantly the level of opportunism
as can be noted from table 8.2. On the other hand, hierarchical decision making as we
can see from table 8.3 increases significantly the level of costs of control (0.21, p«).Os)
and free-riding (0.18,p«).Os).
Thus centralization has a rather fragmental effect on opportunism and costs (tables 8.2
and 8.3). The regression and correlation coeffiåents are consistently providing
significant relationship-estimates between centralization and control costs and between
centralization and free-riding costs. The results do not support hypothesis la that there
is a negative relationship between centralization and opportunism. The indications
105
that centralization increases costs of control and free-riding costs contradicts predictions
derived in hypothesis 2b and hypothesis 2d. The positive relationship in the correlation
matrix between free-riding costs and control costs (0.16,p<0.05) may, however, indicate
that the company increases centralization in order to control the free-riding problem.
Yet, post test interviews indicated that centralization may itself produce free-riding.
The reason is that the basic assumption when the company takes decisions one-sided is
that it has necessary information available. When the company takes decisions without
crucial information regarding the dealer businesses, it may take wrong or poor
decisions.· Free-riding costs, therefore, according to the debriefing interviews, may be a
dealer reaction to mistaken company policy. Centralization of decisions rests on
assumptions that the principal company is well informed about the situation in the
distribution system. When this is not the case, the company might take poor decisions
affecting the company-dealer relationship, increasing opportunism, control costs and
the costs of free-riding.
Formalization seems to have a more consistent impact on opportunism and cost-
dimensions (tables 8.2 and 8.3). Formal rules and procedures reduce the level of
opportunism (-0.36, p«).OOl). Increased formalism also is associated to significant
reduced control costs, maladaption costs and. free-riding costs as can be noted in table
8.3.
Vertical interactions seem to reduce both opportunism and the cost dimensions (tables
__8.2 and 8.3). Supportive activities from the principal company create a better channel
environment and better efficiency. The adjusted R-square seems to indicate that the
model fit to the data is rather weak. Vertical control explains 18% of the variation in the
construct of opportunism (Adj.R-square 0.18). Also vertical control relationship tothe
cost dimensions results in a quite low adjusted R-square of 0.08.
The structural test, therefore, supports the prediction in Hypotheses lb,c, and
2f,g,h,i,j,k,!. Aspects of formalization and interaction reduce opportunism and costs.
The OLS regression model is consistent with the results presented in the Pearson
.orrelation. The test-results provide a weak model support. The model-test indicates a
clear negative relationship between formal and interactive aspects of vertical control
and the cost dimensions.
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The structural model test indicates that more opportunism increases the level of costs
significantly (see table 8.4). The impact of opportunism on free-riding costs resulted in
the lowest explained variance of 0.02, which is low. All B-coefficients describing the
relationships between opportunism and cost-dimensions were significant.
Hypothesis 3a,b,c,d, that there is a positive relationship between opportunism and costs,
therefore, is strongly supported. The test also indicates that the social mechanisms of
opportunism are related to the conduct of vertical control. Thus, the results support the
application of the political economy framework in transaction cost analysis. Both
behavioral and contractual aspects of the relationship affect the dimensions of
transaction costs.
Transaction costs as indicated in table 8.5 reduce effectiveness, but seem to have no
impact on the dealers' efficiency (operating income/gross sales revenue-ratio). The lack
of model support for relations between cost-dimensions and objective performance
measures may have at least two reasons. First, the income/sales revenue-ratio reflects
only one part of the dyadic performance. Also one-sided performance information may
lack essential information about interorganizational efficiency. Another potential
reason is that transaction costs may not be of enough importance relative to production
costs for the agent dealer in the short term, so that it is not possible to detect structural
relationships between costs and efficiency. Since transaction costs are caused by more
structural reasons, defined by the bilateral contract, time series between transaction costs
and annual report data may be needed. There is, however, a marginal positive, though
--not significant assoåation between bargaining costs and control costs and dealer
efficiency (see table 8.6). Although the estimates did not reach the critical significance·'
level, the signs according to Jensen and Merkling (1976) are right. There may be a long
term trade-off between increased control and bargaining and agent performance. When
the company uses resources on bargaining and monitoring activities the contractual
disharmony may be reduced and efficiency will increase. Maladaption costs relate to an
imperfect information system. This leaves both parties disinformed and incompetent
to realign the contract and to optimize the contractual relationship. The relationship
drifts out of alignment (VY dliamson 1988). Free-riding does not, consistent with our
theoretical discussion (H4h) increase performance. Free-riding costs and maladaption
costs have consistent with hypotheses 4 f and h a negative effect on efficiency.
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The estimates of the relationship between costs and perceived performance in the OLS
regression model and in the correlation matrix are consistent. The same is the case in
the relation between the cost dimensions and the efficiency construct (OPER). In order
to control for production cost explanations, sales revenue was applied as a third variable
in the regression model (see table 8.6). Instead of using the sales revenue/ net operating
income-ratio as a dependent variable in the estimation model, we used only net
operating income as a proxy for efficiency. The following results presented in table 8.6
then strongly support production costs explanations. However, only control costs did
not significantly affect perceptual performance/effectiveness. Control costs did not
receive significant support as a determinant for perceptual performance in the prior
model estimation either. The model now explains 25 % of the variation that is better
than previously stated (see table 8.5). The test supported that sales revenue affects net
operating income. Transaction costs dimensions, however, do not produce significant
8-coeffidents at all.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
PERCEPTUAL NET OPERATING
PERFORMANCE INCOME
SALES REVENUE 0.15·· 0.38 •••
BARGAINING COSTS -0.29 ••• 0.03
CONTROL COSTS ~.06 -0.03
MALADAPTION COSTS -0.26 ••• -0.05
FREE-RIDINGCOSTS -0.13 .. 0.01
ADJUSTED R-SQUARE 0.25 0.11
• P < 0.10
.. P <0.05
••• P < 0.001
Table 8.6 Ordinary least square regression p-coefficients in the final model analysis of the
relation between sales revenue, transaction ;t dimensions and performance (N=179).
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The final structural model produces significant results. The adjusted R squares
indicated support for the conceptual model. Vertical control is related to opportunism
and transaction costs, opportunism affects transaction costs. Finally, transaction costs
influence interorganizational performance.
Thus, the empirical results support the prediction derived from theory that transaction
costs dimensions are related to the ex post contract and affected by opportunism. The
results, also question how conbact related costs relate to performance. Our
indications(table 8.6) that production cost theory was far more powerful in predicting
efficiency contradicts evidence produced by Anderson (1985)and John and Weitz (1988).
In their studies production cost theory was dominated by transaction cost explanations.
John and Weitz (1988)also like the study presented here, measured sales volumes as a
proxy for production cost explanations. Anderson (1985),though, applied the value of
assets as a proxy for the production _costsargument However, economies of scale is
closely related to production techniques in the industry and might differ between
industries. Production costs, therefore, might or might not be related to size measures.
On the other hand, studies conducted by both Lilien (1979),Walker and Weber (1984)
and Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990), consistent with our results supported the
importance of production costs.
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9. IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The implications of this research are both theoretical, methodological, and managerial
The study also has some dear limitations. This chapter presents these aspects of the
conducted study. The research presented here may have focused on some relevant
fields for future research. But prior to the implications and limitations, we will relate
our findings to the four conventional dimensions of validity (Cook and Campbell 1919);
a) Statistical conclusion validity
b) Internal validity
c) Construct validity
d) External validity
Statistical conclusion validity refers to inferences about whether it is reasonable to
presume covariation (Cook and Campbell 1979:41). More precisely statistical conclusion
validity focuses the magnitude of covariation between the variables in the model. As
we have presented previously, our structural tests indicate that the dimensions of
vertical control accounts for 8% to 17% of the variation in the dimensions of
transaction costs and 18% of the variation in the level of opportunism. The explained
variation is relative moderate. However, seven of the hypotheses are supported at the
0.05 % level of significance and two hypotheses produce significant results in the
opposite direction. Although the general support for the model is quite weak, the data
have revealed significant and strong indications of a structural relationship between the
independent and dependent variables. The estimates produced in the empirical model,
--therefore, indicate that the study is sensitive enough to draw reasonable statements
about covariation between ex post vertical control and transaction costs.
Our investigation of correlational relationships based on survey data do not intend to
derive decisions about the direction of causality. Internal validity refers to whether it is
possible to infer a causal relationship between the independent and the dependent
variable. Thus, the results presented here do not provide statements about causal
direction. The grounding in prior channel research and theory as well as the chosen
homogeneous setting may control for alternative explanations. Still, the need for
sequential data in order to legitimate statements of causal direction is not satisfied here.
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In the transaction cost literature the concept of transaction costs is outlined very loosely
(Hennart 1986,Williamson 1985, 1988). Therefore, A more precise and operational
definition was needed in order to provide content validity of the concept. The
dimensionalization of transaction costs is derived from the exploratory interviews
guided by theory. Chapter 6 presented the operational definitions and
operationalizations of the other concepts in the theoretical model. Other concepts than
transaction costs were not new to empirical modelling. It was possible to draw the lines
from cumulative research here.
The ambition was to test predictions derived from the presented theory and to develop
new constructs. Inorder to do so we chose to study the phenomenon of transaction cost
dimensions in a real world context by using a survey research design instead of
experimentation. The research, therefore, emphasizes the importance of construct
validity (Reve 1985).Construct validity refers to the approximate validity with which
we can make generalizations about higher-order constructs from research operations
(Cook and Campbell 1979).Construct validity-testing evaluates the relation between
measures in a way that is consistent with the theoretical model Construct validity,
discriminant, and convergent validity were assessed by applying item-total correlation
and common factor analysis. That is, when an applied set of indicators has only one
underlying construct in common, the construct is unidimensional and have achieved
satisfactory construct validity. As reported in table 7.17 and 7.18, the final measurement
model indicates satisfactory unidimensionality.
---Generalization of the presented results had no priority in this study. The empirical
setting for this study might constrain external validity of the results. In addition
cultural, political and market factors might be critical for generalization of the findings.
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9.1 Theoretical Implications
The cumulative empirical research (presented in table 2.1) in transaction cost theory
still has not investigated contract-related cost-dimensions. The situation indicates that a
more performance oriented research perspective is needed. Some aspects of the
empirical evidence presented here may contribute to the investigation of the problem.
Despite the exploratory character of this research, significant test-results as well as a
retest of the measurement model, indicate the existence of contract-related costs. 'The
empirical model supports the cost-dichotomy suggested in the transaction cost literature
(Williamson 1985:22).
However, the fact that our model results not reveal consistent significant support in
favor of transaction cost analysis do not imply that these costs have no impact on
efficiency. There might be a trade off between bargaining costs, control costs on one side
and maladaption costs and free-riding costs on the other. That is, if the contractual
arrangements are changed, the balance between cost dimensions will affect efficiency.
For instance, the company can by increased centralization increase resources used in
bargaining and control activities more than it gets back from reduced maladaption and
free-riding. Decreased centralization might reduce bargaining costs and control costs but
on the other hand increase maladaption costs and free-riding costs.
The research also focuses on the assoctation between dimensions of vertical control.
Contrary to what is believed in the transaction cost literature, hierarchical decision
modes have little or no consequences on the level of opportunism. Centralization
seems to be closely related to the level of control and monitoring costs and the costs of
free-riding. Centralization, therefore, might be instrumental to increase control in
order to reduce the level of free-riding.
However, control costs have an impact on performance. The indication may be
consistent with the Jensen and Meckling (1976)theory that there is a trade-off between
the principals' costs of control and residualloss by using agents.
The results partly support observations from Eccles and W'Lite(1988) that
internalization may be related to transaction costs. The investigation emphasizes the
importance of formalization and interaction inherent in the dyadic contract. Both
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contractual aspects produce cost-efficiency consistent with predictions derived from
transaction cost theory.
This calls for fewer restrictions on the scope of transaction cost analysis. Other
dimensions of the bilateral contract than hierarchical decision modes such as
formalization and interaction seem to be of crucial importance to transaction cost
efficiency. However, the results reported here contradict John (1984) that formalization
leads to erosion of positive attitudes and more opportunism. Our results, on the other
hand, indicates that formalization reduces the level of opportunism.
Inparticular, because our study and the investigation conducted by John (t984) gathered
data from oil companies, the inconsistent results provide interesting speculations.
Aspects related to the empirical setting and the strategy of each company might have
affected the results: Cultural factors (Norwegian versus American culture) and the time
difference might have influenced the test conditions. Methodological differences also
might have caused diverging results. John (1984) based his research on data from the
dealer-side only. On the other hand, our indications that opportunism is reduced by
increased formalism, is consistent with the multi-industry study conducted by Reve
(1980) and the study conducted by Dwyer and Oh (1987) from the automobile industry.
Formalization limits the agents' access to internal decision processes and restricts the
agents' participation in political activities. Formalization reduces the room for potential
subgroup control and therefore any payoff by utilizing asymmetric information. In
__addition, formalization reduces external uncertainty. More formalization creates a
stable interorganizational context and makes both parties more committed to their
relationship. Rules and routines define the roles that both parties have. Thus,
formalization decreases the potential for role conflicts. The structural test indicates a
negative relationship between centralization and formalization. Centralization and
formalization might be alternative governance structures of vertical control. The
principal may use hierarchical decision modes in some relationships and routines and
rules to govern other agents.
Vertical interaction seems to create goal congruence. When the principal company
helps the dealer to operate in the market, the transaction climate is affected positively.
In a principal company-dealer relationship, the agent has an informational advantage
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related to the market operations. Interaction might motivate the parties to be more
open to each other. When interaction increases, the decision making probably will be
more decentralized and the dealer does not feel that the company threatens his
autonomy.
j The results seem to indicate that both parties are more motivated to share information
when the level of vertical interactions is greater. Also vertical interactions have direct
effects on cost dimensions. The agent might be more reæptive to influence from the
company when the agent has a real option to participate or not, Vertical interactions
may create synergy effects. That is, both parties can, through the resources the principal-
company offers to the dealer, combine forces in a more efficient way. Our results do not
support theory that centralization and formalization is negatively related to interaction
(Dwyer and Oh 1988). Our results instead indicate a positive association between
centralization and interaction.
Centralization of decisions as a contractual instrument also makes centralization of
information necessary. However, in a principal-agency context, information asymmetry
in favor of the agent is typical (Milgrom and Roberts 1988). Contrary to what was
expected, costs of free-riding increased when centralization increased. The results may
indicate that centralization may pulverize responsibility for quality-signal activities.
Also, it is possible that fewer output-dependent incentive structures inherent in more
centralized contracts produce a shirking problem and that shirking also affects the
problem of free- riding. Hierarchical decisions may demotivate the agent and make him
"less committed to the quality standards defined by the company. On the other hand, the
company might increase one sided decisions to cope with the free-riding problem. The
indication that centralization is significantly associated to both control costs and free-
riding costs supports this speculation. The company interfers with dealer businesses to
control the problem of free-riding.
Debriefing interviews indicate that causality goes both ways. Centralization may
increase the control costs and costs of free-riding. Yet, the phenomenon of free-riding
also increases the need for more centralized governance structures. The lack of
temporal asymmetry in the data makes it impossible to investigate causal direction.
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The indications that centralization increases opportunism is consistent with results
from the investigation conducted by John (1984) and Reve (1980). Also Dwyer and Oh
(1987) found that centralization had a negative impact on relationship quality.
The research supports the predictions derived from the political-economy framework
that social aspects such as the level of opportunism has economic consequences (Stem
and Reve 1980). The results indicate that the level of opportunism has impact on the
cost structure.
Thus, our results support previous research on the political economy framework.
Structural dimensions of vertical control affect the level of opportunism. Opportunism
as a sodo-political dimension also affect the cost structure. Our results support the
thoughts that there is a strong interplay between social aspects of the transaction and
economic components of the interorganizational relationship.
9.2 Methodological Implications
The study introduced an hour glass shaped three step analyses design. The design is
applicable to settings were data from some but not all cases are available as dyads. Then
it is possible to tune the measurement model before final structural testing as well as
retesting of the measurement model. The fust step was an unilateral model analysis.
The unilateral model provided an overview and a more manageable data set with
-- acceptable face validity and reliability for further analyses. The screening process
through the dyadic model analyses defined a measurement model before final model
testing. The three-step approach produced acceptable convel"8ent and discriminant
validity of parallel constructs in the empirical modeL The most important aspect of the
three step approach is that it provides a measurement model valid to both sides of the
samedyad.
Interorganizational research has previously been criticized to be biased because of the
single side information (John and Reve 1982). Our results indicate that the final model
had better internal consistency and discnuunant validity (see tables 7.17 and 7.18). The
other methodological implication is the multi-item operationalization and sub-
dimensionalization of transaction costs. The research follows the Jines from
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psychometric tradition (Nunnally 1978, Lord and Novick 1968) that a theoretical concept
is difficult to measure in an imperfect and complex world and therefore has to be
measured by several indicators.
A multi-item approach to the transaction cost-operationalization may also be the only
way to study the problem because it seems to be difficult to dimensionalize these costs
by using objective measures or dummy-variables. The multi-item operationalization
approach to the dimensionalization of transaction costs may produce a richer and more
fruitful source for future research and for managerial utilization of the results.
One of the methodological contributions here is the multi-item description of
theoretical concepts. But obtaining construct validity is a long term process and cannot
be stated by one single study. This study, therefore, might contribute to the cumulative
stream of research based on transaction cost theory. The study can be seen as an
extension of transaction cost analysis from using traditional specificity, uncertainty or -
frequency-proxies for transaction costs. Instead, we developed multi-item proxy-
variables that describe contract related cost-dimensions.
9.3 Managerial Implications
Formalization and interaction aspects of bilateral contracts produce consequences of
interest to the management of distribution activities. The empirical analysis especially
emphasizes the strong effects of formalization and interaction. The statistical
relationship between more formalization and decreased opportunism is highly
significant (-0.36, p«).OO1) which, indicates that the model also may have practical
importance <McCloskey 1985). The same may be the case in the relationship between
interaction and reduced bargaining costs (-0.39, p«).OO1). The research suggests that the
principal company, rather than using hierarchical decisions as a mode of managing the
distribution system, instead applies more formal routines, procedures, rules etc. and
offers more vertical cooperation as an operational instrument of vertical control.
The study provides indications that there is a relationship between centralization,
control costs and free-riding costs. It may indicate that the company intervenes to
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control the agent whenever free-riding occur. Centralization, therefore, might be an
appropriate reaction to mitigate the damaging effect of free-riding problems.
Formalization might be a way to economize on transaction costs. Formalization makes
it unnecessary to renegotiate the bilateral agreement on every small occasion.
Therefore, formal routines and programming reduce bargaining costs. Also more
formal rules and procedures constraint the room for suboptimal political activities and
the need to negotiate.
Formalization makes the relationship more predictable. This might stimulate the
commitment between the two parties in the relationship. A predictable and stable
relationship reduces the uncertainty for both parties. More formaUsm a1so constrains
the room for privileges in the system. Therefore, the dealers will reduce their political
activities in order to gain private advantages from the rest of the system. For the
trademark company that invests in reputation capital, it is important to be able to
control dealer activities. A regulated interorganizational system makes company
control easier and more efficient. Another managerial advantage of formalization is
that it contributes to the standardization of activities that are related to the trademark in
the market. Thereby, it may contribute to the production of standard quality signalled
by the trademark. The magnitude of interaction between the parties stimulates a
cooperation where resources do not overlap. Interaction reflects voluntary decisions
taken by the parties. The acceptance of the autonomy of both parties in the transaction
reduces opportunism and transaction costs.
The managerial implications of our findings are twofold. Formalization and interaction
are cost minimizing contractual instruments. Centralization might be an appropriate
contractual instrument when free-riding has been detected.
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9.4 Limitations
This research is to our knowledge the first step to pierce the surface of contract-related
cost-dimensions. The results, therefore, have to be evaluated as preliminary. Obtaining
construct validity is a long-term process and cannot be stated by one single study.
Although, there is sufficient variation in the independent variable, the contractual
relation, the study has not inspected the impact of vertical controlover time. Because
the empirical model does not reflect temporal asymmetry, the structural indications
have to be treated carefully. The conclusions are, therefore, based on a ceteris paribus
argument. The robustness of the results is as good as this argument. However, the
aspects of one company and one relatively homogeneous technology in a stable
economic and social context, may provide a satisfactory empirical setting to explore the
problem of transaction costs. On the other hand, the single informant problem (Phillips
1982) may produce biased perceptions of organizational properties.
While the other constructs in the model reflect satisfactory construct validity across
settings and time, the same is not the case with the sub-dimensions of transaction costs.
The constructs of transaction costs may be limited to the chosen empirical context.
However, the presented study may contribute to the long-term process of construct
validation. The homogeneous setting was chosen in order to gain statistical power and
to control third variables.
The regression results are based on a linearity assumption. That is, the structural
"modelling assumes that a marginal step in one variable causes a linear change in
another variable. The test-results presented in this study are as strong as this
assumption.
Although some diagnostic tests (Appendix A) as well as the correlations in table 8.1 do
not indicate a multicollinearity problem, the complex problem is not solved and cannot
be ignored as a limitation of the presented results.
The three step analysis approach chosen here strongly emphasized the value of
construct validity. The .....ason was that we developed new constructs. During the
rather conservative validation process many items were deleted from the model. A
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more generous specification had produced more items in the final model, but poorer
unidimensionality of the final constructs.
9.5 Further Research
The path of progression following this research would indicate more focus on the
concept of vertical control as an ex post transaction cost economizing instrument. lbat
is, more emphasis on categorizing and development of multi-item constructs. This will
provide a more fruitful insight into these aspects subjected to managerial control after
the relation is established by the ex ante formal contract
The focus on agency theory as well as transaction cost theory of cost-efficient contracts
will only have a long-term empirical value if it is possible to test theory in a real-world
context. Both transaction cost theorists (Williamson 1985:116) and agency theorists
(Holmstrom and Tirole 1989:126) call for stronger interplay between theoretical and
empirical work. It is therefore necessary to continue to explore the nature of contract-
related cost-dimensions theoreticallyas well as empirically. Although both transaction
cost theory and agency theory predict efficiency, few empirical studies have attempted to
address the problem.
Previous research lacks the methodological power of the time-dimension. The
consequence is that causal relations have to be grounded theoretically. Future research,
_~therefore, should use time-series or experimental design in order to assess cost efficient
contracts.
In order to give construct validity high priority we chose a principal-multi-agent
empirical setting. The principal company had invested in trademark specific assets.
However, contrary to what is generally believed according to the transaction cost theory,
the company had designed a plural distribution system. Both internal and independent
dealers operate the same type of business and business relationship with the company.
Few studies have approached the theoretical question inherent in this empirical
observation (Bradach and Eccles 1988, Minkler b~, Walker and Weber 1984). Future
theory development as well as empirical analysis may focus more on a network of
transactions level than on the micro analytic relationship of the single dyad. Our study
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follows the latter category of research tradition based on transaction cost theory and the
transaction as the unit of analysis. However, pursuing the work in theory building
might provide more powerful explanations of the phenomenon of plural forms. Macro
level perspectives like network theory (Thorelli 1986) and price, authority and trust
models (Bradach and Eccles 1989)have produced some insights about the macro level
rationality of pluralism. These perspectives, though, do not intend to explain how
these companies minimize transaction costs and opportunism and survive as
organizational forms (Alehian 1950). A major future chaDenge is to explain how macro
level strategies affect transaction costs and performance.
120
10. CONCLUSIONS
Researchers have almost never tried to explore the magnitude of contract related
transaction costs but instead used transaction characteristica as proxies for the assumed
level of these costs (Day and Klein 1987, Klein, Frazier and Roth 1990). The question is
whether transaction costs can be empirically investigated. The exploratory research
presented here provides evidence that it is possible to operationallze and to observe
contract related cost dimensions. Transaction cost theory as a normative theory only has
value if cost efficiency or performance predictions can be empirically supported. The
extension of transaction cost analysis presented here, might be an instrumental avenue
of research to inspect interorganizational performance. Empirical evidence from this
study may contribute to inspect the normative aspects of the received theory.
We have consistent with transaction cost theory (Williamson 1988) applied an ex post
perspective. That is, we have explored how vertical control influences transaction costs
after the relationship was established between the principal company and the dealer.
Our results indicate associations between vertical control, opportunism and transaction
costs.
The study also presents a three step analysis design. Here, the model specification prior
to hypothesis testing was based on dyadic data. Dyadic data served as a validation
sample to obtain construct validity prior to the final testing. Hypothesis testing though,
was based on one sided data from 179 dealers. The analysis approach was designed in
order to meet two kinds of criticism. First, that one sided information do not permit
vana tests of dyadic relationships (Iohn and Reve 1982). The analysis design also waS
formulated to meet the criticism against the use of the same data both to develop
measures and to test relationships (Noordewier, John and Nevin 1990).
The three step analysis approach provided a measurement model where the constructs
had unidimensionality on both sides. The analysis design presented here might be
instrumental when dyadic information is available for some but not all cases.
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Appendix
APPENDIX A:
MULTICOLLINEARITY DIAGNOSTICS
Dependent variable
Opportunism Centralization Formalization Interaction
1 0.11 - -
2 - -0.42 -
3 - - -0.24
4 0.03 -0.41 -
5 0.16 - -0.27
6 - -0.38 -0.15
7 0.09 -0.35 -0.16
Maximum 0.13 0.07 0.12
Difference
Table AI. Multicollinearity diagnostics. All combinations of p-coefficients in the relationship
between vertiCilI control and opporlunism.(N=179)
Dependent variable
Bargaining costs Centralization Formalization Interaction
1 -0.09 - -
2 - -0.19 -
3 - - -0.43
4 -0.13 -0.22 -
5 0.00 - -0.43
6 - -0.10 -0.41
7 -0.03 -0.11 -0.40
Maximum 0.13 0.12 0.03
Difference
Table A2. Multicollinearity diagnostics. All combinations of p-coefficients in the relationship
between oeriical control and bargaining costs.(N=179)
Dependent variable Centralization Formalization Interaction
Control costs
1 0.21 - -
2 - -0.25 -
3 - - -0.17
4 0.17 -0.22 -
5 0.25 - -0.22
6 - -0.22 -0.12
7 0.21 -0.17 -0.17
Maximum 0.08 0.08 0.10
Difference
Table AJ. Multicollinearity diagnostics. All combinations of p-coefficients between vertical
control and control costs.(N=179)
Dependent variable Centralization Formalization Interaction
Maladaption costs
1 -0.01 - -
2 - -0.26 -
3 - - -0.23
4 -0.07 -0.27 -
5 0.03 - -0.23
6 - -0.22 -0.18
7 -0.02 -0.23 -0.17
Maximum 0.10 0.05 0.06
Difference
Table A4. Multicollinearity diagnostics. All combinations of p-coefficients between vertical
control and maladaption costs.(N=179)
Dependent variable Centralization Formalization Interaction
Free-Riding costs
1 0.17 - -
2 - -0.23 -
3 - - -0.19
4 0.13 -0.21 -
5 0.21 - -0.23
6 - -0.20 -0.15
7 0.18 -0.16 -0.19
Maximum 0.08 0.07 0.08
Difference
Table AS. Multicollinearity diagnostics. All combinations of p-coefficients between vertical
control and free-riding cosfs.(N=179)
APPENDIX B:
SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
(179 CASES)
Total sales of Frequency Percent Cumulative
gasoline (1000 m3) Percent
u/l000 29 16.2 16.2
1000-1500 44 24.6 40.8
1500-2000 48 26.8 67.6
2000-3000 39 21.8 89.4
0/3000 19 10.6 100.0
Total 176 100.0 100.0
Table B 1 The size distribution of the final model cases (N=179).
Activities Number
of stations
Gas Station only 29
Gas Station, car wash and service hall 135
Car Sales 7
Fast Food 17
Mini Super Market 67
Table B 2 Description of selected activities at the stIltions in the final model sample (N=179).
Location Number
of stations
European highway, state highway or 141
other traffic intensive location
Rural district, less traffic location 38
Total 179
Table B 3 The location of the gasoline stations in the final model sample (N=179).
APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRES AND ENCLOSURES
Oslo, 11.Juni 1990
KJÆRE FORHANDLER!
Hvilke oljeselskap vil være 90-åras vinnere? Utviklingen tilsier at det vil være det
oljeselskap som gjennom kontraktsforhold motiverer sine forhandlere best. Denne
studien må anses for å være et ledd idenne prosessen.
Studien er finansiert av Norges Råd for Anvendt Samfunnsvitenskap (NORAS) og
vil bU utført av Prosjektleder Ame Nygaard ved Norsk Institutt for Markedsforskning
(NIM). NIM er en nøytral part som ikke tar stilling til de interesser som hver av
partene eventuelt har idag. Formålet med studien er å frembringe informasjon som
kan danne grunnlaget for å utforme bedre fremtidige kontrakter for både selskap og
forhandler. Du blir derfor anmodet om å svare både av Shell og av Shell's
forhandlerforening (se vedlegg).
Norsk Institutt for Markedsforskning garanterer at de data du gir vil bli behandlet.
konfidensielt. Informasjon om enkeltforhandlere skal ikke gjøres tilgjengelig
hverken for selskap eller for andre. Spørreskjema vil være nummerert slik at NlM
kan purre de som ikke svarer. Spørreskjemaene vil bli makulert. Det er vikti&at alle
spørsmål blir besvart. Dessuten er det viktig at du som daglig leder av stasjonen
besvarer skjemaet.
Skjemaet er basert på tidligere Shell-undersøkelser. Det skulle derfor ikke by på
problemer for deg å besvare spørsmålene ved i hovedsak bare å sette et kryss i ruten
for det alternativ som passer best. De data som det spørres om her bør være svært lett
tilgjengelig. Antakeligvis vil det ta ca. en halv time å besvare hele skjemaet.
-~Det ville være fint om du kunne sende meg svaret tilbake iden ferdig frankerte
konvolutten innen 22. juni 1990. Dersom du ønsker flere opplysninger vedrørende
studien er jeg tilgjengelig på tlf. (02) 1068 25 (privat) eller (02)47 05 00 (NIM).
På forhånd hjertelig takk.
Vennlig hilsen
Ame Nygaard,
Prosjektleder
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ber dere- ta tid til' besvare.
Unders~kelsen er holt nøytral og konfldonsiell, dvs. anonymitet
er sikret. vi ønsker l bruke resultatene for a idontifis~re
svake sider ved vlre strategier 09 arbeidsmIter, for sl l
forbedre disso. Dette arbeid ble staret med de to tidligere
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DEALER QUESTIONNAIRE
Spørreskjema til avhandlingsarbeidet
ARNE NYGAARD, NIM
JUNI 1990
O.l TOTAL OMSETNING VED BENSINSTASJONEN EKSKLUSIV MOMS I 1989
(CA. kroner)
0.2 TOTALT SALG AV DRIVSTOFF I 1989 (CA. 1000 M3)
(kryss av i riktig rute)
U/lOOO
1000-1500
1500-2000
2000-3000
0/3000
0.3 ANTALL FAST ANSATTE PR.DATO
ANTALL ANSATTE pA DELTID PR.DATO
0.4 ANDRE FORRETNINGSOMRADER SOM DRIVES I TILKNYTNING TIL STASJONEN(sett kryss)
REN BENSINSTASJON
BENSINSTASJON M/VASKEHALL
STASJON M/VASKEHALL OG SERVICEHALL
BILSALG
GATEKJØKKEN
DAGLIGVARER
MINIBANK
ANNET
0.5 LOKALISERING/BEBYGGELSE (kryss av i riktig rute)
LAND-DISTRIKT __
TETTSTED
BY
0.6 FORRETNINGSOMRADE: (sett kryss)
F/O NORD-NORGE
F/O NORDVEST
F/O SYDVEST
F/O ØSTLANDET
0.7 LOKALISERT VED: (sett kryss)
EUROPAVEI, RIKSVEI ELLER
ANNEN TRAFFIKKERT VEI
LOKAL VEI ELLER MINDRE
TRAFIKKERT VEI
0.8 STASJONEN ER ORGANISERT SOM: (sett kryss)
ANSVARLIG SELSKAP
AKSJESELSKAP
0.9 SETT KRYSS VED DEN KONTRAKTEN DU HAR MED SELSKAPET: (sett kryss)
SELSKAPSEIET/SELSKAPSDREVET
SELSKAPSEIET/FORHANDLERDREVET
FORHANDLEREIET/FORHANDLERDREVET
0.10 HVOR MANGE ARS ERFARING HAR DU SOM FORHANDLER FOR SHELL (ca.år) ___
0.11 HVILKE SKOLEMESSIGE BAKGRUNN HAR DU? (sett kryss)
GRUNNSKOLE 7-ARIG/9-ARIG
VIDEREGAENDE SKOLE(f.eks.yrkeskole eller gymnas)
HØYSKOLE (f.eks. BI, OH, NHH, ingeniørhøyskoler, o.s.v.)
0.12 HVILKE REP.KODE HAR DIN SALGSANSVARLIGE DISTRIKTSJEF I SHELL?
0.13 HVILKE AR BEGYNTE DU SOM FORHANDLER VED DEN SHELL STASJONEN DER DU NA ER? __
0.14
KONKURRANSEN MELLOM ALLE FORHANDLERE I DET LOKALE MARKEDET
VI OPERERER I ER MEGET HARD UANSETT UANSETT MERKE I
ER DETTE EN GOD ELLER DARLIG BESKRIVELSE AV DIN SITUASJON?
(kryss av i riktig rute)
HVERKEN
MEGET MER DARLIG GOD ELLER MER GOD MEGET
DARLIG DARLIG ENN GOD DARLIG ENN DARLIG GOD GOD
BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
0.15
KONKURRANSEN MELLOM SHELL-FORHANDLERE I DET LOKALE MARKEDET VI OPERERER I, ER MEGET
HARD! ER DETTE EN GOD ELLER DARLIG BESKRIVELSE AV DIN SITUASJON?
(kryss av i riktig rute)
HVERKEN
MEGET MER DARLIG GOD ELLER MER GOD MEGET
DARLIG DARLIG ENN GOD DARLIG ENN DARLIG GOD GOD
BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
GJENNOM DITT SAMARBEIDE MED SHELL ER DET EN REKKE SAKER DER SELSKAPET HAR STØRRE ELLER
MINDRE GRAD AV INNFLYTELSE. HVOR STERKT VIL DU BESKRIVE SELSKAPETS INNFLYTELSE I
F0LGENDE SP0RSMAL (SETT KRYSS I RUTE l TIL 7):
UTEN
INNFLYTELSE
l 2 3
MIDDELS
INNFLYTELSE
4 5 6
FULLSTENDIG
KONTROLL
7
11.1
FORHANDLERMARGINEN
VED DIN STASJON l 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. 2
INVESTERINGER VED
DITT ANLEGG l 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. 3
FINANSIERING AV
VIRKSOMHETEN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
11.4
LEVERANSER AV
ANDRE VARER ENN
DRIVSTOFF OG
MINERALOLJEPRODUKTER
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
UTEN MIDDELS FULLSTENDIG
INNFLYTELSE INNFLYTELSE KONTROLL
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. 5
HVILKE NYE PRODUKTER
OG TJENESTER SOM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SKAL SELGES VED DIN
STASJON
11.6
UTFORMING AV
REKLAME, SALGSOPPLEGG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OG MARKEDSFØRING
11.7
INNKJØPS- OG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BESTILLINGS-
PROSEDYRER
11.8
SAMMENSETNING AV
VAREUTVALGET VED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DIN STASJON
11. 9
SAMARBEIDETS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
VARIGHET
11.10
HVOR OMFATTENDE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SAMARBEIDET VIL
VÆRE NAR DET GJELDER ANTALL
PRODUKTER OG TJENESTER
SOM DIN STASJON MARKEDSFØRER
11.11
APNINGSTIDEN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
VED STASJONEN
11.12
UTFORMING AV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
___BUTIKKLOKALE
11.13
OM DET SKAL TAS
UT PRODUKTER AV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
VAREUTVALGET
11.14
UTSALGSPRISER pA l 2 3 4 5 6 7
ANDRE PRODUKTER ENN
DRIVSTOFF
11.15
OM DET SKAL KJØPES l 2 3 4 5 6 7
INN ANNET UTSTYR ENN
KASSE- OG PUMPEUTSTYR
VED STASJONEN
UTEN
INNFLYTELSE
l 2 3
MIDDELS
INNFLYTELSE
4 5 6
FULLSTENDIG
KONTROLL
7
11.16
BESLUTNINGER OM
HVORVIDT VI KAN
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
KJØPE ANDRE VARER ENN
BENSIN OG MINERALOLJEPRODUKTER
FRA ANDRE LEVERANDØRER ENN SHELL
11.17
MATEN TRANSPORT AV l 2 3 4 5 6 7
ANDRE VARER ENN
BENSIN FRA SHELL SKJER PÅ
11.18
LÅNEGARANTIER l 2 3 4 5 6 7
11.19
FASTSETTELSE AV LØNN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
FOR ANSATTE VED
STASJONEN
I DITT SAMARBEID MED SHELL ER DET LAGT OPP MER ELLER MINDRE KLARE RUTINER,
PROSEDYRER, REGLER OG PLANER FOR HVORDAN FORSKJELLIGE PROBLEMER SKAL
HÅNDTERES. I HVILKEN GRAD GIR FØLGENDE PUNKTER EN GOD ELLER DÅRLIG
BESKRIVELSE AV DENNE SIDEN VED SAMARBEIDET(SETT KRYSS I RUTEN l TIL 7)
MEGET
DÅRLIG
BESKRIVELSE
l
DÅRLIG
BESKRIVELSE
2
MER DÅRLIG
ENN GOD
BESKRIVELSE
3
HVERKEN
GOD ELLER
DÅRLIG
BESKRIVELSE
4
MER GOD
ENN DÅRLIG
BESKRIVELSE
5
GOD
BESKRIVELSE
6
MEGET
GOD
BESKRIVELSE
7
12.1
DET ER LAGT OPP l 2 3 4 5 6 7
KLARE REGLER OG
RUTINER FOR HVORDAN
KLAGEBEHANDLING OG
REKLAMASJONER SKAL SKJE
12.2
DET ER KLARE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RETNINGSLINJER FOR
KUNDEBEHANDLING OG
SERVICE
12.3
DET ER KLARE RETNINGSLINJER l 2 3 4 5 6 7
FOR HVORDAN VI SKAL
DRIVE SALGSARBEID
VIS A VIS VARE KUNDER
12.4
DISTRIKTSJEFEN/SALGSJEFEN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
BESØKER OSS TIL EN pA
FORHÅND AVTALT TID
HVERKEN
MEGET MER DARLIG GOD ELLER MER GOD MEGET
DARLIG DARLIG ENN GOD DARLIG ENN DÅRLIG GOD GOD
BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
12.5
DISTRIKTSJEFEN/SALGSJEFEN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
BESØKER OSS TIL FASTE TIDER
HVER MANED
12.6
DET ER KLARE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
RETNINGSLINJER FOR
UTFORMING AV SELVE
BUTIKKLOKALE
12.7
DET ER INGEN KLARE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
STANDARDER pA UTFORMING
AV STASJONENS
EKSTERIØRMESSIGE UTFORMING
12.8
VARELEVERANSER FRA SHELL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SKJER TIL VARIERENDE
DAGER OG TIDER
12.9
DET ER EN UKLAR ARBEIDS- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FORDELING MELLOM OSS OG
SHELL
12.10
SAMARBEIDET MELLOM OSS
OG SELSKAPET FUNGERER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BEDRE UTEN FOR MANGE
REGLER, RUTINER OG
RETNINGSLINJER
12.11
DET ER UKLARE
__ RUTINER FOR HVORDAN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SIKKERHETSOPPLÆRING AV
ANSATTE SKAL SKJE
12.12
RAPPORTERINGSRUTINENE
TIL SELSKAPET ER GENERELT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SETT SVÆRT UKLARE
DET ER EN REKKE SIDER VED VIRKSOMHETEN DER DU SAMARBEIDER MED SELSKAPET
ELLER DER SELSKAPET TILBYR DEG ET SAMARBEID. HVOR OFTE VIL DU SI AT
DETTE SKJER (SETT KRYSS I RUTE l TIL 7)
ALDRI
SVÆRT
SJELDENT
NOEN
SJELDENT GANGER OFTE
SVÆRT
OFTE ALLTID
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13.1
DERE SAMARBEIDER MED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHELL OM A PLANLEGGE
HVORDAN MARKEDSFØRINGEN AV
STASJONEN SKAL SKJE
13.2
DERE SAMARBEIDER MED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHELL OM LOKALE
SALGSKAMPANJER
13.3
DERE SAMARBEIDER MED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHELL OM A UTARBEIDE
BUDSJETTER FOR STASJONEN
13.4
DERE SAMARBEIDER MED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHELL OM A UTARBEIDE
MARKEDS PLANER
13.5
DERE SAMARBEIDER MED SHELL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OM A DEFINERE MAL FOR
VIRKSOMHETEN
13.6
SELSKAPET GIR OSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
VEILEDNING OM NYE
PRODUKTER
13.7
SELSKAPET HJELPER OSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MED A FORBEDRE VAR
KONKURRANSEMESSIGE
POSISJON
13.8
DET ER KONTINUERLIG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KONTAKT MELLOM OSS
OG SELSKAPET
13.9
DERE SAMARBEIDER MED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHELL OM REKLAME
OG ANNONSERING
13.10
DERE SAMARBEIDER MED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHELL OM A SETTE
SAMMEN ET RIKTIG
PRODUKTUTVALG
ALDRI
SVÆRT
SJELDENT ALLTID
NOEN
SJELDENT GANGER
l 2
13.11
SHELL HJELPER MEG
MED BUTIKKPLANLEGGING,
MODERNISERING OG
UTVIDELSER
13.12
SHELL BISTAR MEG
GJENNOM KURS OG
OPPLAIRING
13.13
SHELL HJELPER OSS I
FINANSIERINGSPØRSMAL
13.14
DISTRIKTSJEFEN HJELPER
MEG MED ØKONOMISKE
ANALYSER OG REGNSKAPSPØRSMAL
13.15
DISTRIKTSJEFEN HJELPER
OSS I SPØRsMAL SOM HAR MED
PERSONALPOLITIKK Å GJØRE
13.16
DISTRIKTSJEFEN HJELPER OSS
MED Å FORBEDRE INNKJØPS-
RUTINER OG LAGERSTYRING
13.17
SHELL TILBYR OSS FINANSIELL
BISTAND
3 4
l 2
OFTE
5
3 4
SVÆRT
OFTE
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6 7
l 2 3 4
6 7
l 2 3 4
6 7
l 2 3 4
6 7
l 2 3 4
6 7
l 2 3 4
6 7
l 2 3 4
6 7
6 7
I ET SAMARBEIDSFORHOLD ER DET VIKTIG AT PARTENE HAR TILLIT TIL AT DET SOM VAR FORMALET
DA KONTRAKTSFORHOLDET BLE INNGÅTT, BLIR OPPFYLT.
I HVILKEN GRAD ER DU I DEN FORBINDELSE ENIG ELLER UENIG I FØLGENDE PÅSTANDER (SETT
KRYSS I RUTE l TIL 7):
HELT
UENIG
l
STORT
SETT
UENIG
2
MER
UENIG
ENN
ENIG
3
HVERKEN
ENIG
ELLER
UENIG
4
MER
ENIG
ENN
UENIG
5
STORT
SETT
ENIG
6
HELT
ENIG
7
23.1
VI HAR GOD GRUNN TIL
A ANTA AT SHELL
SKJULER VIKTIG INFORMASJON
SOM ANGAR VAR STASJON
23.2
SELSKAPET HAR IKKE HOLDT
DET DE LOVET DA SAMARBEIDET
BLE INNGÅTT
l 2
l 2
3 4
3 4
5
5
6 7
6 7
MER HVERKEN MER
STORT UENIG ENIG ENIG STORT
HELT SETT ENN ELLER ENN SETT HELT
UENIG UENIG ENIG UENIG UENIG ENIG ENIG
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
23.3
MITT INNTRYKK ER AT DET 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IKKE LØNNER SEG BESTANDIG
A FORTELLE HELE SANNHETEN
23.4
FOR AT VI SKAL VAIRE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MOTIVERT TIL A FØLGE
SELSKAPETS MAL OM HØY
SERVICE-KVALITET, MA
SELSKAPET KONTROLLERE VART
SERVICENIVA
23.5
DET HENDER AT VI FOR A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FORSVARE VARE INTERESSER
IKKE MEDDELER SELSKAPET
INFORMASJON SOM DET KAN HA
NYTTE AV
23.6
NAR EN AVTALE ER INNGATT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KAN VI ALLTID STOLE pA
AT SHELL OPPFYLLER
SINE FORPLIKTELSER
23.7
DERSOM VI SKAL NA FREM MED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
VARE SYNSPUNKTER OVERFOR
SHELL, ER DET SVAIRTVIKTIG
A FREMLEGGE ALLE
SIDENE VED SAKEN
23.8
SELSKAPET BØR HA 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TILGANG TIL ALLE INTERNE
- ØKONOMISKE OPPLYSNINGER
OM STASJONENS VIRKSOMHET
23.9
DET HAR ALDRI VAIRT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TILFELLER DER VI HAR HATT
FØLELSEN AV A HA BLITT
FØRT BAK LYSET AV SHELL
DET TAR TID OG RESSURSER A STYRE OG A KOORDINERE SAMARBEIDET MED SELSKAPET.
I HVILKEN GRAD GIR FØLGENDE UTTRYKK EN GOD ELLER DARLIG BESKRIVELSE AV
DETTE (SETT KRYSS I RUTE 1 TIL 7)
MEGET
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
1
MER DARLIG
ENN GOD
BESKRIVELSE
3
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
2
HVERKEN
GOD ELLER
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
4
MER GOD
ENN DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
5
GOD
BESKRIVELSE
6
MEGET
GOD
BESKRIVELSE
7
311.1
VI BRUKER FOR MYE TID TIL A
DISKUTERE PROBLEMER MED
SHELL. DENNE TIDEN KUNNE
VÆRT BENYTTET BEDRE TIL
STØRRE INNSATS FOR A ØKE
OVERSKUDDET VED STASJONEN
1
311.2
DET LØNNER SEG A VÆRE
AKTIV OVERFOR SELSKAPET
FOR A FA BEDRE LANE-
OG FINANSIERINGSMULIGHETER
1
311.3
VI BRUKER RELATIVT MYE TID
pA A LØSE KONFLIKTER MED
SHELL
1
311.4
DET SKAPER FORDELER
FREMFOR ANDRE FORHANDLERE
A VÆRE AKTIV OVERFOR SELSKAPET
FOR A FA GJENNOMFØRT INVESTERINGER
1
OG MODERNISERINGER VED STASJONEN
311. 5
VARE MØTER MED SHELLS
REPRESENTANTER ER MEGET
EFFEKTIVE OG SYSTEMATISKE
1
311.6
I MØTER MED SHELL ER BEGGE
~- PARTER ALLTID GODT FORBEREDT
SLIK AT BESLUTNINGER KAN TAS
1
311. 7
SHELL HAR EN FORNUFTIG
POLICY FOR FORDELING AV
INVESTERINGER MELLOM STASJONENE
SOM IKKE pAVIRKES AV KJENNSKAP
OG VENNSKAP MELLOM FORHANDLERE
OG SHELL
1
312.1
VI BRUKER FOR MYE TID pA A
KONTROLLERE DRIVSTOFF-
LEVERANSENE FRA SHELL NAR DET
GJELDER MENGDE OG KVALITET.
ISTEDET KUNNE TIDEN VÆRT
BENYTTET TIL A ØKE
OVERSKUDDET VED STASJONEN
1
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
!NERKEN
MEGET MER DARLIG GOD ELLER MER GOD MEGET
DARLIG DARLIG ENN GOD DARLIG ENN DARLIG GOD GOD
BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
312.2
VI BRUKER FOR MYE TID TIL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
REGNSKAPSARBEID, SOM ISTEDET
KUNNE VÆRT BENYTTET TIL A ØKE
OVERSKUDDET VED STASJONEN
312.3
VI BRUKER FOR MYE TID TIL l 2 3 4 5 6 7
A KONTROLLERE LEVERANSENE
AV MINERALOLJEPRODUKTER FRA
SHELL, SOM ISTEDET KUNNE
VÆRT BENYTTET TIL A ØKE OVERSKUDDET
VED STASJONEN
312.4
VI BRUKER LITE TID TIL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BUDSJETTERINGSARBEID
312.5
VI BRUKER MINDRE TID TIL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A KONTROLLERE LEVERANSENE
FRA SHELL NAR DET GJELDER
MENGDE OG KVALITET ENN FRA ANDRE
LEVERANDØRER SOM VI SAMARBEIDER
MED
312.6
VI BRUKER LITE TID TIL A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KONTROLLERE LEVERANSENE
AV ANDRE VARER FRA SHELL
ENN DRIVSTOFF OG MINERAL-
OLJEPRODUKTER NAR DET GJELDER
MENGDE OG KVALITET
313 .1
SLIK VI SER DET, ER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SELSKAPETS LEVERANSE-
RUTINER GODT TILPASSET
VART BEHOV M.H.T.
LEVERINGSTID OG MENGDE
313 .2
DET ER SVÆRT FA FEIL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
VED VARER SOM ER LEVERT
FRA SELSKAPET
313.3
SHELLS ORDREPROSEDYRER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ER GODT TILPASSET
MITT BEHOV
313.4
SHELL'S PRODUKT- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SPEKTER ER GODT
TILPASSET DET LOKALE MARKEDET
SOM VAR STASJON OPERERER I
HVERKEN
MEGET MER DÅRLIG GOD ELLER MER GOD MEGET
DÅRLIG DÅRLIG ENN GOD DÅRLIG ENN DÅRLIG GOD GOD
BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
313.5
DET ER SVÆRT LITE l 2 3 4 5 6 7
SVINN I LEVERANSENE AV
DRIVSTOFF TIL STASJONEN
313.6
DET ER ET SVÆRT LITE ANTALL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FORSINKELSER I VARE-
LEVERANSER FRA SELSKAPET
313.7
INFORMASJON FRA SELSKAPET 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ER OFTE DARLIG FORMULERT,
UKLAR OG VANSKELIG A
FORSTA
313.8
INFORMASJON FRA SELSKAPET 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OM VIKTIGE spøRsMAL KOMMER
SJELDEN TIL RIKTIG TID
313.9
INFORMASJON FRA SELSKAPET l 2 3 4 5 6 7
ER ENTEN FOR LITE
UTFYLLENDE ELLER FOR
UTFYLLENDE SLIK AT IKKE
HOVEDBUDSKAPET KOMMER FREM
313.10
SHELL ØNSKER AT VI SKAL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KJØPE sA MYE VARER AT VARE-
LAGRENE BLIR FOR STORE
313.11
SHELLS BISTAND M.H.T. KURS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OG OPPLÆRING ER IKKE SÆRLIG
-_ NYTTIGE FOR MEG
313 .12
SHELL TILPASSER SEG DARLIG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TIL DE ENDREDE BETINGELSER
I VART LOKALE MARKED
321.1
DET ER UMULIG A GI GOD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KUNDESERVICE NÅR DET ER
MYE A GJØRE VED STASJONEN
321. 2
VI VURDERER ANDRE l 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHELL-FORHANDLERE
MER SOM KONKURRENTER
ENN SOM MEDSPILLERE
lNERKEN
MEGET MER DARLIG GOD ELLER MER GOD MEGET
DARLIG DÅRLIG ENN GOD DARLIG ENN DÅRLIG GOD GOD
BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
321.3
FORHANDLERNE FRA ANDRE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SELSKAPER ER MER A
BETRAKTE SOM KOLLEGER
pA LINJE MED ANDRE
SHELL-FORHANDLERE
ENN SOM KONKURRENTER
321.4
DET ER ULØNNSOMT FOR OSS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A AVERTERE I AVISENE
FORDI DE ANDRE SHELL-
STASJONENE OGSÅ NYTER GODT
AV DE EKSTRA INNTEKTENE
VARE ANNONSER FØRER TIL
321. 5
VI BRUKER FOR MYE TID TIL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A HOLDE GOD ORDEN OG
RENHOLD. DENNE TIDEN KUNNE
ISTEDET VÆRT BENYTTET
TIL A TJENE PENGER
321.6
DET HENDER AT VI TAR INN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PRODUKTER AV LAVERE KVALITET
FORDI KUNDENE VIL HA DEM
321.7
DET HAR HENDT AT VI HAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BLITT SITTENDE IGJEN MED
VARER FORDI KVALITETEN HAR
VÆRT FOR DARLIG
321.8
DET ER HELT UNØDVENDIG A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KONTROLLERE MATEN A UTFØRE
SERVICE pA VED VAR STASJON
321.9
SELSKAPETS KRAV OM BRUK 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AV UNIFORMER I ARBEIDET
ER EN NØDVENDIGHET
321.10
SELSKAPETS KRAV TIL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ORDEN OG RENHOLD ER
RIKTIGE OG NØDVENDIGE
OGSA OVERFOR MEG
OG DEN STASJONEN VI DRIVER
321.11
DET ER FULLT MULIG A SØRGE l 2 3 4 5 6 7
FOR ET PERFEKT RENHOLD pA
STASJONEN SELV OM KUNDE-
pAGANGEN ER STOR
HVERKEN
MEGET MER DARLIG GOD ELLER MER GOD MEGET
DARLIG DARLIG ENN GOD DARLIG ENN DARLIG GOD GOD
BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
321.12
SHELL BØR BESTEMME 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HVILKEN KVALITET DET SKAL
VÆRE pA ALLE VARENE SOM
VI VELGER A SELGE VED
vAR STASJON
321.13
VARE ANSATTE BLIR OFTE l 2 3 4 5 6 7
INFORMERT OM DE KVALITETS-
MAL SHELL HAR SATT
321.14
VI ER HELT ENIGE MED SHELL l 2 3 4 5 6 7
OM DE METODER SOM BENYTTES
FOR A NA DE KVALITETSMAL
SOM ER SATT
321.15
VARE ANSATTE BLIR OFTE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ORIENTERT OM BETYDNINGEN AV
GOD KUNDESERVICE
322.1
DET LØNNER SEG BEDRE A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DISKUTERE MED SELSKAPET
FOR A ØKE VAR FORHANDLER-
AVANSE ENN A SELGE MER
FOR A ØKE FORTJENESTEN
322.2
VI KUNNE TENKE OSS A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ARBEIDE ENDA MER VED
STASJONEN ISTEDET FOR A
TA FRI, MEN DET LØNNER
SEG IKKE
322.3
DERSOM VI FRITT KUNNE l 2 3 4 5 6 7
BESTEMME APNINGSTIDEN VED
vAR STASJON VILLE VI
HATT KORTERE APNINGSTID
322.4
VI ØNSKER A TA OSS MER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FRI ENN A ARBEIDE MER
322.5
SALGSMAL OG BUDSJETTER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ER FORMALITETER SOM IKKE
FORPLIKTER TIL MER ARBEID
FOR A ØKE SALGET
322.6
DE RAMMEBETINGELSER SOM ER l 2 3 4 5 6 7
GITT FRA SELSKAPETS SIDE GIR
FOR DARLIG KOMPENSASJON FOR
UTFØRT ARBEID
HVERKEN
MEGET MER DARLIG GOD ELLER MER GOD MEGET
DARLIG DARLIG ENN GOD DARLIG ENN DARLIG GOD GOD
BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
322.7
VI BØR pA SELVSTENDIG
GRUNNLAG BESTEMME HVOR MANGE
TIMER VI ØNSKER A HA APENT
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.1
HVORDAN VIL DU SELV KARAKTERISERE DET ØKONOMISKE RESULTATET AV SAMARBEIDET MED SHELL I
FORHOLD TIL DINE FORVENTNINGER DA DU INNGIKK SAMARBEIDET ?
(sett kryss)
SVÆRT UTILFREDSTILLENDE
UTILFREDSTILLENDE
MER UTILFREDSTILLENDE ENN
TILFREDSTILLENDE
HVERKEN UTILFREDSTILLENDE
ELLER TILFREDSTILLENDE
MER TILFREDSTILLENDE ENN
UTILFREDSTILLENDE
TILFREDSTILLENDE
SVÆRT TILFREDSTILLENDE
HVOR VELLYKKET VIL DU KARAKTERISERE ULIKE AKTIVITETER
SOM DU SAMARBEIDER MED SHELL OM (SETT KRYSS I RUTE 1 TIL 7).
SVÆRT
__ MISLYKKET
1 2
HVERKEN
MISLYKKET
ELLER
VELLYKKET
4 5 6
SVÆRT
VELLYKKET
73
4.2
GJENNOMFØRING AV
MARKEDSFØRINGSTILTAK
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.3
TRENING OG OPPLÆRING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.4
STYRING OG KONTROLL l 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.5 A HVOR STORT VAR DRIFTSRESULTATET
(resultat før finanskostnader, etter avskrivninger jfr. post 240 i
regnskapskjemaet og før privat uttak, hvis personlig selskap) i 1989
CA. KR.
4.5 B FOR PERSONLIGE SELSKAPER (ikke aksjeselskaper):
HVOR STORT ER DET SAMLEDE PRIVATE UTTAK I BEDRIFTEN I 1989:
CA. KR.
4.5 C FOR PERSONLIGE SELSKAPER(IKKE AKSJESELSAPER):
HVOR STOR ER DE SAMLEDE SOSIALE KOSTNADER I 1989: (LØNN, FERIEPENGER OG
ARBEIDSGIVERAVGIFT)
KR
4.6
HVORDAN VIL DU KARAKTERISERE UTVIKLINGEN I DRIFTSRESULTAT DE SISTE 5 ARENE
(SIDEN 1984) VED DERES STASJON? (sett kryss). DERSOM DU HAR VÆRT SHELL-
FORHANDLER VED STASJONEN KORTERE TID ENN 5 AR, SAMMENLIKN ALLIKEVEL
UTVIKLINGEN MED DITT FØRSTE AR SOM FORHANDLER:
STERK
NEDGANG
MER ENN 40%
MODERAT
NEDGANG
20%-40%
LITEN
NEDGANG
0%-20%
UENDRET
RESULTAT
0%
LITEN
ØKNING
0%-20%
MODERAT
ØKNING
20%-40%
STERK
ØKNING
MER ENN 40%
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
Til: - Salgsjefer/DK sjefer Ml
Fra: MBM
CC: Retailansv., MBV MBQ PH PU
HIM Unders'kelse forhandlerrelasjoner 1990
Denne undersøkelsen er ni gjennomført og dataene er under
behandling. Oppslutn~ngen blant vAre forhandlere var meget bra
.ad en besvarelsesprosent pl nærmere 70'.
Som kjent vil denne undersøkelsen gi et detaljert overblikkover hva forhandlerne f,ler og synes om oss pl en rekke viktige
felter. Vi ønsker l fl kryssjekket disse oppfatningene mot
deres om de samme spørsmllene som noen av dine forhandlere har
besvart.
Teknikken som skal benyttes er at tre forhandlere pr.s~ne
trekkes tilfeldig ut. Du flr sl tre spørreskjemaer til
besvarelse. Hvert skjema er merket med den aktuelle forhandlers
navn. Du skal sl beskrive ved"l krysse av pl skjemaet hvordan du
føler situasjonen er med den aktuelle forhandler. Du flr ikke
vite hva vedkommende forhandler har svart. Mlr det gjelder dine
informasjoner vil disse kun bli behandlet av NIM, med full
anonymitet. Vi flr således vite kun summen av feltapparates
vurderinger, mot hva de aktuelle forhandlere har svart.
Svarene dere gir skal brukes til l se om det er vesentlig
forskjellige oppfatninger mellom forhandlere og feltapparat nlr
det gjelder mulighet for innflytelse pl markedsmessige og
økonomiske spørsmll pl en stasjon. Hele denne undersøkelsen
skal brukes for l gi bakgrunn for beslutninger som kan bedrefeltapparatets arbeidsituasjon og effektivitet, samt kunne gi
grunnlag for forandringer av strategi og policy pl andre
viktige felter.
Jeg takker pl forhlnd for tiden du bruker pl l fylle ut de tre
SpØrreskjemaene.
1990
KJÆRE SALGSJEF /DISTRIKTSJEF
Oslo, 7. Sept.l990
Vi viser til den undersøkelsen som til nå har funnet sted blant forhandlerne
og til brev av 30. august fra Terje Løken. Undersøkelsen søker å belyse
spørsmålet knyttet til samarbeidskostnadene med data fra både forhandlerne
og fra distriksjefene.
Poenget med studien er å analysere hvordan ulike kostnader påvirkes av den
samarbeidsform som eksisterer mellom forhandler og selskap. Undersøkelsen
vil derfor gi verdifull generell informasjon som kan være nyttig for å
organisere et mer effektivt samarbeide og bedre kontrakter i fremtiden.
Vi har derfor trukket ut et tilfeldig utvalg av de forhandlerne som nå har svart
på vår undersøkelse og ber deg om å karakterisere ulike sider ved dine
erfaringer med dette samarbeidet. Navnet på den forhandler som vi ber des
om å beskrive samarbeidsforholdet til står nevnt på hvert $l)ørreskjema
(vedlegg).
Dine svar vil bli garantert STRENG konfidensialitet. Spørreskjema vil bli
makulert etter koding og ditt navn vil ikke kunne spores tilbake til de data
som du gir. Nummerering av spørreskjema anvendes til purring dersom ikke
svar gis.
Vedlagt ligger også en ferdig frankert konvolutt. Jeg håper spørmålene lar seg
besvare relativt greit. Dersom du skulle ha behov for ytterligere opplysninger
"vedrørende denne studien kan du ringe meg på tlf. (02) 47 05 00 eller
(02) 76 07 04.
Vennlig hilsen
Arne Nygaard,
Prosjektleder
VEDLEGG
SALES AREA MANAGER QUESTIONNAIRE
KONFIDENSIELT
NR.
VI BER DEG OM A KARAKTERISERE ULIKE SIDER VED SAMARBEIDET
MELLOM SHELL OG FORHANDLEREN. DEN FORHANDLER SOM DU I DETTE
SPØRRESKJEMA SKAL VURDERE SELSKAPETS SAMARBEID MED ER:
VI BER OM AT ALLE SPØRSMAL SØKES BESVART.
0.13 HVOR MANGE AR HAR DU VÆRT SALGSJEF FOR DEN FORHANDLER SOM
DRIVER DENNE STASJONEN (ca. antall år) __
GJENNOM SAMARBEIDET MELLOM SHELL OG DENNE FORHANDLEREN ER DET EN REKKE
SAKER DER SELSKAPET HAR STØRRE ELLER MINDRE GRAD AV INNFLYTELSE.
HVORDAN VIL DU SOM SALGSSJEF BESKRIVE SELSKAPETS INNFLYTELSE OVER
DENNE FORHANDLEREN I FØLGENDE spøRSMAL?
(SETT KRYSS I RUTE 1 TIL 7):
UTEN MIDDELS FULLSTENDIG
INNFLYTELSE INNFLYTELSE KONTROLL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11.1
FORHANDLERMARGINEN
VED STASJONEN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
11.2
INVESTERINGER VED
FORHANDLERENS ANLEGG l 2 3 4 5 6 7
11.3
FINANSIERING AV
FORHANDLERENS l 2 3 4 5 6 7
VIRKSOMHET
11.4
LEVERANSER AV
ANDRE VARER ENN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
DRIVSTOFF OG
MINERALOLJE-
PRODUKTER
11.5
HVILKE NYE PRODUKTER
OG TJENESTER SOM l 2 3 4 5 6 7
SKAL SELGES VED
DENNE STASJONEN
11.6
UTFORMING AV
REKLAME, SALGSOPPLEGG l 2 3 4 5 6 7
OG MARKEDSFØRING
11.7
INNKJ0PS- OG l 2 3 4 5 6 7
BESTILLINGS-
PROSEDYRER
11.8
SAMMENSETNING AV
VAREUTVALGET VED l 2 3 4 5 6 7
DENNE STASJONEN
11. 9
SAMARBEIDETS l 2 3 4 5 6 7
VARIGHET
11.10
HVOR OMFATTENDE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SAMARBEIDET VIL
VÆRE NAR DET GJELDER ANTALL
PRODUKTER OG TJENESTER
SOM DENNE STASJONEN MARKEDSFØRER
UTEN MIDDELS FULLSTENDIG
INNFLYTELSE INNFLYTELSE KONTROLL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11.11
ÅPNINGSTIDEN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
VED STASJONEN
11.12
UTFORMING AV l 2 3 4 5 6 7
BUTIKKLOKALE VED
STASJONEN
11.13
OM PRODUKTER SKAL TAS
UT AV VAREUTVALGET l 2 3 4 5 6 7
11.14
UTSALGSPRISER pA l 2 3 4 5 6 7
ANDRE PRODUKTER ENN
DRIVSTOFF
11.15
OM DET SKAL KJØPES l 2 3 4 5 6 7
INN ANNET UTSTYR ENN
KASSE- OG PUMPEUTSTYR
VED STASJONEN
11.16
BESLUTNINGER OM l 2 3 4 5 6 7
HVORVIDT FORHANDLEREN
KAN KJØPE ANDRE VARER ENN
BENSIN OG MINERALOLJEPRODUKTER
FRA ANDRE LEVERANDØRER ENN SHELL
11.17
MATEN TRANSPORT AV l 2 3 4 5 6 7
ANDRE VARER ENN
BENSIN FRA SHELL SKJER pA
11.18
LÅNEGARANTIER l 2 3 4 5 6 7
11.19
FASTSETTELSE AV LØNN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
FOR ANSATTE VED
STASJONEN
I SAMARBEIDET MELLOM SHELL OG DENNE FORHANDLEREN ER DET LAGT OPP MER
ELLER MINDRE KLARE RUTINER, PROSEDYRER, REGLER OG PLANER FOR HVORDAN
FORSKJELLIGE PROBLEMER SKAL HANDTERES. I HVILKEN GRAD GIR FØLGENDE
PUNKTER EN GOD ELLER DARLIG BESKRIVELSE AV DENNE SIDEN VED SAMARBEIDET
(SETT KRYSS I RUTEN 1 TIL 7)
MEGET
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
1
MER DARLIG
ENN GOD
BESKRIVELSE
3
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
2
HVERKEN
GOD ELLER
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
4
MER GOD
ENN DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
5
GOD
BESKRIVELSE
6
MEGET
GOD
BESKRIVELSE
7
12.1
DET ER LAGT OPP
KLARE REGLER 00
RUTINER FOR HVORDAN
KLAGEBEHANDLING OG
REKLAMASJONER SKAL SKJE
1
12.2
DET ER KLARE
RETNINGSLINJER FOR
KUNDEBEHANDLING OG
SERVICE
1
12.3
DET ER KLARE RETNINGSLINJER
FOR HVORDAN FORHANDLEREN
SKAL DRIVE SITT SALGSARBEID
1
12.4
VI BESØKER FORHANDLEREN
TIL EN pA FORHAND AVTALT TID
1
12.5
VI BESØKER FORHANDLEREN TIL
FASTE TIDER HVER MANED
1
12.6
DET ER KLARE
RETNINGSLINJER FOR
UTFORMING AV SELVE
BUTIKKLOKALE
1
12.7
DET ER INGEN KLARE
STANDARDER pA UTFORMING
AV STASJONENS
EKSTERIØRMESSIGE UTFORMING
1
12.8
VARELEVERANSER FRA SHELL
SKJER TIL VARIERENDE
DAGER OG TIDER
1
12.9
DET ER EN UKLAR ARBEIDS-
FORDELING MELLOM SHELL OG
DENNE FORHANDLEREN
1
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
MEGET
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
1
MER DARLIG
ENN GOD
BESKRIVELSE
3
HVERKEN
GOD ELLER
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
4
MER GOD
ENN DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
5
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
2
GOD
BESKRIVELSE
6
MEGET
GOD
BESKRIVELSE
7
12.10
SAMARBEIDET MELLOM
OSS OG FORHANDLEREN
FUNGERER BEDRE UTEN FOR
MANGE REGLER, RUTINER OG
RETNINGSLINJER
1 2 3 4 5 6
12.11
DET ER UKLARE
RUTINER FOR HVORDAN
SIKKERHETSOPPLÆRING AV
ANSATTE SKAL SKJE
VED DENNE STASJONEN
2 5 63 4l
12.12
RAPPORTERINGSRUTINENE
FRA FORHANDLEREN
TIL SELSKAPET ER GENERELT
SETT SVÆRT UKLARE
2 5 63 41
12.13
RAPPORTERINGSRUTINENE
FRA OSS TIL SELSKAPETS
STABSFUNKSJON ER I SAKER
SOM GJELDER DENNE FORHANDLEREN
SVÆRT UKLARE
2 5 63 41
DET ER EN REKKE SIDER VED VIRKSOMHETEN DER SELSKAPET SAMARBEIDER MED
FORHANDLEREN ELLER DER SELSKAPET TILBYR FORHANDLEREN ET SAMARBEID.
HVOR OFTE VIL DU SI AT DETTE SKJER? (SETT KRYSS I RUTE l TIL 7)
7
7
7
7
SVÆRT
SJELDENT
2
NOEN
SJELDENT GANGER
3 4
OFTE
5
SVÆRT
OFTE
6
ALDRI
l
ALLTID
7
13.1
VI SAMARBEIDER MED l 2 3 4 5 6 7
FORHANDLEREN OM A PLANLEGGE
HVORDAN MARKEDSFØRINGEN AV
STASJONEN SKAL SKJE
13.2
VI SAMARBEIDER MED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FORHANDLEREN OM LOKALE
SALGSKAMPANJER
13.3
VI SAMARBEIDER MED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FORHANDLEREN OM A UTARBEIDE
BUDSJETTER VED STASJONEN
13 .4
VI SAMARBEIDER MED l 2 3 4 5 6 7
FORHANDLEREN OM A UTARBEIDE
MARKEDS PLANER
SVÆRT NOEN SVÆRT
ALDRI SJELDENT SJELDENT GANGER OFTE OFTE ALLTID
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
13.5
VI SAMARBEIDER MED l 2 3 4 5 6 7
FORHANDLEREN OM A DEFINERE
MAL FOR VIRKSOMHETEN
13.6
VI GIR FORHANDLEREN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
VEILEDNING OM NYE
PRODUKTER
13.7
VI HJELPER FORHANDLEREN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
MED A FORBEDRE SIN
KONKURRANSEMESSIGE
POSISJON
13 .8
DET ER KONTINUERLIG l 2 3 4 5 6 7
KONTAKT MELLOM OSS
OG FORHANDLEREN
13.9
VI SAMARBEIDER MED l 2 3 4 5 6 7
FORHANDLEREN OM REKLAME
OG ANNONSERING
13.10
VI SAMARBEIDER MED l 2 3 4 5 6 7
FORHANDLEREN OM A SETTE
SAMMEN ET RIKTIG
PRODUKTUTVALG
13.ll
VI HJELPER FORHANDLEREN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
MED BUTIKKPLANLEGGING,
MODERNISERING OG
UTVIDELSER
13.13
- VI HJELPER FORHANDLEREN I l 2 3 4 5 6 7
FINANSIERINGSPØRSMAL
13.14
VI HJELPER FORHANDLEREN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
MED ØKONOMISKE ANALYSER
OG REGNSKAPSPØRsMAL
13.15
VI HJELPER FORHANDLEREN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
I spøRsMAL SOM HAR MED
PERSONALPOLITIKK A GJØRE
13.16
VI HJELPER FORHANDLEREN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
MED A FORBEDRE INNKJØPS-
RUTINER OG LAGERSTYRING
13 .17
VI TILBYR FORHANDLEREN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
FINANSIELL BISTAND
I ET SAMARBEIDSFORHOLD ER DET VIKTIG AT PARTENE HAR TILLIT TIL
AT DET SOM VAR FoRMALET DA KONTRAKTSFORHOLDET BLE INNGATT, BLIR OPPFYLT.
I HVILKEN GRAD ER DU I DEN FORBINDELSE ENIG ELLER UENIG I
FØLGENDE pASTANDER (SETT KRYSS I RUTE l TIL 7):
HELT
UENIG
l
STORT
SETT
UENIG
2
MER
UENIG
ENN
ENIG
3
HVERKEN
ENIG
ELLER
UENIG
4
MER
ENIG
ENN
UENIG
5
STORT
SETT
ENIG
6
HELT
ENIG
7
23.1
VI HAR GOD GRUNN TIL
A ANTA AT FORHANDLEREN
SKJULER INFORMASJON
SOM ER AV INTERESSE
FOR SELSKAPET
23.2
FORHANDLEREN HAR IKKE HOLDT
DET SOM BLE LOVET DA
SAMARBEIDET BLE INNGATT
23.3
VART INNTRYKK ER AT DET
IKKE LØNNER SEG BESTANDIG
A FORTELLE HELE SANNHETEN
23.4
FOR AT FORHANDLEREN SKAL
VÆRE MOTIVERT TIL A FØLGE
SELSKAPETS MAL OM HØY
SERVICE-KVALITET, MA
VI KONTROLLERE SERVICENIVAET
VED STASJONEN
23.5
MAR EN AVTALE ER INNGATT
KAN VI IKKE ALLTID STOLE pA
AT FORHANDLEREN OPPFYLLER
SINE FORPLIKTELSER
23.6
FORHANDLERENS TILBAKE-
RAPPORTERING TIL OSS ER IKKE
ALLTID I SAMSVAR MED
VIRKELIGHETEN
23.7
DET HENDER AT VI FOR A
FORSVARE VARE INTERESSER
IKKE MEDDELER FORHANDLEREN
INFORMASJON SOM HAN/HUN KAN HA
NYTTE AV
23.8
DERSOM VI SKAL NA FREM MED
VARE SYNSPUNKTER OVERFOR
FORHANDLEREN, ER DET SVÆRT
VIKTIG A FREMLEGGE ALLE
SIDENE VED SAKEN
1 2 5 6 73 4
l 2 5 763 4
1 2 6 73 4 5
1 2 5 763 4
1 2 6 73 4 5
1 2 5 6 73 4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
l 2 5 763 4
MER HVERKEN MER
STORT UENIG ENIG ENIG STORT
HELT SETT ENN ELLER ENN SETT HELT
UENIG UENIG ENIG UENIG UENIG ENIG ENIG
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
23.9
FORHANDLEREN BØR HA l 2 3 4 5 6 7
TILGANG TIL ALLE
OPPLYSNINGER I SELSKAPET
SOM VEDRØRER STASJONENS
VIRKSOMHET
23.10
DET HAR ALDRI V.ÆRT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TILFELLER DER VI HAR HATT
FØLELSEN AV A HA BLITT
FØRT BAK LYSET AV FORHANDLEREN
MEGET
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
1
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
2
MER DARLIG
ENN GOD
BESKRIVELSE
3
HVERKEN
GOD ELLER
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
4
MER GOD
ENN DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
5
GOD
BESKRIVELSE
6
MEGET
GOD
BESKRIVELSE
7
DET TAR TID OG RESSURSER A STYRE OG A KOORDINERE SAMARBEIDET MED
FORHANDLEREN. I HVILKEN GRAD GIR FØLGENDE UTTRYKK EN GOD ELLER DARLIG BESKRIVELSE AV
DETTE? (SETT KRYSS I RUTE 1 TIL 7)
311.1
VI BRUKER FOR MYE TID TIL A
DISKUTERE PROBLEMER MED
FORHANDLEREN. DENNE TIDEN KUNNE
VÆRT BENYTTET MER EFFEKTIVT
pA ANDRE MATER
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
311.2
VART INNTRYKK ER AT DET
KAN LØNNE SEG FOR
FORHANDLEREN A VÆRE AKTIV
---OVERFOR SELSKAPET FOR A FA BEDRE LANE-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OG FINANSIERINGSMULIGHETER
311.3
VI BRUKER MYE TID 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
pA A LØSE KONFLIKTER MED
FORHANDLEREN
311.4
DET GIR IKKE NOE FORTRINN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FREMFOR ANDRE FORHANDLERE
A VÆRE AKTIV OVERFOR SELSKAPET
FOR A FA GJENNOMFØRT INVESTERINGER
OG MODERNISERINGER VED STASJONEN
311. 5
VARE MØTER MED FORHANDLEREN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ER MEGET EFFEKTIVE OG
SYSTEMATISKE
HVERKEN
MEGET MER DARLIG GOD ELLER MER GOD MEGET
DARLIG DARLIG ENN GOD DARLIG ENN DARLIG GOD GOD
BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
311. 6
I MØTER MED FORHANDLEREN ER l 2 3 4 5 6 7
BEGGE PARTER ALLTID GODT
FORBEREDT SLIK AT
BESLUTNINGER KAN TAS
311. 7
SHELLS INVESTERINGER l 2 3 4 5 6 7
VED DENNE STASJONEN KUNNE
ALTERNATIVT IKKE BLITT GJORT MER
FORNUFTIG VED ANDRE STASJONER
312.1
VI BRUKER FOR MYE TID pA A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
FØLGE OPP FORHANDLERENS
BETALING FOR LEVERANSENE AV
DRIVSTOFF FRA SHELL.
312.2
VI BRUKER FOR MYE TID TIL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ØKONOMISK KONTROLL AV
STASJONENS VIRKSOMHET
312.3
VI BRUKER FOR MYE TID TIL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A KONTROLLERE LEVERANSER
OG BETALING AV MINERALOLJE-
PRODUKTER TIL FORHANDLEREN
312.4
VI BRUKER LITE TID TIL l 2 3 4 5 6 7
BUDSJETTERINGSARBEID
VED DENNE STASJONEN
312.5
VI BRUKER LITE TID TIL A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KONTROLLERE LEVERANSENE OG
BETALING FOR ANDRE VARER
FRA SHELL ENN DRIVSTOFF OG
MINERAL-OLJEPRODUKTER TIL
DENNE FORHANDLEREN
312.6
HVOR MANGE AV DINE 20 DAGSVERK PR.MÅNED BRUKER DU GJENNOMSNITTLIG pA A FØLGE OPP
DENNE FORHANDLEREN:
CA. DAGER
HVERKEN
MEGET MER DARLIG GOD ELLER MER GOD MEGET
DARLIG DARLIG ENN GOD DARLIG ENN DARLIG GOD GOD
BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
313 .1
SLIK VI SER DET, ER l 2 3 4 5 6 7
FORHANDLERENS LAGER-
STYRINGSRUTINER GODT TILPASSET
SELSKAPETS BEHOV M.H.T.
LEVERINGSTID OG MENGDE
313.2
VI FAR TILBAKEMELDING OM l 2 3 4 5 6 7
SVÆRT FA FEIL VED VARER SOM
ER LEVERT FRA SELSKAPET
313.3
FORHANDLERENS ORDRERUTINER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ER GODT TILPASSET
SHELLS RUTINER
313.4
FORHANDLERENS PRODUKT- l 2 3 4 5 6 7
UTVALG ER GODT TILPASSET
SHELLS TILBUD AV PRODUKTER
313.5
VI FAR TILBAKEMELDING OM l 2 3 4 5 6 7
SVÆRT LITE SVINN I
LEVERANSENE AV DRIVSTOFF TIL
DENNE STASJONEN
313.6
VI FAR TILBAKEMELDING OM 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ET SVÆRT LITE ANTALL
FORSINKELSER I VARE-
LEVERANSER FRA SELSKAPET
TIL DENNE FORHANDLEREN
313.7
INFORMASJON FRA FORHANDLEREN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
TIL OSS ER OFTE DARLIG
FORMULERT, UKLAR OG VANSKELIG
A FORSTA
313.8
INFORMASJON FRA FORHANDLEREN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
OM VIKTIGE SP0RSMAL KOMMER
SJELDEN TIL RIKTIG TID
313.9
INFORMASJON FRA FORHANDLEREN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
ER FOR LITE UTFYLLENDE
SLIK AT HOVEDBUDSKAPET IKKE
KOMMER FREM
313.10
INFORMASJON FRA FORHANDLEREN l 2 3 4 5 6 7
ER FOR UTFYLLENDE SLIK AT
HOVEDBUDSKAPET IKKE KOMMER
FREM
MEGET
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
l
MER DARLIG
DARLIG ENN GOD
BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE
2 3
INERKEN
GOD ELLER
DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
4
MER GOD
ENN DARLIG
BESKRIVELSE
5
GOD
BESKRIVELSE
6
MEGET
GOD
BESKRIVELSE
7
313.11
VI ØNSKER AT FORHANDLEREN
SKAL KJØPE sA MYE VARER SOM
MULIG FRA SHELL
1
313.12
FORHANDLEREN TILPASSER SEG
DARLIG TIL DE ENDREDE
BETINGELSER I VART LOKALE
MARKED
1
321.1
DET ER HELT NØDVENDIG
FOR OSS A KONTROLLERE MATEN
KUNDE-SERVICEN BLIR UTFØRT
pA VED DENNE STASJONEN
1
321.2
SELSKAPETS KRAV OM BRUK
AV UNIFORMER I ARBEIDET
BLIR SJELDEN FULGT AV
DENNE FORHANDLEREN
1
321.3
SELSKAPETS KRAV TIL
ORDEN OG RENHOLD BLIR IKKE
I TILFREDSTILLENDE GRAD FULGT
AV DENNE FORHANDLEREN
1
321.4
DET ER ALLTID ET PERFEKT
RENHOLD VED DENNE STASJONEN
SELV NAR KUNDEPAGANGEN ER STOR
1
321. 5
DET ER UNØDVENDIG AV OSS A
FØLGE OPP AT SHELLS
KVALITETSMAL HOLDES, FORDI
FORHANDLEREN HOLDER SEG SELV OG
DE ANSATTE ORIENTERT OM DE KVALITETS-
MAL SHELL HAR SATT
1
321.6
VI ER HELT ENIGE MED
FORHANDLEREN OM DE METODER
SOM HAN/HUN BENYTTER FOR A
NA DE KVALITETSMAL SOM ER SATT
1
322.1
FORHANDLEREN BRUKER FOR
MYE TID pA A DISKUTERE MED
OSS ISTEDET FOR A BRUKE TIDEN
TIL A SELGE MER
FOR A ØKE FORTJENESTEN
l
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
6 7
HVERKEN
MEGET MER DARLIG GOD ELLER MER GOD MEGET
DARLIG DARLIG ENN GOD DARLIG ENN DARLIG GOD GOD
BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE BESKRIVELSE
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
322.2
SLIK VI SER DET, LØNNER l 2 3 4 5 6 7
DET SEG IKKE FOR
FORHANDLEREN A ØKE SIN
ARBEIDSINNSATS VED STASJONEN
322.3
SALGSMAL OG BUDSJETTER l 2 3 4 5 6 7
ER FORMALITETER SOM IKKE
FORPLIKTER FORHANDLEREN
I TILSTREKKELIG GRAD TIL
ØKT INNSATS
322.4
DE RAMMEBETINGELSER SOM ER l 2 3 4 5 6 7
GITT FRA SELSKAPETS SIDE GIR
FORHANDLEREN FOR DARLIG
KOMPENSASJON FOR
UTFØRT ARBEID
4.1
HVORDAN VIL DU KARAKTERISERE DET
ØKONOMISKE RESULTATET AV SAMARBEIDET MED DENNE
FORHANDLEREN I FORHOLD TIL DE FORVENTNINGER SELSKAPET HADDE DA
DET INNGIKK SAMARBEIDET ?
(sett kryss)
SVÆRT UTILFREDSTILLENDE
UTILFREDSTILLENDE
MER UTILFREDSTILLENDE ENN
TILFREDSTILLENDE
HVERKEN UTILFREDSTILLENDE
ELLER TILFREDSTILLENDE
MER TILFREDSTILLENDE ENN
UTILFREDSTILLENDE
TILFREDSTILLENDE
SVÆRT TILFREDSTILLENDE
HVOR VELLYKKET VIL DU KARAKTERISERE ULIKE AKTIVITETER SOM DERE SAMARBEIDER MED
FORHANDLEREN OM (SETT KRYSS I RUTE 1 TIL 7).
HVERKEN
MISLYKKET
SVÆRT ELLER SVÆRT
MISLYKKET VELLYKKET VELLYKKET
l 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.2
GJENNOMFØRING AV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SALGSKAMPANJER,
MARKEDSFØRINGSTILTAK,
ANNONSERING ETC.
4.3
TRENING OG OPPLÆRING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.4
ØKONOMISK STYRING OG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KONTROLL
4.5
KVALITETS-STYRING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.6
SIKKERHETSARBEIDE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4.7
ARBEIDSMILJØ OG 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
PERSONALPOLITIKK
Oslo, 11. Juni 1990
KJÆRE FORHANDLER!
Hvilke oljeselskap vil være 90-åras vinnere? Utviklingen tilsier at det vil være det
oljeselskap som gjennom kontraktsforhold motiverer sine forhandlere best. Denne
studien må anses for å være et ledd i denne prosessen.
Studien er finansiert av Norges Råd for Anvendt Samfunnsvitenskap (NORAS) og
vU bli utført av Prosjektleder Ame Nygaard ved Norsk Institutt for Markedsforskning
(NIM). NIM er en nøytral part som ikke tar stilling til de interesser som hver av
partene eventuelt har idag. Formålet med studien er å frembringe informasjon som
kan danne grunnlaget for å utforme bedre fremtidige kontrakter for både selskap og
forhandler. Du blir derfor anmodet om å svare både av Shell og av Shell's
forhandlerforening (se vedlegg).
Norsk Institutt for Markedsforskning garanterer at de data du gir vil bli behandlet
konfidensielt. Informasjon om enkeltforhandlere skal ikke gjøres tilgjengelig
hverken for selskap eller for andre. Spørreskjema vil være nummerert slik at NIM
kan purre de som ikke svarer. Spørreskjemaene vil bli makulert. Det er viktig at alle
spørsmål blir besvart. Dessuten er det viktig at du som daglig leder av stasjonen
besvarer skjemaet.
Skjemaet er basert på tidligere Shell-undersøkelser. Det skulle derfor ikke by på
problemer for deg å besvare spørsmålene ved i hovedsak bare å sette et kryss i ruten
for det alternativ som passer best. De data som det spørres om her bør være svært lett
tilgjengelig. Antakeligvis vil det ta ca. en halv time å besvare hele skjemaet.
Det ville være fint om du kunne sende meg svaret tilbake i den ferdig frankerte
konvolutten innen 22 juni 1990. Dersom du ønsker flere opplysninger vedrørende
studien er jeg tilgjengelig på tlf. (02) 10 68 25 (privat) eller (02) 47 05 00 (NIM).
På forhånd hjertelig takk.
Vennlig hilsen
Arne Nygaard,
Prosjektleder
